Maternal communicative functions and mind-mindedness at 16 months as predictors of children’s internal and non-internal language at 20 months

The effects of Communicative functions and Mind-Mindedness on children’s language development have been typically investigated in separate studies. The present longitudinal research was therefore designed to yield new insight into the simultaneous impact of these two dimensions of maternal responsiveness on the acquisition of expressive language skills in a sample of 25 mother-child dyads. The frequencies of five communicative functions (Tutorial, Didactic, Conversational, Control and Asynchronous) and two types of mind-related comments (attuned vs. non-attuned) were assessed from a 15-min play session at 16 months. Children’s expressive language was examined at both 16 months (number of word types and tokens produced, and number of words attributed to the child in the Questionnaire for Communication and Early Language development) and 20 months (number of internal and non-internal words attributed to the child in the Italian version of the Mac Arthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory). The main finding was that mothers’ use of attuned mind-related comments at 16 months predicted internal state language at 20 months, above and beyond the effects of CFs and children’s linguistic ability at 16 months; in addition, mothers’ Tutorial function at 16 months marginally predicted non-internal state language at 20 months, after controlling for MM and children’s linguistic ability at 16 months. These results suggest that different expressions of maternal responsiveness influence distinct aspects of children’s expressive language in the second year of life, although the effects of MM appear to be more robust.     

How a crisis mindset activates implicit knowledge and brings it into awareness: The role of attentional switch cost

In this study, we relied on the attentional switch cost to ascertain whether a crisis mindset can activate and momentarily bring related implicit knowledge into awareness. We found that the attentional switch cost was higher in a crisis mindset condition than in a common mindset condition in which non-crisis-related stimuli were being attended to (Experiment 1). However, the attentional switch cost was lower in the crisis mindset condition when crisis-related stimuli were being attended to (Experiment 2A), and the reduced cost was not attributable to the complexity of the stimuli (Experiment 2B). A link emerged in the crisis mindset condition between the attentional switch cost and related implicit knowledge (Experiment 3A and 3B). Potential confounding factors were adequately controlled (see the Appendix). In conclusion, the results offer insight into the pivotal role of a crisis mindset. This finding delineates an alternative pathway in which implicit knowledge can be activated and brought into working memory once an event is perceived and interpreted as a crisis.     

Simulation and multi‐attribute utility modelling of life cycle profit

Investments on capital goods are assessed with respect to the life cycle profit as well as the economic lifetime of the investment. The outcome of an investment with respect to these economic criteria is generally non‐deterministic. An assessment of different investment options thus requires probabilistic modelling to explicitly account for the uncertainties. A process for the assessment of life cycle profit and the evaluation of the adequacy of the assessment is developed. The primary goal of the assessment process is to aid the decision‐maker in structuring and quantifying investment decision problems characterized by multiple criteria and uncertainty. The adequacy of the assessment process can be evaluated by probabilistic criteria indicating the degree of uncertainty in the assessment. Bayesian inference is used to re‐evaluate the initial assessment, as evidence of the system performance becomes available. Thus authentication of contracts of guarantee is supported. Numerical examples are given to demonstrate features of the described life cycle profit assessment process. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Good conversations: Grounding,convergence, and richness

We apply three communication theories (the collaborative theory of language use, communication accommodation theory, and media richness theory) to aspects of conversational structure (openings, closings) and communicative setting (audiovisual, written) in order to make predictions about how people will feel about conversational interactions. We distinguish between two sources of information that interlocutors use to evaluate conversations: conversational outcomes and subjective conversational experience. We propose that positive subjective conversational experience comes about when interlocutors reach common ground with one another and do so with the least required effort possible (collaborative theory of language use), converge on their language use and communicative behaviors (communication accommodation theory), and select the appropriate medium for their conversation to take place (media richness theory). This positive subjective conversational experience is an important component of good conversations.     

The effects of visual feedback on hemispheric alpha asymmetries and reported processing strategies: a single-subject experimental design

A double reversal single-subject experimental design was used to study the effects of visual feedback on the hemispheric alpha asymmetries of a male subject during a linguistic task. Results indicated that the subject demonstrated flexibility in hemispheric alpha and corresponding processing strategies employed when an alpha biofeedback procedure was used. These results provide further support for the notion that right and left hemispheric activation is associated with different, yet compatible, cognitive strategies and that both can be manipulated under conditions of feedback.     

The multimodality of infant's rhythmic movements as a modulator of the interaction with their caregivers

Children’s rhythmic movements during the first year of life possess a meaningful predictive validity for later communicative development. However, their role within adult-child interactions is still underexplored. In this study, we examined whether children’s rhythmic movements were significantly responded by adults and the role of multimodality and object use in this process. We observed 22 dyads of 9-month-olds and their parents in natural play interactions. Infants’ multimodal rhythmic movements increased the probability of adult responding. Adults offered different types of responses and significantly followed the child’s focus of attention. These dynamics could support communicative development by promoting joint attention frameworks.     

额叶与非额叶脑肿瘤患者分心记忆和符号数字作业的比较研究

本文以95例额叶、颞叶和顶枕叶脑肿瘤患者为被试,探讨了脑肿瘤部位同分心记忆和符号数字的关系。结果表明,额叶患者的故事意义分的分心消耗值显著高于正常人,其词的分心回忆和分心消耗值显著差于颞叶组,表明额叶在分心作业中较颞叶参与较多。右顶叶也有涉及分心注意较多的趋势,提示大脑前部可能与分心注意关系较密切。“符号数字”作业中,则“写”的作业有颞叶组好于额叶组,“说”的作业颞叶组好于顶枕组的趋势。     

Inaction inertia, the sunk cost effect, and handedness: Avoiding the losses of past decisions

Strength of handedness, or the degree to which an individual prefers to use a single hand to perform various tasks, is a neurological marker for brain organization and has been shown to be linked to episodic memory, attribute framing, and anchoring, as well as other domains and tasks. The present work explores the relationship of handedness to both inaction inertia (the inclination to resist an action after previously bypassing a similar action) as well as to the sunk cost effect (the tendency to continue to engage in a behavior after an initial investment of time or money has been made). In Experiment 1, mixed-handers displayed a larger inaction inertia effect than strong-handers. In Experiment 2, they displayed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the sunk cost finding into a different domain and explored how mixed- and strong-handers react to additional information designed to increase the comparative advantage of terminating, rather than continuing, a failed project. Overall, we found that mixed-handers were more likely to show inertia effects because of an increased aversion to losses. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that, when provided with additional information that made it clear that continuing a project would be a greater loss than terminating it, mixed-handers no longer showed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers, highlighting the importance of carefully considering exactly how sunk cost scenarios are worded and providing additional information on how mixed- and strong-handers differ in belief updating.     

眼跳发起位置对预视效应的影响

本文试图用实验的方法，通过调整目标词在句子中的位置，操纵目标词上注视点的眼跳发起位置，考察该变量对预视效应的影响。主要结果发现，和目标词上注视点的眼跳发起距离近的条件相比，眼跳发起距离远时凝视时间和回视路径时间的预视效应更大；但对数据的进一步分析表明这是一种阻碍效应。虽然“预视效益”这个词常用来代表预视加工，它实质包含了预视促进和阻碍两种不同的加工。本研究的结果有助于大家理解这两种不同性质的加工及其可能的影响因素。     

Blind to Bias? Young Children Do Not Anticipate that Sunk Costs Lead to Irrational Choices

Young children anticipate that others act rationally in light of their beliefs and desires, and environmental constraints. However, little is known about whether children anticipate others’ irrational choices. We investigated young children's ability to predict that sunk costs can lead to irrational choices. Across four experiments, 5- to 6-year-olds (total N = 185) and adults (total N = 117) judged which of two identical objects an agent would keep, one obtained at a high cost or one obtained at a low cost. In Experiment 1, adults predicted that the agent would choose the high-cost object over the low-cost one, whereas children responded at chance. Experiment 2 replicated these findings in children, but also included another condition which showed they were sensitive to future costs. They predicted that an agent would be more likely to seek out a low-cost item than a high-cost item. Experiments 3 and 4 then found that children do not anticipate the sunk cost bias in first person scenarios, or in interpersonal sunk cost scenarios, where costs are sunk by others. Taken together, our findings suggest that young children may struggle to understand and predict irrational behavior. The findings also reveal an asymmetry between how they consider sunk costs and future costs in understanding actions. We propose that this asymmetry might arise because children do not consider sunk costs as wasted.