Power of the desired self: Influence of induced perceptions of the self on reasoning

This research shows that the motivation to posses a desired characteristic (or to avoid an undesired one) results in self-perceptions that guide people’s use of base rate in the Lawyer–Engineer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In four studies, participants induced to believe (or recall, Exp. 2) that a rational cognitive style is success-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style failure-conducive) subsequently viewed themselves as more rational and relied more on base rate in their probability estimates than those induced to believe that a rational cognitive style is failure-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style success-conducive). These findings show that the desired self had an influence on reasoning in the self-unrelated lawyer–engineer task, since the use of base rates was mediated by changes in participants’ perceptions of their own rationality. These findings therefore show that the desired self, through the working self-concept that it entails, constitutes another factor influencing people’s use of distinct modes of reasoning.     

Intuition, reason, and metacognition

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.     

Mental abilities and school achievement: A test of a mediation hypothesis

This study analyzes the interplay of four cognitive abilities - reasoning, divergent thinking, mental speed, and short-term memory - and their impact on academic achievement in school in a sample of adolescents in grades seven to 10 (N = 1135). Based on information processing approaches to intelligence, we tested a mediation hypothesis, which states that the complex cognitive abilities of reasoning and divergent thinking mediate the influence of the basic cognitive abilities of mental speed and short-term memory on achievement. We administered a comprehensive test battery and analyzed the data through structural equation modeling while controlling for the cluster structure of the data. Our findings support the notion that mental speed and short-term memory, as ability factors reflecting basic cognitive processes, exert an indirect influence on academic achievement by affecting reasoning and divergent thinking (total indirect effects: β = .22 and .24, respectively). Short-term memory also directly affects achievement (β = .22).     

The interrelationship between speeded and unspeeded divergent thinking and reasoning, and the role of mental speed

The relationship between intelligence and creativity is still subject to substantial debate in the research literature. In the present study, we focused on core dimensions of both constructs, that is divergent thinking and reasoning. We hypothesized their relationship to depend both on the speededness of test tasks and on the subject's mental speed, positing that with increasing speededness of the tasks, mental speed would have a stronger impact on task outcomes. We disentangled the effects of task speededness and mental speed experimentally, testing 261 participants (mean age 14.48 years) with 12 divergent thinking and 12 reasoning tasks, 6 of each under power conditions, 6 time-constrained. In addition, we assessed mental speed with 6 tasks. We analyzed the data through structural equation modeling. Results confirmed our expectations: test speededness contributed significantly to mental speed variance in divergent thinking task performance. Divergent thinking assessed under time constraints was fully explained by divergent thinking assessed under power conditions and by mental speed. Divergent thinking and reasoning showed no correlation when controlling for mental speed. Our findings suggest that the correlations between divergent thinking and reasoning are mainly the result of variance both constructs share with mental speed, and that timed versus untimed test-taking plays a minor role.     

Expertise in complex decision making: the role of search in chess 70 years after de Groot

One of the most influential studies in all expertise research is de Groot's (1946) study of chess players, which suggested that pattern recognition, rather than search, was the key determinant of expertise. Many changes have occurred in the chess world since de Groot's study, leading some authors to argue that the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise have also changed. We decided to replicate de Groot's study to empirically test these claims and to examine whether the trends in the data have changed over time. Six Grandmasters, five International Masters, six Experts, and five Class A players completed the think-aloud procedure for two chess positions. Findings indicate that Grandmasters and International Masters search more quickly than Experts and Class A players, and that both groups today search substantially faster than players in previous studies. The findings, however, support de Groot's overall conclusions and are consistent with predictions made by pattern recognition models.     

One’s own reasoning

Abstract

Responding to Cappelen and Dever’s claim that there is no distinctive role for perspectivality in epistemology, I argue that facts about the outcomes of one’s own reasoning processes may have a different evidential significance than facts about the outcomes of others’.     

小学生领导力萌芽与发展的实证研究

摘 要 本研究以四年级学生为研究对象,通过话语分析,探究了八个无领导小组八次讨论过程中领导力的萌芽状况及其影响因素。结果发现,小学生可自发出现领导力行为,但只有两个小组会涌现出明显的领导者,并表现为独立领导和协同领导两种不同模式。对学生和教师行为的综合分析显示,学生领导力的形成与教师示范、反馈及同伴互动存在密切关系,这对学生领导力的培养具有重要的启示意义。     

Understanding dynamic and static displays: using images to reason dynamically

We examined expert meteorologists as they created a weather forecast while working in a naturalistic environment. We examined the type of external representation they chose to examine (a static image, a sequence of static images, or a dynamic display) and the kind of information they extracted from those representations (static or dynamic). We found that even though weather is an extremely dynamic domain, expert meteorologists examined very few animations, examining primarily static images. However, meteorologists did extract large amounts of dynamic information from these static images, suggesting that they reasoned about the weather by mentally animating the static images rather than letting the software do it for them.     

Information becomes evidence when an explanation can incorporate it into a causal framework

Recognizing information as evidence is central to the development of scientific reasoning. When does information about an event come to be treated as evidence relevant to explaining the event? We asked whether this was increasingly likely to happen when an explanation becomes available that can incorporate both the event and the information into a single causal framework. In three studies, we presented participants with events for which there were two possible and plausible explanations (a baseline and one of two alternative explanations), as well as with two pieces of background information. While all explanations could account for the event, only one alternative explanation (the “target” explanation) could incorporate both the event and the background information into a single causal framework. The results indicated that information is more likely to be seen as evidentially relevant to an event when there is an explanation available that can accommodate both the event and the information into a single casual framework than when such an explanation is lacking. Furthermore, the presence of this information renders the target alternative increasingly plausible. That is, it is the interdependence of explanation or theory and evidence that allows us to realize that some information is likely to be evidential. However, for this to happen, the relation between explanation and information must be made salient, either by explicitly asking about it (as we did in Study 1) or by fleshing out the target explanation (as we did in Study 3).