The One-to-One Constraint in Analogical Mapping and Inference

Theories of analogical reasoning have assumed that a 1-to-1 constraint discourages reasoners from mapping a single element in 1 analog to multiple elements in another. Empirical evidence suggests that reasoners sometimes appear to violate the one-to-one constraint when asked to generate mappings, yet virtually never violate it when asked to generate analogical inferences. However, few studies have examined analogical inferences based on nonisomorphic analogs, and their conclusions are suspect due to methodological problems. We sought to elicit mixed inferences that could result from combining information from 2 possible mappings. Participants generated 2-to-1 correspondences when asked for explicit mappings, but did not produce mixed inferences. Multiple correspondences appear to arise from multiple isomorphic mappings, rather than from a single homomorphic mapping.     

Acquiring new spatial intuitions: learning to reason about rotations

There are certain simple rotations of objects that most people cannot reason about accurately. Reliable gaps in the understanding of a fundamental physical domain raise the question of how learning to reason in that domain might proceed. Using virtual reality techniques, this project investigated the nature of learning to reason across the domain of simple rotations. Learning consisted of the acquisition of spatial intuitions: there was encoding of useful spatiotemporal information in specific problem types and a gradual accumulation of this understanding across the domain. This pattern of learning through the accumulation of intuitions is especially interesting for rotational motion, in which an elegant domain-wide kinematics is available to support insightful learning. Individual ability to reason about rotations correlated highly with mastery motivation, skill in fluid reasoning, and skill in reasoning about spatial transformations. Thus, general cognitive advantages aided the understanding of individual rotations without guaranteeing immediate generalization across the domain.     

Thirsty for H2O? Multiple essences and psychological essentialism

Within psychology, essentialism has often been understood as the imputation of a hidden natural underpinning that determines the identity and membership of a given category. This naturalistic understanding has failed to address the varied and multi-faceted manner in which essentialist beliefs function on a cognitive level. Specifically, such an understanding does not account for essentialist beliefs that are related to functional categories derivative of a particular individual's present needs or social context. A parsimonious theory of psychological essentialism that accounts for beliefs in essences with respect to all categories, including those believed to be “natural”, is found in the writing of James (The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, Dover, New York, NY, 1890/1950). After accounting for the manner in which James’ theory addresses the limitations of the naturalistic view and extends it, it is recommended that his theory be incorporated into future empirical study of psychological essentialism.     

Prolegomena to Concise Theories of Action

A new methodology for developing theories of action has recently emerged which provides means for formally evaluating the correctness of such theories. Yet, for a theory of action to qualify as a solution to the frame problem, not only does it need to produce correct inferences, but moreover, it needs to derive these inferences from a concise representation of the domain at hand. The new methodology however offers no means for assessing conciseness. Such a formal account of conciseness is developed in this paper. Combined with the existing criterion for correctness, our account of conciseness offers a framework where proposed solutions to the frame problem can be formally evaluated.     

Disjunctive logic programming with types and objects: The DLV system

The paper presents DLV⁺, a Disjunctive Logic Programming (DLP) system with object-oriented constructs, including classes, objects, (multiple) inheritance, and types. DLV⁺ is built on top of DLV (a state-of-the art DLP system), and provides a graphical user interface that allows one to specify, update, browse, query, and reason on knowledge bases. Two strong points of the system are the powerful type-checking mechanism and the advanced interface for visual querying.DLV⁺ is already used for the development of knowledge based applications for information extraction and text classification.     

Jumping to conclusions and the continuum of delusional beliefs

The present study examined the jumping to conclusions reasoning bias across the continuum of delusional ideation by investigating individuals with active delusions, delusion prone individuals, and non-delusion prone individuals. Neutral and highly self-referent probabilistic reasoning tasks were employed. Results indicated that individuals with delusions gathered significantly less information than delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on both the neutral and self-referent tasks, (p<.001). Individuals with delusions made less accurate decisions than the delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on both tasks (p<.001), yet were more confident about their decisions than were delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on the self-referent task (p=.002). Those with delusions and those who were delusion prone reported higher confidence in their performance on the self-referent task than they did the neutral task (p=.02), indicating that high self-reference impacted information processing for individuals in both of these groups. The results are discussed in relation to previous research in the area of probabilistic reasoning and delusions.     

Traditional difference-score analyses of reasoning are flawed

Studies of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning have relied on three traditional difference score measures: the logic index, belief index, and interaction index. Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010, 2011) argued that the interaction index incorrectly assumes a linear receiver operating characteristic (ROC). Here, all three measures are addressed. Simulations indicated that traditional analyses of reasoning experiments are likely to lead to incorrect conclusions. Two new experiments examined the role of instructional manipulations on the belief bias effect. The form of the ROCs violated assumptions of traditional measures. In comparison, signal detection theory (SDT) model-based analyses were a better match for the form of the ROCs, and implied that belief bias and instructional manipulations are predominantly response bias effects. Finally, reanalyses of previous studies of conditional reasoning also showed non-linear ROCs, violating assumptions of traditional analyses. Overall, reasoning research using traditional measures is at risk of drawing incorrect conclusions.     

Procedimientos analítico-racionales en la adaptación de tests. Adaptación al español de la batería de pruebas de razonamiento

Adapting a test between cultures or languages requires taking into account legal, linguistic, metric, and use-related considerations. Significantly more attention has been paid to the methodological aspects involved in the study of metric equivalence than to judgmental-analytical procedures prior to the empirical confirmation stage. However, considering the latter is crucial in the adaptation process. Along these lines, this paper seeks to describe and focus on the relevance of the previous stages, thereby offering a systematization process that comprises ten sections. This approach contributes to ensuring the construction of a test adapted and equivalent in as much as possible to the original. This process is exemplified by means of a Spanish language adaptation of a cognitive test originally designed in Portuguese for the Portuguese population, the Reasoning Test Battery.     

Useful lies: The twisted rationality of denial

He who increases knowledge increases sorrow.

Ecclesiastes 1:18

The truth will set you free.

John 8:32

Denial, or the habit of treating a real problem as if it were a nonissue, has both rational and irrational features. The interplay between these is best captured by a utilitarian-rationalist framework stretched to its limits. When in denial, people follow what they feel to be in their best interest by minimizing the psychosocial cost of acknowledging their problems. At its core, denial is thus based on a self-interested rationale of pain avoidance and harm minimization. Depending on the characteristics of the issue at hand, some of the effects are deeply ironic. I demonstrate this by starting from the simplest and most beneficial form of denial, before moving on to cases that are more complex and harmful. I also show how people can be liberated from denial when the practice has become counterproductive. Most of the mystery surrounding denial disappears when we accept that it is premised on a twisted kind of rationality.