Anthropocentric by Default? Attribution of Familiar and Novel Properties to Living Things

Humans naturally and effortlessly use a set of cognitive tools to reason about biological entities and phenomena. Two such tools, essentialist thinking and teleological thinking, appear to be early developmental cognitive defaults, used extensively in childhood and under limited circumstances in adulthood, but prone to reemerge under time pressure or cognitive load. We examine the nature of another such tool: anthropocentric thinking. In four experiments, we examined patterns of property attribution to a wide range of living and non‐living objects, manipulating time pressure, response type, and property (either novel or familiar) in a total of 471 participants. Results showed no tendency toward increased similarity‐based attribution patterns indicative of anthropocentric thinking under time pressure. However, anthropocentric thinking was consistently observed for unfamiliar properties. These findings suggest that anthropocentric thinking is not a developmentally persistent cognitive default, but rather a cognitive strategy deliberately employed in situations of uncertainty.     

Cognitive functioning in delusions: a longitudinal analysis

BACKGROUND: This study explored the longitudinal course of the relationship between delusions and different aspects of cognitive functioning. METHODS: Deluded patients were compared to psychiatric and non-clinical controls on three tasks: negative priming, a probabilistic judgement task (the 'beads' task), and the pragmatic inference task (PIT). All groups were tested at two time points, once when actively symptomatic, and once when in remission. RESULTS: Deluded individuals exhibited a 'jump-to-conclusions' (JTC) reasoning bias: i.e., they made decisions on the basis of limited evidence and were more likely to revise their estimates when faced with disconfirmatory evidence. This JTC bias remained stable over time, although probability judgments seemed to normalise in remission. No deficits in cognitive inhibition were found on negative priming. The deluded group displayed an excessive self-focus on the PIT at both time points, but did not show a depressive attributional style. Only a small sub-sample, characterised by the "bad-me" type of paranoia [Trower & Chadwick, 1995 Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 2, 263-278.], demonstrated depressive schemas when symptomatic, but no longer did so when remitted. Few relationships were found between tasks, suggesting that different areas of functioning are relatively independent. The only measures associated with delusion symptom scores were from the 'beads' task. CONCLUSIONS: Overall these findings suggest that the JTC bias is a stable factor associated with delusional thinking, while the depressive attributional style characteristic of a small sub-sample of paranoid patients fluctuates with delusional course.     

Delusions and decision-making style: use of the Need for Closure Scale

Clinicians and researchers have suggested that rapidity in belief formation, due to having a high 'need for closure' (NFC), may contribute to the acceptance of delusional explanations. The aim of the study is to determine whether NFC has such a direct link with delusions. A secondary aim is to examine if NFC is related to the delusion-associated reasoning process of 'jumping to conclusions'. One hundred and eighty-seven patients with psychosis, recruited for a treatment trial of psychological therapy (the PRP trial), completed the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS), symptom measures, and probabilistic reasoning tasks. The NFCS was considered in terms of its two dimensions: a desire for simple structure and a preference for quick, decisive answers. The individuals with psychosis reported being poor at making quick, decisive answers but required a greater need for simple structure. NFC was associated with levels of anxiety and depression. There were weak links between NFC and both positive and negative symptoms of psychosis, but these were explained by differences in affect. NFCS scores were unrelated to jumping to conclusions. Contrary to the argument that NFC is directly linked to delusions, individuals with delusions actually perceive themselves as indecisive. There was no evidence that NFC-at least as assessed by the NFCS-could be a proximal cause of delusions. Any potential effect on psychotic symptom presentation is indirect, mediated through affect. The use of the NFCS on its own in the study of psychotic symptoms cannot be recommended.     

Need for closure and anxiety in delusions: a longitudinal investigation in early psychosis

This study investigated the role of need for closure (NFC) and anxiety in delusions. The Need For Closure Scale (NFCS) and measures of trait and state anxiety were administered to an early psychosis group with current delusions, a clinical (generalised anxiety disorder--GAD) control group and a non-clinical control group. The battery of questionnaires was repeated at follow-up one year later. The NFCS did not meet criteria for a unidimensional scale and two sub-scales were removed from all further analyses. At baseline the deluded and GAD groups scored significantly higher on the reduced NFCS (NFCS-R) than the control group. Trait anxiety was related to NFCS-R in the GAD and non-clinical control groups, but not in the deluded group. At follow-up all groups scored significantly lower on the NFCS-R, perhaps suggesting a practice effect, although the two clinical groups continued to have higher scores than the non-clinical control group. The recovered and non-recovered deluded groups did not differ on the NFCS-R one year later, unlike in the GAD group where recovered participants had significantly lower scores than the non-recovered. Change scores on the NFCS-R and trait anxiety were correlated at trend level in the GAD and non-clinical control groups, but not in the deluded group. These findings suggest that whilst NFC and trait anxiety are related in non-psychotic groups, NFC may be implicated in the formation of delusions, independently of anxiety, in psychotic individuals.     

Scriptural Reasoning as a “Classic”: The Aesthetics of Interreligious Politics

Seeking to find a new way of meeting between Abrahamic traditions, Scriptural Reasoning has established a unique dynamic. This unique dynamic centres on meetings that are based on friendship rather than consensus, wisdom rather than propositional knowledge or binary thinking. Such virtues are not without problems. This article considers one problem: how the results of Scriptural Reasoning, and the insights gleaned from the meetings, can be passed on to the Abrahamic communities and the wider public. Addressing this problematic, the article focuses on the aesthetics of Scriptural Reasoning and its performance. Whereas one method of extending its influence is to widen the practice into the civic sphere and draw more people into the meetings, this article proposes another approach that suggests that the meetings of scholars or “representatives” around their texts constitute a “classic”, which, through vicarious performance can affect the wider public. Further than this, the article outlines a kind of aesthetic politics of religions. Building upon the idea of aesthetic representation proposed in the political sphere by Frank Ankersmit, it is argued that interfaith movements such as Scriptural Reasoning might be presented as a form of political representation.     

A multitrait–multimethod study of assessment instruments for complex problem solving

Recently published studies on Complex Problem Solving (CPS) suggest that assessments of CPS using multiple complex systems are only moderately related to tests of classical cognitive abilities. Further, CPS assessments show incremental validity beyond tests of other cognitive abilities when predicting relevant outcomes. However, these empirical accounts have relied on single CPS assessment instruments. We do not know whether these findings will generalize to the construct level across different CPS assessment instruments. To answer this question, we tested a sample of N = 339 German university students who completed three CPS assessment instruments based on multiple complex systems (MicroDYN, the Genetics Lab, and MicroFIN) and the matrices subtest of the Intelligence Structure Test as measure of reasoning. Students further reported their school grades. Analyses including latent multitrait–multimethod models provided support for the conceptualization of CPS as a complex cognitive ability. Results indicated that different CPS assessment instruments showed sufficient convergent validity (with a consistency mostly between .50 and .60). In addition, we found evidence for the divergent validity of CPS from reasoning (reasoning predicted two CPS facets, knowledge and control, β_KNOW = .49 and β_CON = .53, respectively). In the prediction of academic achievement, CPS explained variance in natural science grades after we controlled for reasoning (β_CPS = .22), whereas social science grades were not predicted. Our findings suggest that the validity of CPS generalizes across different measurement instruments.     

Updating beliefs in light of uncertain evidence: Descriptive assessment of Jeffrey's rule

Jeffrey (1983) proposed a generalisation of conditioning as a means of updating probability distributions when new evidence drives no event to certainty. His rule requires the stability of certain conditional probabilities through time. We tested this assumption (“invariance”) from the psychological point of view. In Experiment 1 participants offered probability estimates for events in Jeffrey's candlelight example. Two further scenarios were investigated in Experiment 2, one in which invariance seems justified, the other in which it does not. Results were in rough conformity to Jeffrey's (1983) principle.     

Relating developments in children's counterfactual thinking and executive functions

The performance of 93 children aged 3 and 4 years on a battery of different counterfactual tasks was assessed. Three measures: short causal chains, location change counterfactual conditionals, and false syllogisms—but not a fourth, long causal chains—were correlated, even after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. Children's performance on our counterfactual thinking measure was predicted by receptive vocabulary ability and inhibitory control. The role that domain general executive functions may play in 3- to 4-year olds' counterfactual thinking development is discussed.     

Response demands and the recruitment of heuristic strategies in syllogistic reasoning

Two experiments investigated whether dealing with a homogeneous subset of syllogisms with time-constrained responses encouraged participants to develop and use heuristics for abstract (Experiment 1) and thematic (Experiment 2) syllogisms. An atmosphere-based heuristic accounted for most responses with both abstract and thematic syllogisms. With thematic syllogisms, a weaker effect of a belief heuristic was also observed, mainly where the correct response was inconsistent with the atmosphere of the premises. Analytic processes appear to have played little role in the time-constrained condition, whereas their involvement increased in a self-paced, unconstrained condition. From a dual-process perspective, the results further specify how task demands affect the recruitment of heuristic and analytic systems of reasoning. Because the syllogisms and experimental procedure were the same as those used in a previous neuroimaging study by Goel, Buchel, Frith, and Dolan (2000), the result also deepen our understanding of the cognitive processes investigated by that study.     

Temporal distinctiveness and repetition benefits in task switching: Disentangling stimulus-related and response-related contributions

Despite the popularity of the Wason selection task in the psychology of reasoning, doubt remains as to whether card choices actually reflect a process of reasoning. One view is that while participants reason about the cards and their hidden sides—as indicated by protocol analysis—this reasoning merely confabulates explanations for cards that were preconsciously cued. This hypothesis has apparently been supported by studies that show that participants predominantly inspect cards which they end up selecting. In this paper, we reanalyse the data of one such study, which used eye-movement tracking to record card inspection times (Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 2003). We show that while cards favoured by matching bias are inspected for roughly equal lengths of times, their selection rates are strongly affected by their logical status. These findings strongly support a two-stage account in which attention is necessary but not sufficient for card selections. Hence, reasoning does indeed affect participants' choices on this task.