Epistemic presentism

Commonsense functionalism is taken to entail a version of the extended mind thesis, according to which one’s dispositional beliefs may be partly constituted by artifacts. As several opponents of the extended mind thesis have objected, claiming so can generate a cognitive/knowledge bloat, according to which we may count as knowing the contents of trusted websites, even before looking them up (!). One way to retain commonsense functionalism, but avoid the ensuing “cognitive/knowledge bloat” worry is to introduce epistemic presentism—the view that there are no dispositional beliefs and that we can only believe, and thereby know, things in the present. Independently of the above problem, epistemic presentism can be further motivated by shedding light on two central epistemological questions: (1) how to understand the distinction between doxastic and propositional justification and (2) how to interpret the closure principle. The view also aligns with strong intuitions about what we may take ourselves to know, what the relation between action and belief is, and what may count as part of our minds.     

An illumination robust road detection method based on color names and geometric information

Road detection is a basic task in automated driving field. In existing methods, detecting lane marks is a frequently used approach. However, road marks could fade with time, or even do not exist on some roads. Considering these factors, road region segmentation from background is much more reliable. One of the difficulties in this area is dealing with variant illumination conditions. Existing methods make some progress on reducing the influence of shadows, but they are still not satisfactory. Taking this into account, we put forward an improved shadow-free road detecting method based on color names, whose performance exceeds the existing methods. In addition, to further improving our performance on application, we adopt vanishing point detection and fuse two confidence maps to reduce the interference of sidewalk regions. Experiments on KITTI dataset depict that the proposed method is efficient. Moreover, the improved road detection method has low-complexity, which meets the requirement of practical usage.     

Association between synesthetic colors and sensitivity to physical colors changed by type of synesthetic experience in grapheme-color synesthesia

Grapheme-color synesthesia is a condition in which visual perception of letters induces simultaneous perception of a specific color. Previous studies indicate that grapheme-color synesthetes are more sensitive to physical colors than non-synesthetes. Synesthetic colors are found to be concentrated in multiple regions of the color space, forming “synesthetic color clusters”. The present study investigated whether color sensitivity corresponding to synesthetic color clusters (clustered colors) is higher than color sensitivity that does not correspond to synesthetic color clusters (non-clustered colors). However, we found no difference in the color sensitivity for clustered and non-clustered colors. We also investigated whether the color sensitivity is dependent on the synesthetic experience (associators and projectors). We found that the greater the tendency toward associator characteristics, the greater the sensitivity for clustered colors compared to that for non-clustered colors. Our findings suggest an association between synesthetic colors and physical color sensitivity that is modulated by synesthetic experience.     

Searles Kritik am Funktionalismus — Eine Untersuchung des Chinesischzimmers

Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's Gedankenexperiment results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are two ways of not understanding. According to one of these ways a person (Searle's homunculus) does not understand something without knowing that s/he does not understand. While in the other mode the person knows that s/he doesn't understand. In the first case the inference from facts about the homunculus to facts about the computer is not valid whereas in the second case one would attribute mental states to the computer. Thereby Searle's claim turns out to be unfounded.     

Measuring Graded Membership: The Case of Color

This paper considers Kamp and Partee's account of graded membership within a conceptual spaces framework and puts the account to the test in the domain of colors. Three experiments are reported that are meant to determine, on the one hand, the regions in color space where the typical instances of blue and green are located and, on the other hand, the degrees of blueness/greenness of various shades in the blue–green region as judged by human observers. From the locations of the typical blue and typical green regions in conjunction with Kamp and Partee's account follow degrees of blueness/greenness for the color shades we are interested in. These predicted degrees are compared with the judged degrees, as obtained in the experiments. The results of the comparison support the account of graded membership at issue.     

The event of color

When objects are illuminated, the light they reflect does not simply bounce off their surface. Rather, that light is entirely reabsorbed and then reemitted, as the result of a complex microphysical event near the surface of the object. If we are to be physicalists regarding color, then we should analyze colors in terms of that event, just as we analyze heat in terms of molecular motion, and sound in terms of vibrations. On this account, colors are not standing properties of objects, but events, or (more cautiously) properties associated with events. Accordingly, objects in the dark are no more colored than a turned-off stove is hot. Such an account requires rejecting some of what folk ordinarily say about color, but this is the most coherent version of color physicalism.

Nature versus nurture: The simple contrast

We respond to the commentary of Franklin, Wright, and Davies (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology,102, 239-245 [2009]) by returning to the simple contrast between nature and nurture. We find no evidence from the toddler data that makes us revise our ideas that color categories are learned and never innate.     

Rating the similarity of simple perceptual stimuli: asymmetries induced by manipulating exposure frequency.

When judging the similarity of two stimuli, people's ratings often differ depending on the order in which the comparison is presented (A vs. B or B vs. A). Such directional asymmetries have typically been demonstrated using complex concepts that have a large number of semantic features and a standard explanation is that different sets of features are emphasized depending on the direction of the comparison. In this study, we show that directional asymmetries in the similarity of simple perceptual stimuli can be predictably manipulated merely by presenting each member of a pair with different frequency. Participants rated the similarity of color patches before and after performing an irrelevant training task in which a subset of colors was presented ten times more frequently than others. The similarity ratings after training were significantly more asymmetric than the ratings before training. We discuss the implications of these findings for models of similarity judgment and propose a computationally explicit explanation based on asymmetries in representational stability.     

Seventy Years in Philosophy of Mind: An Overview,with Emphasis on the Issue of Mental Causation

This paper is an opinionated overview of major developments in philosophy of mind during the past seventy years, with emphasis on the issue of mental causation. Its most prominent positions all embrace a broadly “naturalistic” or “materialistic” conception of human beings, and of mentality and its place in nature. Included in this paper are discussions of analytical behaviorism, the psychophysical identity theory, functionalism, multiple realizability and strong multiple realizability, supervenience, the causal exclusion problem, phenomenal mental states, wide content, contextualist causal compatibilism, agentive phenomenology, and the agent-exclusion problem.