Increasing on-task behavior in every student in a second-grade classroom during transitions: Validating the color wheel system

A single-case (B-C-B-C) experimental design was used to evaluate the effects of the Color Wheel classroom management system (CWS) on on-task (OT) behavior in an intact, general-education, 2nd-grade classroom during transitions. The CWS included three sets of rules, posted cues to indicate the rules students are expected to be following at that time, and transition procedures for altering activities and rules. Class-wide data analysis showed large, immediate, and sustained increases in OT behavior when the CWS was applied, with OT behavior returning to baseline levels when typical classroom management (TCM) procedures were reinstated. Each student's average phase data also showed increases in OT behavior when the CWS was applied and re-applied, and showed reductions when the CWS was withdrawn. Discussion focuses on evaluating the internal, external, and contextual validity of class-wide remediation and prevention procedures.     

The cognitive implications of asymmetric color generalization in honeybees

Generalization occurs when a conditioned response formed to one stimulus is also elicited by other stimuli which have not been used in the course of conditioning. Here, we studied color generalization in honeybees Apis mellifera trained to two rewarded colors, S₁+ and S₂+. After training, bees were tested with non-rewarded novel stimuli, which lay between the trained stimuli in a honeybee color space (Int) or outside the range defined by the trained stimuli (E ₁ and E ₂). We analyzed whether bees interpolated their choice to Int and/or extrapolated it to E ₁ and E ₂. We compared the performances of the group trained with S₁+ and S₂+ to those of control groups trained only with S₁+ or S₂+. Bees trained with S₁+ and S₂+ responded similarly and highly to all test stimuli. These results do not allow discerning between generalization models based on the presence of interpolation and/or extrapolation. Nevertheless, bee’s performance was consistent with a linear summation of the two generalization gradients generated by S₁+ and S₂+, respectively. These gradients were asymmetric because control bees responded to the test stimuli as if these belonged to different similarity classes in spite of the fact that they had similar perceptual distances separating them. Stimuli treated as similar were located in the same half of the color spaces, whereas stimuli treated as different were located in opposite halves. Our results suggest that color categories could exist in honeybees and may underlie the performance of the control groups. Under this assumption, color categories would be also present in simpler nervous systems, and would not require factors such as language to be expressed.     

Categorical Perception Beyond the Basic Level: The Case of Warm and Cool Colors

Categories can affect our perception of the world, rendering between‐category differences more salient than within‐category ones. Across many studies, such categorical perception (CP) has been observed for the basic‐level categories of one's native language. Other research points to categorical distinctions beyond the basic level, but it does not demonstrate CP for such distinctions. Here we provide such a demonstration. Specifically, we show CP in English speakers for the non‐basic distinction between “warm” and “cool” colors, claimed to represent the earliest stage of color lexicon evolution. Notably, the advantage for discriminating colors that straddle the warm–cool boundary was restricted to the right visual field—the same behavioral signature previously observed for basic‐level categories. This pattern held in a replication experiment with increased power. Our findings show that categorical distinctions beyond the basic‐level repertoire of one's native language are psychologically salient and may be spontaneously accessed during normal perceptual processing.     

Seasonal Variations in Color Preference

We investigated how color preferences vary according to season and whether those changes could be explained by the ecological valence theory (EVT). To do so, we assessed the same participants’ preferences for the same colors during fall, winter, spring, and summer in the northeastern United States, where there are large seasonal changes in environmental colors. Seasonal differences were most pronounced between fall and the other three seasons. Participants liked fall‐associated dark‐warm colors—for example, dark‐red, dark‐orange (brown), dark‐yellow (olive), and dark‐chartreuse—more during fall than other seasons. The EVT could explain these changes with a modified version of Palmer and Schloss’ (2010) weighted affective valence estimate (WAVE) procedure that added an activation term to the WAVE equation. The results indicate that color preferences change according to season, as color‐associated objects become more/less activated in the observer. These seasonal changes in color preferences could not be characterized by overall shifts in weights along cone‐contrast axes.     

汉语句子理解中物体隐含颜色心理模拟的ERPs研究

当前研究采用事件相关电位(ERPs)技术,同时沿用经典的句图匹配范式,考察句子理解中物体典型颜色与非典型颜色的心理加工过程在脑电活动上的反映。实验中被试先阅读句子再判断句子后呈现的图片物体是否在句子中出现过,句子中隐含的物体颜色或是关键物体的典型颜色或是非典型颜色。实验结果发现,典型颜色句子版本下句图不匹配条件比句图匹配条件引发了更大的N400效应;而非典型颜色句子版本下两者N400差异不显著。研究结果表明,人们在汉语句子理解过程中会实时对隐含的物体颜色信息进行心理模拟。并且,句子隐含物体颜色的典型性是造成匹配易化或不匹配易化的关键因素之一。     

The effect of color (red versus blue) on assimilation versus contrast in prime-to-behavior effects

This paper examines whether color can modify the way that primed constructs affect behavior. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that, compared to the color white, blue is more likely to lead to assimilative shifts in behavior, whereas red is more likely to lead to contrastive changes in behavior. In our experiment, previous findings were replicated in the white color condition: participants’ behavior assimilated to primed stereotypes of (un)intelligence and contrasted away from primed exemplars of (un)intelligence. However, in the blue color condition, participants’ behavior assimilated to the primed constructs, whereas in the red color condition, participants’ behavior contrasted away from the primed constructs, irrespective of whether the primed constructs were stereotypes or exemplars.     

“White” or “European American”? Self-identifying labels influence majority group members' interethnic attitudes

Multiculturalism (i.e., the recognition and celebration of cultural differences) has many potential benefits for society, including reduced prejudice among nonminorities and increased psychological well-being among ethnic minorities. Yet nonminorities generally tend to resist multiculturalism more than do minorities and believe that it is irrelevant to them. Two studies were conducted to examine why and under what conditions this is the case. In both studies, nonminority participants were randomly assigned to mark their race/ethnicity as either “White” or “European American” on a demographic survey, before answering questions about their interethnic attitudes. Results demonstrated that nonminorities primed to think of themselves as White (versus European American) were subsequently less supportive of multiculturalism and more racially prejudiced, due to decreases in identification with ethnic minorities. Implications for how to improve nonminorities' attitudes toward multiculturalism are discussed.     

The multiple realization book

In this review of Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book I look at the positive account, Modest Identity Theory, that Polger and Shapiro advance. In §2 of this review, I outline P&S’s arguments against multiple realization and summarize the view they defend, Modest Identity Theory. In §3, I consider what consequences the adoption of Modest Identity Theory might have on the ontology of psychological or mental kinds. In particular, I highlight the ontological pluralism and anti-reductionism that Polger and Shapiro endorse. Modest Identity Theory tolerates multiple taxonomies of psychological kinds, which represents an important departure from earlier versions of Identity Theory. I conclude in §4 by arguing that the way Modest Identity Theory individuates psychological kinds very closely resembles the way that those kinds are individuated by functionalism. I argue that the causal properties individuative of psychological kinds can be used to group together distinct neuroanatomical characteristics. I illustrate this by describing research into the functional connectivity of the reading network. I conclude by emphasizing the value of using empirical evidence from neuroscience and cognitive science to inform the new pluralistic ontology of psychological and mental kinds with which Modest Identity Theory is compatible.     

Methodological functionalism and the description of natural systems

The primary way that explanations are constructed in cognitive psychology is by methodological functionalism: in short, functionally defined components are proposed in order to explain how inputs (i.e., stimuli from the environment) are turned into behavior. But despite its close association with cognitive psychology, methodological functionalism is a technique that can be used to describe any natural system. I look at how methodological functionalism has fared when used by other special sciences and what lessons can be learned from these cases. Three explanations of chemical and biological systems that were developed using methodological functionalism are examined: Willis’s (1684) explanation of fermentation, Farr’s (mid-1800s) explanation of cholera, and Mendel’s (mid-1800s) explanation of inheritance. The discovery of HIV in the early 1980s, an investigation that rejected methodological functionalism early on, is also discussed. The assessment of methodological functionalism is not positive. This technique has limitations. The implications for cognitive psychology are considered, and one conclusion is that cognitive psychology will eventually cease relying on methodological functionalism.     

Color naming universals: the case of Berinmo

Proponents of a self-identified 'relativist' view of cross-language color naming have confounded two questions: (1) Is color naming largely subject to local linguistic convention? and (2) Are cross-language color naming differences reflected in comparable differences in color cognition by their speakers? The 'relativist' position holds that the correct answer to both questions is Yes, based on data from the Berinmo language of Papua New Guinea. It is shown here that the Berinmo facts instead support a more complex view -- that cross-language color naming follows non-trivial universal tendencies, while cross-language color-naming differences do indeed correlate with differences in color cognition. The rhetoric of 'relativity' versus 'universalism' impedes understanding of cross-language color naming and cognition.