Piéron's Law holds during stroop conflict: insights into the architecture of decision making

Piéron's Law describes the relationship between stimulus intensity and reaction time. Previously (Stafford & Gurney, 2004), we have shown that Piéron's Law is a necessary consequence of rise-to-threshold decision making and thus will arise from optimal simple decision-making algorithms (e.g., Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006). Here, we manipulate the color saturation of a Stroop stimulus. Our results show that Piéron's Law holds for color intensity and color-naming reaction time, extending the domain of this law, in line with our suggestion of the generality of the processes that can give rise to Piéron's Law. In addition, we find that Stroop condition does not interact with the effect of color saturation; Stroop interference and facilitation remain constant at all levels of color saturation. An analysis demonstrates that this result cannot be accounted for by single-stage decision-making algorithms which combine all the evidence pertaining to a decision into a common metric. This shows that human decision making is not information-optimal and suggests that the generalization of current models of simple perceptual decision making to more complex decisions is not straightforward.     

Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action‐related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception‐related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action ( Bruno & Franz, 2009 ; Dassonville & Bala, 2004 ; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008 ; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008 ). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process ( Schenk & McIntosh, 2010 ). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action‐guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi‐conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.     

A priori causal laws

Sober and Elgin defend the claim that there are a priori causal laws in biology. Lange and Rosenberg take issue with this on Humean grounds, among others. I will argue that Sober and Elgin don’t go far enough – there are a priori causal laws in many sciences. Furthermore, I will argue that this thesis is compatible with a Humean metaphysics and an empiricist epistemology.     

颜色偏好的性别差异研究进展

颜色偏好是人在心理上所喜爱或偏好的颜色,性别是影响颜色偏好的重要因素之一。本文区分一般人群和特殊人群,结合不同的心理发展阶段,评述对抽象颜色和具体物色的偏好的性别差异研究进展,具体比较了打猎者-采摘者理论、视锥-对立对比成分理论、性别图式理论以及生态效价理论等,并且讨论分析了以往研究者在内容和理论解释等方面存在的不足。未来研究者应采用多元化的方法,深入探索颜色偏好性别差异的机制,期望整合得到解释力更强的理论观点。     

Multiple Realizability Intuitions and the Functionalist Conception of the Mind

A popular argument supporting functionalism has been what is commonly called the “multiple realizability” argument. One version of this argument uses thought experiments designed to show that minds could be composed of different types of material. This article offers a metaphilosophical analysis of this argument and shows that it fails to provide a strong case for functionalism. The multiple realizability argument is best understood as an inference‐to‐the‐best‐explanation argument, whereby a functionalist account of our mental concepts serves to explain our multiple realizability intuitions. I show that the argument is inadequate because alternative accounts of our mental concepts exist that provide equally plausible explanations for these intuitions. Moreover, in the case of our qualia concepts, a nonfunctionalist account explains several other intuitions that functionalism cannot explain. Thus, despite its popularity, the intuition‐based version of the multiple realizability argument is a poor reason for accepting functionalism.     

Color-function categories that prime infants to use color information in an object individuation task

There is evidence for developmental hierarchies in the type of information to which infants attend when reasoning about objects. Investigators have questioned the origin of these hierarchies and how infants come to identify new sources of information when reasoning about objects. The goal of the present experiments was to shed light on this debate by identifying conditions under which infants’ sensitivity to color information, which is slow to emerge, could be enhanced in an object individuation task. The outcome of Experiment 1 confirmed and extended previous reports that 9.5-month-olds can be primed, through exposure to events in which the color of an object predicts its function, to attend to color differences in a subsequent individuation task. The outcomes of Experiments 2-4 revealed age-related changes in the nature of the representations that support color priming. This is exemplified by three main findings. First, the representations that are formed during the color-function events are relatively specific. That is, infants are primed to use the color difference seen in the color-function events to individuate objects in the test events, but not other color differences. Second, 9.5-month-olds can be led to form more abstract event representations, and then generalize to other colors in the test events if they are shown multiple pairs of colors in the color-function events. Third, slightly younger 9-month-olds also can be led to form more inclusive categories with multiple color pairs, but only when they are allowed to directly compare the exemplars in each color pair during the present events. These results shed light on the development of categorization abilities, cognitive mechanisms that support color-function priming, and the kinds of experiences that can increase infants’ sensitivity to color information.     

手持移动用户界面显示效果的工效学研究

手持移动界面功效是小屏幕显示界面设计关注的主要问题之一,本研究采用实验和问卷调查相结合的方法,探讨手机界面的前景和背景颜色搭配、界面呈现方式(图标或文字)等对手持界面操作效率的影响。研究结果表明,前景和背景颜色搭配对手持界面操作效率有显著影响,界面呈现方式对操作效率有一定影响,但没有达到显著水平,问卷调查结果与实验结果存在一致性。     

What can we learn from toddlers about categorical perception of color? Comments on Goldstein, Davidoff, and Roberson

We comment on Goldstein, Davidoff, and Roberson’s replication and extension (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 102, 219-238 [2009]) of our study of the effect of toddlers’ color term knowledge on their categorical perception (CP) of color (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 90, 114-141 [2005]). First, we discuss how best to assess color term knowledge when concerned with the effects of language on color CP. A reanalysis of our data indicates that even toddlers who do not know the terms for the relevant focal colors still show CP. Second, we comment on Goldstein and colleagues’ finding of blue-purple CP, as we did, but not of blue-green CP in Himba toddlers. We present contrasting data from Wright (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Surrey, 2006) that demonstrates blue-green CP in Himba toddlers. Finally, we discuss the limitations of the approach taken by all of these investigations and discuss theoretical accounts of the origin and nature of color CP.     

The semantic red effect: Processing the word red undermines intellectual performance

Recent research has shown that a two second glimpse of color can have an important influence on affect, cognition, and behavior. The present research examined whether perceiving color is necessary to produce an effect on psychological functioning or whether the mere act of processing a color word might be sufficient. Specifically, four experiments tested the hypothesis that processing the word red undermines intellectual performance, much like actually perceiving the color red. Supportive data were obtained with three different types of subtle manipulation, with three different types of control words, and on two different types of IQ test performance. Worry, but not mood or general arousal, was shown to mediate the semantic red effect, which appears to take place outside of individuals’ awareness. The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.     

Electrophysiological markers of categorical perception of color in 7-month old infants

The origin of color categories has been debated by psychologists, linguists and cognitive scientists for many decades. Here, we present the first electrophysiological evidence for categorical responding to color before color terms are acquired. Event-related potentials were recorded on a visual oddball task in 7-month old infants. Infants were shown frequent presentations of one color (standard) interspersed with infrequent presentations of a color that was either from the same category (within-category deviant) or from a different category (between-category deviant) to the standard. Differences in the event-related potentials elicited by the stimuli were found that were related to the categorical relationship of the standard and the deviant stimuli. The data are discussed in relation to the processes that underlie categorical responding in infancy, as well as the debate about the origin of color categories in language and cognition.