À l’école et au supermarché : le développement des connaissances sur deux organisations sociales

The development of naive theories regarding social organizations has not received the same emphasis as other conceptual domains, such as naive biology and naive psychology. However, a number of studies have been devoted to the development of children's naive conceptions of politics, school, or economics, most of them with interviews. In the present study, we studied six-, 10-, 14-year-old children's conceptions regarding two familiar organizations, school and supermarket. Results show that, even young children have knowledge regarding these two institutions. However, even 10-year-old children might fail to integrate these institutions in more general organizational, institutional and social dimensions. In many cases, only children aged 14 consistently integrate these various dimensions.     

Beyond perceptual symbols: A call for representational pluralism

Recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that certain cognitive processes employ perceptual representations. Inspired by this evidence, a few researchers have proposed that cognition is inherently perceptual. They have developed an innovative theoretical approach that rests on the notion of perceptual simulation and marshaled several general arguments supporting the centrality of perceptual representations to concepts. In this article, I identify a number of weaknesses in these arguments and defend a multiple semantic code approach that posits both perceptual and non-perceptual representations.     

Unintended embodiment of concepts into percepts: Sensory activation boosts attention for same-modality concepts in the attentional blink paradigm

This study shows that sensory priming facilitates reports of same-modality concepts in an attentional blink paradigm. Participants had to detect and report two target words (T1 and T2) presented for 53 ms each among a series of nonwords distractors at a frequency of up to 19 items per second. SOA between target words was set to 53 ms or 213 ms, with reduced attention expected for T2 under the longer SOA (attentional blink) and for T1 under the shorter SOA (lag-1 sparing). These effects were found but reduced when the sensory modality of the concepts matched that of a sensory stimulation occurring prior to the detection trial. Hence, sensory activation increased report for same-modality concepts. This finding reveals that grounded cognition effects (1) are involved in conceptual processing as soon as a word has reached the point of lexical identification and (2) occur independent of intentional access to sensory properties of concepts.     

Moving hands, moving entities

In this study we investigated with a priming paradigm whether uni and bimanual actions presented as primes differently affected language processing. Animals’ (self-moving entities) and plants’ (not self-moving entities) names were used as targets. As prime we used grasping hands, presented both as static images and videos. The results showed an interference effect with unimanual action primes (both static and moving) with plants’ names. No modulation of responses for animals’ names was found. We argue that in the present task plants elicit information on unimanual grasping actions they support, while the lack of effect for animals could be due to them being better characterized as active agents.     

Kantian non-conceptualism

There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.

Causal relations drive young children's induction, naming, and categorization

A number of recent models and experiments have suggested that evidence of early category-based induction is an artifact of perceptual cues provided by experimenters. We tested these accounts against the prediction that different relations (causal versus non-causal) determine the types of perceptual similarity by which children generalize. Young children were asked to label, to infer novel properties, and to project future appearances of a novel animal that varied in two opposite respects: (1) how much it looked like another animal whose name and properties were known, and (2) how much its parents looked like parents of another animal whose name and properties were known. When exemplar origins were known, children generalized to exemplars with similar origins rather than with similar appearances; when origins were unknown, children generalized to exemplars with similar appearances. Results indicate even young children possess the cognitive control to choose the similarities that best predict accurate generalizations.     

Concept empiricism: a methodological critique

Thanks to Barsalou's, Damasio's, Glenberg's, Prinz' and others' work, neo-empiricism is gaining a deserved recognition in the psychology and philosophy of concepts. I argue, however, that neo-empiricists have underestimated the difficulty of providing evidence against the amodal approach to concepts and higher cognition. I highlight three key problems: the difficulty of sorting out amodal predictions from neo-empiricist predictions, the difficulty of finding experimental tasks that are not best solved by imagery and the difficulty of generalizing findings concerning a given cognitive process in a given context to other cognitive processes or other contexts. Finally, solutions to these three problems are considered.     

Developmental changes in the understanding of generics

Generic sentences (such as "Birds lay eggs") are important in that they refer to kinds (e.g., birds as a group) rather than individuals (e.g., the birds in the henhouse). The present set of studies examined aspects of how generic nouns are understood by English speakers. Adults and children (4- and 5-year-olds) were presented with scenarios about novel animals and questioned about their properties, using generic and non-generic questions. Three primary findings emerged. First, both children and adults distinguished generic from non-generic reference, interpreting generics as referring to kinds. Thus, under certain contexts children and adults accepted that "Dobles have claws" even when all the dobles in the available context were clawless. Second, adults further distinguished properties that are inborn from those that are acquired. Inborn properties were judged to be predicated of a generic kind, even when all available instances have lost the property, but this was not the case for acquired properties. Third, children did not distinguish inborn from acquired properties. These data suggest the existence of developmental changes in conceptual or semantic understanding, and are interpreted in light of recent theories of psychological essentialism.     

Use of the mathematical principle of inversion in young children

An important issue in the development of mathematical cognition is the extent to which children use and understand fundamental mathematical concepts. We examined whether young children successfully use the principle of inversion and, if so, whether they do so based on qualitative identity, length, or quantity. Twenty-four preschool children and 24 children in Grade 1 were presented with three-term inversion problems (e.g., 3+2-2) and standard problems of similar magnitude (e.g., 2+4-3). Problems were presented in three conditions to determine whether children used inversion at all and, if so, whether their decisions were based on quantitative or nonquantitative features of the problems. Both preschool and Grade 1 children showed evidence of using inversion in a fully quantitative manner, indicating that this principle is available in some form prior to extensive formal instruction in arithmetic.     

Information sources for noun learning

Why are some words easier to learn than others? And what enables the eventual learning of the more difficult words? These questions were addressed for nouns using a paradigm in which adults were exposed to naturalistic maternal input that was manipulated to simulate access to several different information sources, both alone and in combination: observation of the extralinguistic contexts in which the target word was used, the words that co‐occurred with the target word, and the target word's syntactic context. Words that were not accurately identified from observation alone were both abstract (e.g., music) and concrete (e.g., tail). Whether a noun could be learned from observation depended on whether it labeled a basic‐level object category (BLOC). However, the difference between BLOC labels and non‐BLOC labels was eliminated when observation was supplemented with linguistic context. Thus, although BLOC labels can be learned from observation alone, non‐BLOC labels require richer linguistic context. These findings support a model of vocabulary growth in which an important role is played by changes in the information to which learners have access.