Sensory load incurs conceptual processing costs

Theories of grounded cognition propose that modal simulations underlie cognitive representation of concepts [Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(4), 577-660; Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617-645]. Based on recent evidence of modality-specific resources in perception, we hypothesized that verifying properties of concepts encoded in different modalities are hindered more by perceptual short-term memory load to the same versus different sensory modality as that used to process the property. We manipulated load to visual and auditory modalities by having participants store one or three items in short-term memory during property verification. In the high (but not low) load condition, property verification took longer when the property (e.g., yellow) involved the same modality as that used by the memory load (e.g., pictures). Interestingly, similar interference effects were obtained on the conceptual verification and on the memory task. These findings provide direct support for the view that conceptual processing relies on simulation in modality-specific systems.     

The conceptual grouping effect: categories matter (and named categories matter more)

Do conceptual categories affect basic visual processing? A conceptual grouping effect for familiar stimuli is reported using a visual search paradigm. Search through conceptually-homogeneous non-targets was faster and more efficient than search through conceptually-heterogeneous non-targets. This effect cannot be attributed to perceptual factors and is not explained by a long-term representational reorganization due to perceptual-learning. Rather, conceptual categories seem to modulate visual representations dynamically, and are sensitive to task-demands. Verbally labeling a visual target further exaggerates the degree to which conceptual categories penetrate visual processing.     

Why stereotypes don't even make good defaults

Many concepts have stereotypes. This leaves open the question of whether concepts are stereotypes. It has been argued elsewhere that theories that identify concepts with their stereotypes or with stereotypical properties of their instances (e.g., Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Ed.), Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; Smith, E. E., Medin, D. L. (1981). Categories and Concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.) fail to provide an adequate account of the compositionality of concepts (Fodor, J., Lepore, E. (1996). The red herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still cannot be prototypes. Cognition, 58, 253-270.; Fodor, J. (1998). Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.). This paper extends this argument and reports an experiment suggesting that participants do not assume, even as a default strategy, that complex concepts inherit the stereotypes of their constituents. Thus propositions such as "Baby ducks have webbed feet" were judged to be less likely to be true than propositions like "Ducks have webbed feet." Moreover, manipulation of the type and number of noun phrase modifiers revealed a systematic departure from the unmodified noun's stereotype both with the addition of stereotypical modifiers ("Quacking ducks have webbed feet" versus "Ducks have webbed feet") and with the addition of a second modifier ("Baby Peruvian ducks have webbed feet" versus "Baby ducks have webbed feet"). Thus, in the general case the stereotypical properties of a head noun are systematically discounted when that head noun combines with modifiers. This effect represents a general principle of conceptual combination that argues against the inheritance of stereotypical features of concepts as a default strategy. Instead, we advocate a model of conceptual combination where concepts remain inert under combination, supported by a separate machinery that introduces pragmatic and knowledge-dependent inferences.     

Contextualizing counterintuitiveness: how context affects comprehension and memorability of counterintuitive concepts

A number of anthropologists have argued that religious concepts are minimally counterintuitive and that this gives them mnemic advantages. This paper addresses the question of why people have the memory architecture that results in such concepts being more memorable than other types of concepts by pointing out the benefits of a memory structure that leads to better recall for minimally counterintuitive concepts and by showing how such benefits emerge in the real-time processing of comprehending narratives such as folk tales. This model suggests that memorability is not an inherent property of a concept; rather it is a property of the concept, the context in which the concept is presented, and the background knowledge that the comprehendor possesses about the concept. The model predicts how memorability of a concept should change if the context containing the concept were changed. The paper also presents the results of experiments carried out to test these predictions.     

The effect of prosody on conceptual combination

Research into people's comprehension of novel noun-noun phrases has long neglected the possible influences of prosody during meaning construction. At the same time, work in conceptual combination has disagreed about whether different classes of interpretation emerge from single or multiple processes; for example, whether people use distinct mechanisms when they interpret octopus apartment as property-based (e.g., an apartment with eight rooms) or relation-based (e.g., an apartment where an octopus lives). In two studies, we manipulate the prosodic emphasis patterns of novel noun-noun combinations (placing stress on the modifier noun, the head noun, or dual stress on both nouns) and ask participants to generate an interpretation for the novel phrase. Results show that people are faster to generate property-based interpretations when dual emphasis stresses both nouns equally, with prosody having little effect on the speed of relation-based interpretations. These findings highlight a role for prosody during meaning construction and underline important differences between relation- and property-based interpretations that are difficult to reconcile with unitary process views of conceptual combination.     

Cognitive templates for religious concepts: cross-cultural evidence for recall of counter-intuitive representations

Presents results of free-recall experiments conducted in France, Gabon and Nepal, to test predictions of a cognitive model of religious concepts. The world over, these concepts include violations of conceptual expectations at the level of domain knowledge (e.g., about 'animal' or 'artifact' or 'person') rather than at the basic level. In five studies we used narratives to test the hypothesis that domain-level violations are recalled better than other conceptual associations. These studies used material constructed in the same way as religious concepts, but not used in religions familiar to the subjects. Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed a distinctiveness effect for such material. Experiment 3 shows that recall also depends on the possibility to generate inferences from violations of domain expectations. Replications in Gabon (Exp. 4) and Nepal (Exp. 5) showed that recall for domain-level violations is better than for violations of basic-level expectations. Overall sensitivity to violations is similar in different cultures and produces similar recall effects, despite differences in commitment to religious belief, in the range of local religious concepts or in their mode of transmission. However, differences between Gabon and Nepal results suggest that familiarity with some types of domain-level violations may paradoxically make other types more salient. These results suggest that recall effects may account for the recurrent features found in religious concepts from different cultures.     

The weirdness of belief in free will

It has been argued that belief in free will is socially consequential and psychologically universal. In this paper we look at the folk concept of free will and its critical assessment in the context of recent psychological research. Is there a widespread consensus about the conceptual content of free will? We compared English “free will” with its lexical equivalents in Lithuanian, Hindi, Chinese and Mongolian languages and found that unlike Lithuanian, Chinese, Hindi and Mongolian lexical expressions of “free will” do not refer to the same concept free will. What kind people have been studied so far? A review of papers indicate that, overall, 91% of participants in studies on belief in free will were WEIRD. Thus, given that free will has no cross-culturally universal conceptual content and that most of the reviewed studies were based on WEIRD samples, belief in free will is not a psychological universal.     

On historical consciousness: A pilot investigation

Philosophers of history posit a class of concepts known as colligatory concepts that contribute to historical consciousness and that refer specifically to historical events. Although analysis has identified colligatory concepts in historical discourse, these concepts have not yet been investigated empirically. We present a new methodology for studying these concepts and historical consciousness more broadly, as well as pilot data supporting the methodology. Our aim in the pilot study was to establish whether colligatory concepts are processed differently from control concepts when subjects are asked to judge historical statements. We compared judgments of colligatory concepts in healthy participants and in a patient group with impaired working memory cognitive processing capacity. Forty healthy, college-educated participants and 25 patients with Parkinson's disease were asked to rate narrative sentences containing historical content and an equal number of identically constructed narrative sentences of equal length but devoid of historical content. All participants rated their pre-test interest in history as relatively low (mean 5 out of 7). Though no group differences emerged, historical sentences were judged by both groups (total N = 65) to be significantly different from non-historical sentences across dimensions of interestingness, meaningfulness, likeability, complexity, thought provoking-ness, and truth content. Interestingly, historical sentences were judged to be truer than control sentences even though participants were not interested in and presumably knew little about history. The neurocognitive system appears to process sentences with historical content separately from sentences without historical content. The methodology described here appears to be a valid approach for study of processing of historical content of sentences.     

The bicoherence theory of situational irony

Situational irony concerns what it is about a situation that causes people to describe it as ironic. Although situational irony is as complex and commonplace as verbal and literary irony, it has received nowhere near the same attention from cognitive scientists and other scholars. This paper presents the bicoherence theory of situational irony, based on the theory of conceptual coherence (Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998). On this theory, a situation counts as ironic when it is conceived as having a bicoherent conceptual structure, adequate cognitive salience, and evokes an appropriate configuration of emotions. The theory is applied to a corpus of 250 examples of situational ironies gathered automatically from electronic news sources. A useful taxonomy of situational ironies is produced, new predictions and insights into situational irony are discussed, and extensions of the theory to other forms of irony are examined.     

Categorical invariance and structural complexity in human concept learning

An alternative account of human concept learning based on an invariance measure of the categorical stimulus is proposed. The categorical invariance model (CIM) characterizes the degree of structural complexity of a Boolean category as a function of its inherent degree of invariance and its cardinality or size. To do this we introduce a mathematical framework based on the notion of a Boolean differential operator on Boolean categories that generates the degrees of invariance (i.e., logical manifold) of the category in respect to its dimensions. Using this framework, we propose that the structural complexity of a Boolean category is indirectly proportional to its degree of categorical invariance and directly proportional to its cardinality or size. Consequently, complexity and invariance notions are formally unified to account for concept learning difficulty. Beyond developing the above unifying mathematical framework, the CIM is significant in that: (1) it precisely predicts the key learning difficulty ordering of the SHJ [Shepard, R. N., Hovland, C. L., & Jenkins, H. M. (1961). Learning and memorization of classifications. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 75(13), 1-42] Boolean category types consisting of three binary dimensions and four positive examples; (2) it is, in general, a good quantitative predictor of the degree of learning difficulty of a large class of categories (in particular, the 41 category types studied by Feldman [Feldman, J. (2000). Minimization of Boolean complexity in human concept learning. Nature, 407, 630-633]); (3) it is, in general, a good quantitative predictor of parity effects for this large class of categories; (4) it does all of the above without free parameters; and (5) it is cognitively plausible (e.g., cognitively tractable).