Social understanding through direct perception? Yes,by interacting

This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I elaborate on the role of social interaction with a discussion of participatory sense-making to show that direct perception, rather than being a perception enriched by mainly individual capacities, can be best understood as an interactional phenomenon.     

Perceiving speech rhythm in music: Listeners classify instrumental songs according to language of origin

Recent evidence suggests that the musical rhythm of a particular culture may parallel the speech rhythm of that culture’s language (Patel, A. D., & Daniele, J. R. (2003). An empirical comparison of rhythm in language and music. Cognition, 87, B35-B45). The present experiments aimed to determine whether listeners actually perceive such rhythmic differences in a purely musical context (i.e., in instrumental music without words). In Experiment 1a, listeners successfully classified instrumental renditions of French and English songs having highly contrastive rhythmic differences. Experiment 1b replicated this result with the same songs containing rhythmic information only. In Experiments 2a and 2b, listeners successfully classified original and rhythm-only stimuli when language-specific rhythmic differences were less contrastive but more representative of differences found in actual music and speech. These findings indicate that listeners can use rhythmic similarities and differences to classify songs originally composed in two languages having contrasting rhythmic prosody.     

Both motor prediction and conceptual congruency between preview and action-effect contribute to explicit judgment of agency

The sense of agency is the sense that one is causing an action. The inferential account of the sense of agency proposes that we experience the sense of agency when we infer that one’s own thoughts are the cause of an action. According to this account, the inference occurs when a thought appears in consciousness prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and is not accompanied by conspicuous other causes of the action. Alternatively, a predictive account of the sense of agency proposes that sensory prediction based on efferent (motor) information plays a critical role in generating the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the sense of agency depended primarily on the conceptual congruence between preview information (i.e., to elicit a thought) and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the inferential account, or whether it depended primarily on the sensory-motor congruence between prediction and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the predictive account. The results indicated that both of these factors did contribute to the sense of agency, although sensory-motor congruence appears to have a more robust impact.     

View-invariant object category learning, recognition, and search: how spatial and object attention are coordinated using surface-based attentional shrouds

How does the brain learn to recognize an object from multiple viewpoints while scanning a scene with eye movements? How does the brain avoid the problem of erroneously classifying parts of different objects together? How are attention and eye movements intelligently coordinated to facilitate object learning? A neural model provides a unified mechanistic explanation of how spatial and object attention work together to search a scene and learn what is in it. The ARTSCAN model predicts how an object's surface representation generates a form-fitting distribution of spatial attention, or "attentional shroud". All surface representations dynamically compete for spatial attention to form a shroud. The winning shroud persists during active scanning of the object. The shroud maintains sustained activity of an emerging view-invariant category representation while multiple view-specific category representations are learned and are linked through associative learning to the view-invariant object category. The shroud also helps to restrict scanning eye movements to salient features on the attended object. Object attention plays a role in controlling and stabilizing the learning of view-specific object categories. Spatial attention hereby coordinates the deployment of object attention during object category learning. Shroud collapse releases a reset signal that inhibits the active view-invariant category in the What cortical processing stream. Then a new shroud, corresponding to a different object, forms in the Where cortical processing stream, and search using attention shifts and eye movements continues to learn new objects throughout a scene. The model mechanistically clarifies basic properties of attention shifts (engage, move, disengage) and inhibition of return. It simulates human reaction time data about object-based spatial attention shifts, and learns with 98.1% accuracy and a compression of 430 on a letter database whose letters vary in size, position, and orientation. The model provides a powerful framework for unifying many data about spatial and object attention, and their interactions during perception, cognition, and action.     

What can we learn from toddlers about categorical perception of color? Comments on Goldstein, Davidoff, and Roberson

We comment on Goldstein, Davidoff, and Roberson’s replication and extension (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 102, 219-238 [2009]) of our study of the effect of toddlers’ color term knowledge on their categorical perception (CP) of color (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 90, 114-141 [2005]). First, we discuss how best to assess color term knowledge when concerned with the effects of language on color CP. A reanalysis of our data indicates that even toddlers who do not know the terms for the relevant focal colors still show CP. Second, we comment on Goldstein and colleagues’ finding of blue-purple CP, as we did, but not of blue-green CP in Himba toddlers. We present contrasting data from Wright (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Surrey, 2006) that demonstrates blue-green CP in Himba toddlers. Finally, we discuss the limitations of the approach taken by all of these investigations and discuss theoretical accounts of the origin and nature of color CP.     

Sound enhances detection of visual target during infancy: a study using illusory contours

In adults, a salient tone embedded in a sequence of nonsalient tones improves detection of a synchronously and briefly presented visual target in a rapid, visually distracting sequence. This phenomenon indicates that perception from one sensory modality can be influenced by another one even when the latter modality provides no information about the judged property itself. However, no study has revealed the age-related development of this kind of cross-modal enhancement. Here we tested the effect of concurrent and unique sounds on detection of illusory contours during infancy. We used a preferential looking technique to investigate whether audio-visual enhancement of the detection of illusory contours could be observed at 5, 6, and 7 months of age. A significant enhancement, induced by sound, of the preference for illusory contours was observed only in the 7-month-olds. These results suggest that audio-visual enhancement in visual target detection emerges at 7 months of age.     

Seeing power in action: The roles of deliberation, implementation, and action in inferences of power

Six experiments investigate the hypothesis that social targets who display a greater action orientation are perceived as having more power (i.e., more control, less dependence, and more influence) than less action-oriented targets. I find evidence that this inference pattern is based on the pervasive belief that individuals with more power experience less constraint and have a greater capacity to act according to their own volition. Observers infer that targets have more power and influence when they exhibit more implementation than deliberation in the process of making decisions in their personal lives (Study 1a), in a public policy context (Study 1b), and in small groups (Study 2). In an organizational context, observers infer that a target who votes for a policy to change from the status quo has more power than a target who votes not to change from the status quo (Study 3). People also infer greater intra-organizational power and higher hierarchical rank in targets who take physical action toward a personal goal than in those who do not (Studies 4-5).     

Who is approachable?

The consequences of social interaction can be variable, sometimes harmful, but often rewarding. The adaptive social perceiver must therefore determine which interactions are worthwhile pursuing and which are not. The present research investigated whether subtle but meaningful differences in facial expressions are perceived in terms of the affordance of approachability. Participants engaged in simulated social encounters with targets displaying enjoyment smiles, non-enjoyment smiles or neutral expressions while fluctuations in their posture were measured. The results indicated systematic differences in perceived approachability as a function of facial expression and target sex. These findings are discussed in terms of the functional coupling between social perception and action with respect to the information that specifies the affordance of approachability.     

Between a rock and a hard place: Damned if you do, damned if you don’t

Individuals are frequently forced to make decisions from among undesirable choice-sets. Raise taxes or cut social services? Lay off workers or go bankrupt? Go deep in debt or forgo a college education? The research presented here suggests that in such situations, decision-makers are often evaluated negatively regardless of the choice they make. In Experiment 1, participants read about a judge deciding which of two seemingly unfit parents to award sole custody in a real-life divorce case. In Experiment 2, participants were led to believe that their partner in the experiment was forced to pick one of two unpleasant tasks for the participant to perform. In both cases, the decision and decision-maker were evaluated negatively regardless of the alternative chosen–and regardless of the fact that they were the only options in the choice-set. Discussion focuses on the source, scope, and consequences of this phenomenon.     

Do local properties function as cues for musical key perception?1

Abstract: A global property (i.e., pitch set) of a melody appears to serve as a primary cue for key identification. Previous studies have proposed specific local properties in a melody (e.g., the augmented fourth, the perfect fifth, etc.) that may function as further cues. However, the role of the latter in key identification is controversial. The present study was designed to investigate what kinds of local properties, if any, function as reliable cues for key identification. Listeners were asked to identify keys for 450 melodies that consisted of the same pitch set, but which differed in sequential constraints. Using multiple discriminant analyses, we evaluated relative contributions of as many kinds of local properties as possible (e.g., single intervals, single pitch classes in each sequential position, etc.). The results showed that, except for the pitch class of the final tone, for which interpretation should be taken cautiously, none of the specific local properties examined contributed significantly to key identification. This finding suggests that, contrary to prior findings, key identification is derived from unidentified properties other than the specific local properties.