Movement and visual coding: the structure of visuo-spatial working memory

The influential model of verbal working memory (WM) introduced by Baddeley and Hitch (Recent advances in learning and motivation. Academic, New York, 1974) comprised three interacting component parts; an executive controller and two subservient systems. The two subservient systems, one underpinning verbal processing and the other underpinning visual processing are themselves subdivided. In the verbal system, a passive phonological store is maintained by an active phonological loop, which is able to rehearse the material in the passive store. The visual working memory system has traditionally been thought of as having a similar architecture with a passive visual store being maintained by an active store, which codes in terms of movement over space. The paper discusses the evidence for this relationship in visuo-spatial WM and concludes that the architecture does not fit well with the experimental literature. A direction for future research is suggested.     

Does matter really matter? Computer simulations,experiments, and materiality

A number of recent discussions comparing computer simulation and traditional experimentation have focused on the significance of “materiality.” I challenge several claims emerging from this work and suggest that computer simulation studies are material experiments in a straightforward sense. After discussing some of the implications of this material status for the epistemology of computer simulation, I consider the extent to which materiality (in a particular sense) is important when it comes to making justified inferences about target systems on the basis of experimental results.     

Rigorous results,cross-model justification,and the transfer of empirical warrant: the case of many-body models in physics

This paper argues that a successful philosophical analysis of models and simulations must accommodate an account of mathematically rigorous results. Such rigorous results may be thought of as genuinely model-specific contributions, which can neither be deduced from fundamental theory nor inferred from empirical data. Rigorous results provide new indirect ways of assessing the success of models and simulations and are crucial to understanding the connections between different models. This is most obvious in cases where rigorous results map different models on to one another. Not only does this put constraints on the extent to which performance in specific empirical contexts may be regarded as the main touchstone of success in scientific modelling, it also allows for the transfer of warrant across different models. Mathematically rigorous results can thus come to be seen as not only strengthening the cohesion between scientific strategies of modelling and simulation, but also as offering new ways of indirect confirmation.     

The philosophy of simulation: hot new issues or same old stew?

Computer simulations are an exciting tool that plays important roles in many scientific disciplines. This has attracted the attention of a number of philosophers of science. The main tenor in this literature is that computer simulations not only constitute interesting and powerful new science, but that they also raise a host of new philosophical issues. The protagonists in this debate claim no less than that simulations call into question our philosophical understanding of scientific ontology, the epistemology and semantics of models and theories, and the relation between experimentation and theorising, and submit that simulations demand a fundamentally new philosophy of science in many respects. The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate these claims. Our conclusion will be sober. We argue that these claims are overblown and that simulations, far from demanding a new metaphysics, epistemology, semantics and methodology, raise few if any new philosophical problems. The philosophical problems that do come up in connection with simulations are not specific to simulations and most of them are variants of problems that have been discussed in other contexts before. An erratum to this article can be found at     

A tale of two methods

Simulations (both digital and analog) and experiments share many features. But what essential features distinguish them? I discuss two proposals in the literature. On one proposal, experiments investigate nature directly, while simulations merely investigate models. On another proposal, simulations differ from experiments in that simulationists manipulate objects that bear only a formal (rather than material) similarity to the targets of their investigations. Both of these proposals are rejected. I argue that simulations fundamentally differ from experiments with regard to the background knowledge that is invoked to argue for the “external validity” of the investigation.     

Working memory impairment in people with Williams syndrome: Effects of delay, task and stimuli

Williams syndrome (WS) is a neurodevelopmental disorder associated with impaired visuospatial representations subserved by the dorsal stream and relatively strong object recognition abilities subserved by the ventral stream. There is conflicting evidence on whether this uneven pattern in WS extends to working memory (WM). The present studies provide a new perspective, testing WM for a single stimulus using a delayed recognition paradigm in individuals with WS and typically developing children matched for mental age (MA matches). In three experiments, participants judged whether a second stimulus ‘matched’ an initial sample, either in location or identity. We first examined memory for faces, houses and locations using a 5 s delay (Experiment 1) and a 2 s delay (Experiment 2). We then tested memory for human faces, houses, cat faces, and shoes with a 2 s delay using a new set of stimuli that were better controlled for expression, hairline and orientation (Experiment 3). With the 5 s delay (Experiment 1), the WS group was impaired overall compared to MA matches. While participants with WS tended to perform more poorly than MA matches with the 2 s delay, they also exhibited an uneven profile compared to MA matches. Face recognition was relatively preserved in WS with friendly faces (Experiment 2) but not when the faces had a neutral expression and were less natural looking (Experiment 3). Experiment 3 indicated that memory for object identity was relatively stronger than memory for location in WS. These findings reveal an overall WM impairment in WS that can be overcome under some conditions. Abnormalities in the parietal lobe/dorsal stream in WS may damage not only the representation of spatial location but may also impact WM for visual stimuli more generally.     

When simple things are meaningful: Working memory strength predicts children’s cognitive flexibility

People often perseverate, repeating outdated behaviors despite correctly answering questions about rules they should be following. Children who perseverate are slower to respond to such questions than children who successfully switch to new rules, even after controlling for age and processing speed. Thus, switchers may have stronger working memory strength than perseverators, with stronger rule representations supporting both flexible switching and faster responses to questions. Alternatively, better inhibitory abilities may support switchers’ faster responses by helping to resolve conflict. The current study tested these accounts using a new one-dimensional card sort. Even with all possible sources of conflict removed, switchers still responded faster than perseverators to questions about rules, supporting the graded working memory account.     

Working memory in children: a time-constrained functioning similar to adults

Within the time-based resource-sharing (TBRS) model, we tested a new conception of the relationships between processing and storage in which the core mechanisms of working memory (WM) are time constrained. However, our previous studies were restricted to adults. The current study aimed at demonstrating that these mechanisms are present and functional before adulthood. For this purpose, we investigated the effect on maintenance of the duration of the attentional capture induced by processing. In two experiments using computer-paced WM span tasks, 10-year-olds were asked to maintain letters while performing spatial location judgments. The duration of this processing was manipulated by varying either the discriminability between target locations or the contrast between targets and background. In both experiments, longer processing times resulted in poorer recall, as we observed previously in adults. These findings suggest that the core mechanisms of WM described by the TBRS model are already settled during childhood.     

Hilbert,logicism, and mathematical existence

David Hilbert’s early foundational views, especially those corresponding to the 1890s, are analysed here. I consider strong evidence for the fact that Hilbert was a logicist at that time, following upon Dedekind’s footsteps in his understanding of pure mathematics. This insight makes it possible to throw new light on the evolution of Hilbert’s foundational ideas, including his early contributions to the foundations of geometry and the real number system. The context of Dedekind-style logicism makes it possible to offer a new analysis of the emergence of Hilbert’s famous ideas on mathematical existence, now seen as a revision of basic principles of the “naive logic” of sets. At the same time, careful scrutiny of his published and unpublished work around the turn of the century uncovers deep differences between his ideas about consistency proofs before and after 1904. Along the way, we cover topics such as the role of sets and of the dichotomic conception of set theory in Hilbert’s early axiomatics, and offer detailed analyses of Hilbert’s paradox and of his completeness axiom (Vollständigkeitsaxiom).     

Integrated Primary Care: An Inclusive Three-World View Through Process Metrics and Empirical Discrimination

Integrating behavioral health services within the primary care setting drives higher levels of collaborative care, and is proving to be an essential part of the solution for our struggling American healthcare system. However, justification for implementing and sustaining integrated and collaborative care has shown to be a formidable task. In an attempt to move beyond conflicting terminology found in the literature, we delineate terms and suggest a standardized nomenclature. Further, we maintain that addressing the three principal worlds of healthcare (clinical, operational, financial) is requisite in making sense of the spectrum of available implementations and ultimately transitioning collaborative care into the mainstream. Using a model that deconstructs process metrics into factors/barriers and generalizes behavioral health provider roles into major categories provides a framework to empirically discriminate between implementations across specific settings. This approach offers practical guidelines for care sites implementing integrated and collaborative care and defines a research framework to produce the evidence required for the aforementioned clinical, operational and financial worlds of this important movement.