Theoretical Synergy: Evolving Understanding of Organizational Diversity Dynamics

The author discusses the power of cumulative theory generation in which two or more grounded theories are joined utilizing the constant comparative method of analysis. He introduces an example of such theoretical synergy between his theory of weathering change and Gregory's and Thomas' work on diversity dynamics. Initial grounded theory analysis by Gregory and Raffanti indicates that combining relevant aspects of weathering and diversity management has the potential to generate powerful explanatory and operational theories.     

A Complexity Approach To Co-Creating An Innovative Environment

The distinguishing characteristic of complex co-evolving systems is their ability to create new order. In human systems this may take the form of new ways of working or relating, new ideas for products, procedures, artefacts, or even the creation of a different culture or a new organizational form. This article will explore the creation of new order using the principles of complexity and the concepts of creativity and innovation. It will argue that innovation can be facilitated by an enabling environment based on the logic of complexity and describe how one organization (the Humberside Training and Enterprise Council) co-created an innovative environment and changed its culture, ways of working, thinking, and relating.     

Dreams are more negative than real life: Implications for the function of dreaming

Dream content studies have revealed that dream experiences are negatively biased; negative dream contents are more frequent than corresponding positive dream contents. It is unclear, however, whether the bias is real or due to biased sampling, i.e., selective memory for intense negative emotions. The threat simulation theory (TST) claims that the negativity bias is real and reflects the evolved biological function of dreaming. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis of the TST that threatening events are overrepresented in dreams, i.e., more frequent and more severe in dreams than in real life. To control for biased sampling, we used as a baseline the corresponding negative events in real life rather than the corresponding positive events in dreams. We collected dream reports (N=419) and daily event logs (N=490) from 39 university students during a two-week period, and interviewed them about real threat experiences retrievable from autobiographical memory (N=714). Threat experiences proved to be much more frequent and severe in dreams than in real life, and Current Dream Threats more closely resembled Past than Current Real Threats. We conclude that the TST's predictions hold, and that the negativity bias is real.     

Implicit interpretation biases affect emotional vulnerability: A training study

Cognitive theories of emotion propose that the interpretation of emotion-eliciting situations crucially shapes affective responses. Implicit or automatic biases in these interpretations may hinder emotion regulation and thereby increase risk for the onset and maintenance of psychological disorders. In this study, participants were randomly assigned to a positive or negative interpretation bias training using ambiguous social scenarios. After the completion of the training, a stress task was administered and changes in positive and negative affect and self-esteem were assessed. The results demonstrate that the interpretation bias training was successful in that participants exhibited a tendency to interpret novel scenarios in accordance with their training condition. Importantly, the positive training condition also had a protective effect on self-esteem. Participants in this condition did not exhibit a decrease in self-esteem after the stress task, whereas participants in the negative condition did. These results demonstrate that implicit cognitive biases can be trained and that this training affects self-esteem. Implications of these findings for research on psychopathology and emotion regulation are discussed.     

Recovering from negative events by boosting implicit positive affect

Upregulation of implicit positive affect (PA) can act as a mechanism to deal with negative affect. Two studies tracked temporal changes in positive and negative affect (NA) assessed by self-report and the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test (IPANAT; Quirin, Kazén, & Kuhl, 2009). Study 1 observed the predicted increases in implicit PA after exposure to a threat-related film clip, which correlated positively with the speed of recognising a happy face among an angry crowd. Study 2 replicated increases in implicit PA after exposition to the same film clip, and showed that such increases were enhanced by priming self-referential stimuli. The findings are discussed against the background of personality systems interaction (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001), which emphasises the role of the implicit self in affect regulation.     

Difficulties in disengaging attentional resources from self-generated thoughts moderate the link between dysphoria and maladaptive self-referential thinking

Negative emotions increase self-focused attention, a core feature of depression and anxiety-related disorders. However, the cognitive mechanisms associated with the tendency to self-focus—and, conversely, with the ability to voluntarily disengage attentional resources from the self and direct them towards the external environment—remain poorly understood. Thus, this study aimed to examine whether a specific cognitive control mechanism that directs attention between self-generated thoughts and external information might moderate the relationship between dysphoria and maladaptive self-referential thinking. Results showed that dysphoria increases the frequency of rumination, self-blame, and catastrophising, especially for participants who have more difficulty in switching from self-generated thoughts to information provided by the environment. These results shed new light on the cognitive mechanisms underlying maladaptive self-referential thinking associated with dysphoria. More specifically, this specific cognitive mechanism might play a key role in the maintenance or amplification of a depressed mood.     

Pathways linking temperament and depressive symptoms: A short-term prospective diary study among adolescents

The current study examined mechanisms through which trait negative affectivity (NA) and effortful control (EC) prospectively predict increases in depressive symptoms in a community sample of 110 adolescents (mean age=16.40 years) in a 9-week, multi-wave diary study. We hypothesised youth with high NA and low EC would experience greater increases in depressive symptoms because they generate more maladaptive cognitive responses to stress. NA predicted greater event-specific rumination and negative cognitive style across the study period. After controlling for trait cognitive vulnerabilities, only event-specific rumination mediated the effect of NA on subsequent depressive symptoms, suggesting that high-NA youth are more likely to ruminate about stressful events, which then predicts increases in depressive symptoms. EC did not moderate the effects of NA on either depressive symptoms or cognitive responses to stress. Results are discussed in terms of vulnerability-stress models linking temperament and depressive symptoms in adolescence.     

Cognitive control and attentional functions

Cognitive control is essential to flexible, goal-directed behavior under uncertainty, yet its underlying mechanisms are not clearly understood. Because attentional functions are known to allocate mental resources and prioritize the information to be processed, we propose that the attentional functions of alerting, orienting, and executive control and the interactions among them contribute to cognitive control in the service of uncertainty reduction. To test this hypothesis, we examined the relationship between cognitive control and attentional functions. We used the Majority Function Task (MFT) to manipulate uncertainty in order to evoke cognitive control along with the Revised Attention Network Test (ANT-R) to measure the efficiency and the interactions of attentional functions. A backwards, stepwise regression model revealed that performance on the MFT could be significantly predicted by attentional functions and their interactions as measured by the ANT-R. These results provide preliminary support for our theory that the attentional functions are involved in the implementation of cognitive control as required to reduce uncertainty, though further investigation is needed.     

Differential brain shrinkage over 6 months shows limited association with cognitive practice

The brain shrinks with age, but the timing of this process and the extent of its malleability are unclear. We measured changes in regional brain volumes in younger (age 20–31) and older (age 65–80) adults twice over a 6 months period, and examined the association between changes in volume, history of hypertension, and cognitive training. Between two MRI scans, 49 participants underwent intensive practice in three cognitive domains for 100 consecutive days, whereas 23 control group members performed no laboratory cognitive tasks. Regional volumes of seven brain structures were measured manually and adjusted for intracranial volume. We observed significant mean shrinkage in the lateral prefrontal cortex, the hippocampus, the caudate nucleus, and the cerebellum, but no reliable mean change of the prefrontal white matter, orbital-frontal cortex, and the primary visual cortex. Individual differences in change were reliable in all regions. History of hypertension was associated with greater cerebellar shrinkage. The cerebellum was the only region in which significantly reduced shrinkage was apparent in the experimental group after completion of cognitive training. Thus, in healthy adults, differential brain shrinkage can be observed in a narrow time window, vascular risk may aggravate it, and intensive cognitive activity may have a limited effect on it.     

A Comparison of American and Nepalese Children's Concepts of Freedom of Choice and Social Constraint

Recent work has shown that preschool‐aged children and adults understand freedom of choice regardless of culture, but that adults across cultures differ in perceiving social obligations as constraints on action. To investigate the development of these cultural differences and universalities, we interviewed school‐aged children (4–11) in Nepal and the United States regarding beliefs about people's freedom of choice and constraint to follow preferences, perform impossible acts, and break social obligations. Children across cultures and ages universally endorsed the choice to follow preferences but not to perform impossible acts. Age and culture effects also emerged: Young children in both cultures viewed social obligations as constraints on action, but American children did so less as they aged. These findings suggest that while basic notions of free choice are universal, recognitions of social obligations as constraints on action may be culturally learned.