Developmental differences in mental rotation.

A reaction time paradigm was used to investigate developmental differences in ability to rotate and compare imaginal representations. Third grade, fifth grade, and college students (ages 9, 11, and 20 years, respectively) were required to determine whether a letter of the alphabet was presented in its backward or normal position. Letters were presented at 0, 60, 120, 180, 240, or 300° orientations from upright. Subjects were given no advance information about a test letter, or they were given identity and orientation information. In the no information condition, reaction time increased for all age groups as a function of the departure in orientation of the test letter from an upright position. In the advance information condition, reaction time remained uniform across orientation for only the college subjects. The developmental implications of these findings are discussed.     

Formal models of language learning

Research is reviewed that addresses itself to human language learning by developing precise, mechanistic models that are capable in principle of acquiring languages on the basis of exposure to linguistic data. Such research includes theorems on language learnability from mathematical linguistics, computer models of language acquisition from cognitive simulation and artificial intelligence, and models of transformational grammar acquisition from theoretical linguistics. It is argued that such research bears strongly on major issues in developmental psycholinguistics, in particular, nativism and empiricism, the role of semantics and pragmatics in language learning, cognitive development, and the importance of the simplified speech addressed to children.     

中学生的互联网使用与其应对方式的关系

通过问卷调查探究了589名初二及高二年级中学生的应对方式与病理性互联网使用（Pathological Internet Use,PIU）的关系。研究结果表明,PIU高分组被试较少采用问题解决这一应对方式,而可能更多采用幻想与发泄这二种应对方式;问题解决分数随PIU分数降低而上升,而幻想与发泄二种应对方式随PIU分数降低而降低。问题解决、幻想与发泄在不同PIU分组间的差异显著。因此较多使用问题解决这一应对方式,较少使用发泄与幻想两种应对方式,可能会减少互联网使用带给中学生的消极影响     

Discovery in complex adaptive systems

The distinction between ontological ground-truth phenomena and epistemic measurements of those phenomena is discussed and analyzed in the context of complex cognitive systems research. A common style of computational simulation is identified as a Dissect-the-Simulation motif. In this style, a model of cognition is designed and when it generally mimics some cognitive behavior, its own ontic processes (which are fully accessible because it is a simulation) are proposed as potential ontic processes inside actual human cognition. I propose here a second style of modeling, which might be called Measure-the-Simulation. In this style, simulated versions of coarse-grained epistemic measurements are performed on the model with the intent of discovering how those epistemic measurements themselves may transform the actual ontic data, and thus induce a variety of mis-categorizations of phenomena. When our epistemic measurements are better understood, such mis-categorizations can perhaps be avoided. As a proof of concept, Conway’s Game of Life is analyzed and measured with two different types of coarse-grained epistemic measures. Dramatic differences are identified in how a binary coarse-graining, versus a graded coarse-graining, transforms the discovery process for activity patterns on the lattice of this cellular automaton.     

The time course of attentional modulation on emotional conflict processing

Cognitive conflict resolution is critical to human survival in a rapidly changing environment. However, emotional conflict processing seems to be particularly important for human interactions. This study examined whether the time course of attentional modulation on emotional conflict processing was different from cognitive conflict processing during a flanker task. Results showed that emotional N200 and P300 effects, similar to colour conflict processing, appeared only during the relevant task. However, the emotional N200 effect preceded the colour N200 effect, indicating that emotional conflict can be identified earlier than cognitive conflict. Additionally, a significant emotional N100 effect revealed that emotional valence differences could be perceived during early processing based on rough aspects of input. The present data suggest that emotional conflict processing is modulated by top-down attention, similar to cognitive conflict processing (reflected by N200 and P300 effects). However, emotional conflict processing seems to have more time advantages during two different processing stages.     

Transfer of location-specific control to untrained locations

Recent research highlights a seemingly flexible and automatic form of cognitive control that is triggered by potent contextual cues, as exemplified by the location-specific proportion congruence effect--reduced compatibility effects in locations associated with a high as compared to low likelihood of conflict. We investigated just how flexible location-specific control is by examining whether novel locations effectively cue control for congruency-unbiased stimuli. In two experiments, biased (mostly compatible or mostly incompatible) training stimuli appeared in distinct locations. During a final block, unbiased (50% compatible) stimuli appeared in novel untrained locations spatially linked to biased locations. The flanker compatibly effect was reduced for unbiased stimuli in novel locations linked to a mostly incompatible compared to a mostly compatible location, indicating transfer. Transfer was observed when stimuli appeared along a linear function (Experiment 1) or in rings of a bullseye (Experiment 2). The novel transfer effects imply that location-specific control is more flexible than previously reported and further counter the complex stimulus–response learning account of location-specific proportion congruence effects. We propose that the representation and retrieval of control settings in untrained locations may depend on environmental support and the presentation of stimuli in novel locations that fall within the same categories of space as trained locations.     

The influence of practicum supervisors’ facilitation styles on student teachers’ reflective thinking during collective reflection

Student teachers’ reflective thinking is closely associated with learning and improving practice. Novice student teachers require adequate support to reflect more deeply. The role of ‘others’ in collective reflection and knowledge generation as an outcome creates a platform for deep reflection, addressing both the processes and premises of reflective thinking. Facilitation styles of practicum supervisors could influence the level of student teachers’ reflective thinking during collective reflection. This is a case study using purposeful sampling involving a Malaysian teacher training institution that conducted an undergraduate early childhood programme in collaboration with a UK university. Sources of evidence were interviews, direct observations and documents. Data collected were analysed using both inductive and deductive methods. It was found that facilitation styles influence the depth of student teachers’ reflective thinking during group dialogic reflection. A continuum of facilitation styles from collaborative to instructive typologies was constructed. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

认知操作、认知方式与外倾性人格特质的关系

对28名外倾被试和28名内倾被试进行实验性认知测试,以考察认知操作、认知方式与外倾性人格特质的关系。结果表明,内外倾被试在含有社会认知操作、非社会认知操作的认知任务的测试总分上没有差异,而在社会认知一非社会认知方式的评价分数上存在显著差异。外倾被试更多地倾向于社会认知型认知方式,内倾被试更多地倾向于非社会认知型认知方式。研究结果支持了外倾性与智力关系的假设：外倾性与社会认知一非社会认知的认知方式存在相关关系,而与认知操作测试总分无关。     

Wittgenstein’s ‘Non-Cognitivism’ – Explained and Vindicated

The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’. The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular, hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary, in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical work, at the level of both aims and methods.