Mechanisms for Robust Cognition

To function well in an unpredictable environment using unreliable components, a system must have a high degree of robustness. Robustness is fundamental to biological systems and is an objective in the design of engineered systems such as airplane engines and buildings. Cognitive systems, like biological and engineered systems, exist within variable environments. This raises the question, how do cognitive systems achieve similarly high degrees of robustness? The aim of this study was to identify a set of mechanisms that enhance robustness in cognitive systems. We identify three mechanisms that enhance robustness in biological and engineered systems: system control, redundancy, and adaptability. After surveying the psychological literature for evidence of these mechanisms, we provide simulations illustrating how each contributes to robust cognition in a different psychological domain: psychomotor vigilance, semantic memory, and strategy selection. These simulations highlight features of a mathematical approach for quantifying robustness, and they provide concrete examples of mechanisms for robust cognition.     

Unconscious biases in task choices depend on conscious expectations

Recent studies highlight the influence of non-conscious information on task-set selection. However, it has not yet been tested whether this influence depends on conscious settings, as some theoretical models propose. In a series of three experiments, we explored whether non-conscious abstract cues could bias choices between a semantic and a perceptual task. In Experiment 1, we observed a non-conscious influence on task-set selection even when perceptual priming and cue-target compound confounds did not apply. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that, under restrictive conditions of visibility, cues only biased task selection when the conscious task-setting mindset led participants to search for information during the time period of the cue. However, this conscious strategy did not modulate the effect found when a subjective measure of consciousness was used. Altogether, our results show that the configuration of the conscious mindset determines the potential bias of non-conscious information on task-set selection.     

Cognitive distortions in sexual aggressors against children: An examination of the Abel and Becker Cognition Scale (ABCS)

IntroductionCognitive distortions are generally considered a key factor in the evaluation and treatment of sexual aggressors against children.AimThe aim of this study was to examine the discriminant properties of the Abel and Becker Cognition Scale.Method and resultsThe results of analyses of covariance, in a sample of 265 aggressors against children, do not support ABCS's discriminating properties.ConclusionLimits and implications for future researches are discussed.     

Methods and aims of investigative interviewing of adult witnesses: An analysis of professional practices

Eyewitnesses provide crucial evidence for the investigation of criminal cases. We analysed professional police interviewers’ behaviour by conducting a literature review. Our results indicate that the interviewing techniques used by untrained and trained investigators are predominantly inappropriate and harmful to memory recall. The way investigators curtail and select witnesses’ responses suggests that they look for specific information. As a subsequent step, we analysed investigative interviewing in terms of professional objectives, identifying the types of information that the police inquire about during the interview. Based on our results, we conclude future research should perform a fine-grained analysis of professional interviewing procedures with the aim of producing effective interviewing techniques that meet investigators’ real-world objectives.     

Cognitive processes in writing during pause and execution periods

The present study investigated how writing processes are activated during pause and execution periods. In two experiments, handwriting demands were manipulated by asking participants to compose with their familiar handwriting or with a high-demanding cursive uppercase calligraphy. Experiment 1 investigated narrative writing, a task with low planning demands. Experiment 2 addressed essay writing, a task with stronger planning demands. Occurrences of processes and their cognitive effort were analysed by asking participants to respond to random auditory probes and then to report their ongoing mental activity according to learned categories referring to the planning, translating, and revising writing processes. All together, the findings indicate that demands on planning did not affect how writing processes were activated during pauses and execution periods but automaticity of handwriting did. When handwriting was effortless, translating was mostly activated in parallel with motor execution, whereas revising and planning were mainly activated during pauses. However, none of the writing processes could be characterised as being typical of pauses, since translating was activated to a similar extent as the other two processes. By contrast, when handwriting was effortful, participants shifted to a more sequential functioning and activated translating mainly during pauses.     

A quantification of robustness

Robustness is an important construct in domains as diverse as evolutionary biology, structural engineering, and decision-making. Unfortunately, in many domains, most relevantly cognitive science, considerations of robustness end with vague semantic references. Little attention is paid to formal analysis. The aim of this paper is to initiate a discussion in the scientific community regarding methods for quantifying and analyzing robustness. To this end, we propose a means for assessing robustness that may supplant the current ambiguous use of the term. We demonstrate our quantitative approach using examples of heuristic-based decision processes, selected due to their explicit association with robustness in the psychological literature. These examples serve to illustrate basic properties of our general methodology for quantifying robustness.     

Individual differences in emotional reactivity moderate the strength of the relationship between attentional and implicit-memory biases towards threat-related stimuli

The study investigated whether the strength of the relationship between attentional and implicit-memory biases for threat-related material can be moderated by individual differences in temperament and personality. A spatial cueing task, where task-irrelevant angry, happy, and neutral faces acted as spatial cues preceding a target, was immediately followed by an unexpected “old/new” task involving previously presented faces. Temperament-based emotional reactivity (ER; one's typical response strength to emotional stimuli) predicted improved memory performance for angry faces in the “old/new” task. Critically, the relationship between the attentional bias towards threat (indexed by a cue validity index, i.e., a difference in response times on trials where cues with angry expression were presented in the same versus different location to the subsequent target) and enhanced implicit-memory for previously presented task-irrelevant threat-related information was found to be moderated by ER. The current findings provide the first evidence that temperament traits can offer novel insights into the mechanisms enhancing cognitive biases towards threat in the typical population.     

Mental rotation is not easily cognitively penetrable

When participants take part in mental imagery experiments, are they using their “tacit knowledge” of perception to mimic what they believe should occur in the corresponding perceptual task? Two experiments were conducted to examine whether such an account can be applied to mental imagery in general. These experiments both examined tasks that required participants to “mentally rotate” stimuli. In Experiment 1, instructions led participants to believe that they could reorient shapes in one step or avoid reorienting the shapes altogether. Regardless of instruction type, response times increased linearly with increasing rotation angles. In Experiment 2, participants first observed novel objects rotating at different speeds, and then performed a mental rotation task with those objects. The speed of perceptually demonstrated rotation did not affect the speed of mental rotation. We argue that tacit knowledge cannot explain mental imagery results in general, and that in particular the mental rotation effect reflects the nature of the underlying internal representation and processes that transform it, rather than participants’ pre-existing knowledge.     

The role of processes and contents in human memory: An item response theory approach

This study investigated the specificities and communalities of visuospatial and verbal memory contents, as well as short-term memory and working memory (STM and WM) processes with the use of Rasch models as an alternative to the previous studies based on the classical test theory. A sample of 547 undergraduate students executed four computerised tasks, each consisting of verbal-numeric WM, visuospatial WM, verbal-numeric STM, and visuospatial STM content. Confirmatory factor analyses indicated that visuospatial and verbal-numeric memory are distinct, but correlated variables. Findings also support a domain-general view of WM capacity distinct from domain-specific storage. With the use of Rasch models, our results confirm previous experimental, psychometric, and neuropsychological studies, highlighting that memory span tasks can be divided into separate subsystems for content and processes. This study also shows that better results are obtained when models with person parameter estimates (provided from Rasch models) are adopted, rather than summed raw scores.     

The effect of stimulus variability on children's judgements of quantity

This study investigates the effect of stimulus variability on development of the ability to make quantity judgements related to area. Participants were 241 children (aged 4, 5, 6, 8, and 12 years) and 82 university students, who were asked to compare the quantities in 2 sets of 5 chocolate bars of constant width but variable length. Participants indicated which set contained more chocolate or that the amounts of chocolate were equal. Judgement accuracy of 12-year-olds and adults decreased monotonically as the variance of bar lengths increased. In younger children, performance was low when variance was very low or very high, but accuracy was higher for intermediate levels of variance, thus resulting in an inverted U-shaped effect. This pattern was confirmed in a second experiment in which we controlled for a possible age-related response bias against “equal” judgements. Findings suggest that judgements of quantity are based on a mixture of learned heuristics and comparisons of approximate quantity representations, both of which develop throughout childhood.