The Dark Triad,happiness and subjective well-being

Narcissism can be expressed in grandiose or vulnerable forms. We examined whether positive psychological states (defined by the Oxford Happiness Inventory (OHI) and the Diener Satisfaction With Life (SWL) scales) assisted differentiation relative to general personality traits and the “the Dark Triad” (psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism, measured by the D12 and Short Dark Triad (SD3) indices) for 840 persons primarily from the UK, USA and Canada. The best fitting structural equation model comprised two latent variables, one of positive mood (comprising total scores on the OHI and SWL scales), and another forming a “dark dyad” of Machiavellianism and psychopathy (predicted by low agreeableness and lower positive mood), with narcissism regarded as a separate construct correlated with the dark dyad. Latent positive mood was primarily predicted by higher emotional stability and extraversion. Narcissism was predicted by lower emotional stability, lower agreeableness, and higher extraversion. Latent profile analysis identified four groups in the data: “unhappy but not narcissistic”, “vulnerable narcissism”, “happy non-narcissism” and “grandiose narcissism”. Our results suggest more problematic narcissism can be identified by reference to measures indexing positive mood states and general personality traits.     

Unraveling Brain Functional Connectivity of encoding and retrieval in the context of education

Human memory is an enigmatic component of cognition which many researchers have attempted to comprehend. Accumulating studies on functional connectivity see brain as a complex dynamic unit with positively and negatively correlated networks in perfect coherence during a task. We aimed to examine coherence of network connectivity during visual memory encoding and retrieval in the context of education. School Educated (SE) and College Educated (CE) healthy volunteers (n = 60) were recruited and assessed for visual encoding and retrieval. Functional connectivity using seed to voxel based connectivity analysis of the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) was evaluated. We noticed that there were reciprocal dynamic changes in both dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) region and PCC regions during working memory encoding and retrieval. In agreement with the previous studies, there were more positively correlated regions during retrieval compared to encoding. The default mode network (DMN) networks showed greater negative correlations during more attentive task of visual encoding. In tune with the recent studies on cognitive reserve we also found that number of years of education was a significant factor influencing working memory connectivity. SE had higher positive correlation to DLPFC region and lower negative correlation to DMN in comparison with CE during encoding and retrieval.     

Rotating With Rotated Text: A Natural Behavior Approach to Investigating Cognitive Offloading

Determining how we use our body to support cognition represents an important part of understanding the embodied and embedded nature of cognition. In the present investigation, we pursue this question in the context of a common perceptual task. Specifically, we report a series of experiments investigating head tilt (i.e., external normalization) as a strategy in letter naming and reading stimuli that are upright or rotated. We demonstrate that the frequency of this natural behavior is modulated by the cost of stimulus rotation on performance. In addition, we demonstrate that external normalization can benefit performance. All of the results are consistent with the notion that external normalization represents a form of cognitive offloading and that effort is an important factor in the decision to adopt an internal or external strategy.     

Evaluations Versus Expectations: Children's Divergent Beliefs About Resource Distribution

Past research reveals a tension between children's preferences for egalitarianism and ingroup favoritism when distributing resources to others. Here we investigate how children's evaluations and expectations of others' behaviors compare. Four‐ to 10‐year‐old children viewed events where individuals from two different groups distributed resources to their own group, to the other group, or equally across groups. Groups were described within a context of intergroup competition over scarce resources. In the Evaluation condition, children were asked to evaluate which resource distribution actions were nicer. In the Expectation condition, children were asked to predict which events were more likely to occur. With age, children's evaluations and expectations of others' actions diverged: Children evaluated egalitarian actions as nicer yet expected others to behave in ways that benefit their own group. Thus, children's evaluations about the way human social actors should behave do not mirror their expectations concerning those individuals' actions.     

Who’s bringing the donuts: The role of affective patterns in group decision making

Two studies examined how intragroup affective patterns influence groups’ pervasive tendency to ignore the unique expertise of their members. Using a hidden profile task, Study 1 provided evidence that groups with at least one member experiencing positive affect shared more unique information than groups composed entirely of members experiencing neutral affect. This occurred because group members experiencing positive affect were more likely to initiate unique information sharing, as well as information seeking. Study 2 built upon this base by showing that confidence mediates the relationship between positive affect and the initiation of unique information sharing. Additionally, Study 2 investigated the role of negative affect in group decision making and how negative and positive affect concurrently influence decision making when groups are composed of members experiencing each. The results are discussed in terms of the role affect plays in influencing group behavior and the resultant importance of investigating specific affective patterns.     

SAwSu: An Integrated Model of Associative and Reinforcement Learning

Successfully explaining and replicating the complexity and generality of human and animal learning will require the integration of a variety of learning mechanisms. Here, we introduce a computational model which integrates associative learning (AL) and reinforcement learning (RL). We contrast the integrated model with standalone AL and RL models in three simulation studies. First, a synthetic grid‐navigation task is employed to highlight performance advantages for the integrated model in an environment where the reward structure is both diverse and dynamic. The second and third simulations contrast the performances of the three models in behavioral experiments, demonstrating advantages for the integrated model in accounting for behavioral data.     

Constructive criticism: An evaluation of Buller and Hardcastle's genetic and neuroscientific arguments against Evolutionary Psychology

David Buller and Valerie Hardcastle have argued that various discoveries about the genetics and nature of brain development show that most “central” psychological mechanisms cannot be adaptations because the nature of the contribution from the environment on which they are based shows they are not heritable. Some philosophers and scientists have argued that a strong role for the environment is compatible with high heritability as long as the environment is highly stable down lineages. In this paper I support this view by arguing that the discoveries Buller and Hardcastle refer to either do not show as strong a role for the environment as they suggest, or these discoveries show that the brain's developmental process depends in many cases on input from the environment that is highly stable across generations.     

Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision

This paper examines the relationship between cognitive impenetrability and perceptual nonconceptualism. I argue against the view, recently defended by Raftopoulos, that the (alleged) cognitive impenetrability of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for states of early vision and their content to be nonconceptual. I show that that view, here dubbed ‘the mutually entailing thesis’, admits two different standard interpretations depending on how we understand the property of being nonconceptual—corresponding to the distinction between the state and the content views of perceptual nonconceptualism. I first argue for the falsity of the state-nonconceptualist reading of the mutually entailing thesis, on the grounds that it mistakenly takes being nonconceptual to be a causal instead of a constitutive relationship. The content-nonconceptualist understanding of the thesis, I then argue, is disproved by plausible views regarding the content of experience. The mutually entailing thesis could only be true, I conclude, on a non-standard, causal interpretation of the notion of nonconceptual content. Yet, on that reading, the thesis would either be trivially true or would entirely fail to engage with the contemporary literature on perceptual nonconceptualism. Some potential relationships between the causal reading of the mutually entailing thesis and psychological research in this area are also briefly discussed.     

Why there might be a moral faculty: A reply to Johnson

Is there a cognitive faculty dedicated to the moral domain? Mark Johnson has developed a number of arguments against the existence of such a faculty. I claim that these arguments are not persuasive and that there may be a moral faculty.     

The myth of the moral faculty: Response to Kirkby

David Kirkby argues that I have misrepresented Marc Hauser's conception of a moral faculty, in a way that invalidates my chief arguments against the existence and necessity of such a faculty. The core of Kirkby's challenge is that what Hauser lists as necessary conditions for the moral faculty to do its work are not themselves components of that faculty. I argue that there is no useful way to distinguish necessary conditions of moral judgments from the alleged moral faculty itself, and that even if we could do this, we would be left with an empty non-explanation of the supposed moral faculty that amounts to nothing more than the claim that we have a faculty that generates judgments of right versus wrong.