SAwSu: An Integrated Model of Associative and Reinforcement Learning

Successfully explaining and replicating the complexity and generality of human and animal learning will require the integration of a variety of learning mechanisms. Here, we introduce a computational model which integrates associative learning (AL) and reinforcement learning (RL). We contrast the integrated model with standalone AL and RL models in three simulation studies. First, a synthetic grid‐navigation task is employed to highlight performance advantages for the integrated model in an environment where the reward structure is both diverse and dynamic. The second and third simulations contrast the performances of the three models in behavioral experiments, demonstrating advantages for the integrated model in accounting for behavioral data.     

反复胸闷胸痛伴心理精神障碍的诊疗进展

近年来,临床中关于反复胸闷胸痛患者的较高误诊率引起了广大医务工作者的重视,此类患者伴有的心理精神障碍往往被忽视,得不到合理的治疗,预后较差.本文主要讨论关于反复胸闷胸痛患者病因的鉴别、心理精神障碍引起胸闷胸痛的机制、胸闷胸痛与心理精神障碍的关系、“双心”医学诊疗模式以及反复胸闷胸痛的治疗进展,通过增强临床医生对“双心”医学的认识降低胸闷胸痛患者的误诊率、漏诊率,减少过度治疗,通过心血管医学和心理干预联合治疗,改善心血管疾病患者的预后、降低死亡率.     

Constructive criticism: An evaluation of Buller and Hardcastle's genetic and neuroscientific arguments against Evolutionary Psychology

David Buller and Valerie Hardcastle have argued that various discoveries about the genetics and nature of brain development show that most “central” psychological mechanisms cannot be adaptations because the nature of the contribution from the environment on which they are based shows they are not heritable. Some philosophers and scientists have argued that a strong role for the environment is compatible with high heritability as long as the environment is highly stable down lineages. In this paper I support this view by arguing that the discoveries Buller and Hardcastle refer to either do not show as strong a role for the environment as they suggest, or these discoveries show that the brain's developmental process depends in many cases on input from the environment that is highly stable across generations.     

Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision

This paper examines the relationship between cognitive impenetrability and perceptual nonconceptualism. I argue against the view, recently defended by Raftopoulos, that the (alleged) cognitive impenetrability of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for states of early vision and their content to be nonconceptual. I show that that view, here dubbed ‘the mutually entailing thesis’, admits two different standard interpretations depending on how we understand the property of being nonconceptual—corresponding to the distinction between the state and the content views of perceptual nonconceptualism. I first argue for the falsity of the state-nonconceptualist reading of the mutually entailing thesis, on the grounds that it mistakenly takes being nonconceptual to be a causal instead of a constitutive relationship. The content-nonconceptualist understanding of the thesis, I then argue, is disproved by plausible views regarding the content of experience. The mutually entailing thesis could only be true, I conclude, on a non-standard, causal interpretation of the notion of nonconceptual content. Yet, on that reading, the thesis would either be trivially true or would entirely fail to engage with the contemporary literature on perceptual nonconceptualism. Some potential relationships between the causal reading of the mutually entailing thesis and psychological research in this area are also briefly discussed.     

Why there might be a moral faculty: A reply to Johnson

Is there a cognitive faculty dedicated to the moral domain? Mark Johnson has developed a number of arguments against the existence of such a faculty. I claim that these arguments are not persuasive and that there may be a moral faculty.     

The myth of the moral faculty: Response to Kirkby

David Kirkby argues that I have misrepresented Marc Hauser's conception of a moral faculty, in a way that invalidates my chief arguments against the existence and necessity of such a faculty. The core of Kirkby's challenge is that what Hauser lists as necessary conditions for the moral faculty to do its work are not themselves components of that faculty. I argue that there is no useful way to distinguish necessary conditions of moral judgments from the alleged moral faculty itself, and that even if we could do this, we would be left with an empty non-explanation of the supposed moral faculty that amounts to nothing more than the claim that we have a faculty that generates judgments of right versus wrong.     

The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual content

I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain, first, the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that is, it is NCC. Then, I examine the definitions of NCC and argue that they lead to the view that the NCC of perception is retrieved in a stage of visual processing that is CI. Thus, the CI of a state and content is a sufficient and necessary condition for the state and its content to be purely NCC, the CI?≡?NCC thesis. Since early vision is CI, the purely NCC of perception is formed in early vision. I defend the CI?≡?NCC thesis by arguing against objections raised against both the sufficient and the necessary part of the thesis.     

A neural cognitive model of argumentation with application to legal inference and decision making

Formal models of argumentation have been investigated in several areas, from multi-agent systems and artificial intelligence (AI) to decision making, philosophy and law. In artificial intelligence, logic-based models have been the standard for the representation of argumentative reasoning. More recently, the standard logic-based models have been shown equivalent to standard connectionist models. This has created a new line of research where (i) neural networks can be used as a parallel computational model for argumentation and (ii) neural networks can be used to combine argumentation, quantitative reasoning and statistical learning. At the same time, non-standard logic models of argumentation started to emerge. In this paper, we propose a connectionist cognitive model of argumentation that accounts for both standard and non-standard forms of argumentation. The model is shown to be an adequate framework for dealing with standard and non-standard argumentation, including joint-attacks, argument support, ordered attacks, disjunctive attacks, meta-level attacks, self-defeating attacks, argument accrual and uncertainty. We show that the neural cognitive approach offers an adequate way of modelling all of these different aspects of argumentation. We have applied the framework to the modelling of a public prosecution charging decision as part of a real legal decision making case study containing many of the above aspects of argumentation. The results show that the model can be a useful tool in the analysis of legal decision making, including the analysis of what-if questions and the analysis of alternative conclusions. The approach opens up two new perspectives in the short-term: the use of neural networks for computing prevailing arguments efficiently through the propagation in parallel of neuronal activations, and the use of the same networks to evolve the structure of the argumentation network through learning (e.g. to learn the strength of arguments from data).     

Cognitive load while driving impairs memory of moving but not stationary elements within the environment

The negative impact of cognitive load, such as cell phone conversations, while driving is well established, but understanding the nature of this performance deficit is still being developed. To test the impact of load on awareness of different elements in a driving scene, memory for items within the environment was examined under load and no load conditions. Participants drove through two different scenarios in a driving simulator, were periodically interrupted by a pause in the driving during, and were asked questions regarding moving and stationary objects in the environment. Participants in the load condition drove while concurrently counting backwards by sevens. Results indicate that driving under load conditions led to diminished knowledge of moving, but not stationary, objects in the scene. This result suggests not all types of knowledge are equally impaired. Potential implications for current theories of cell phone use while driving and applied attention theory are discussed.     

Evaluating the effectiveness of employee assistance programmes: a systematic review

The rapid growth of employee assistance Programmes (EAPs) has not been matched by the accompanying research base of their efficacy. Given the inconsistent information relating to the effectiveness of EAPs in enhancing employee and organizational outcomes, the present review systematically appraised available evidence from organizational psychology and business databases and grey literature sources. A total of 17 studies examining the impact of EAPs, met the inclusion criteria. These were mostly from North America and utilized quantitative methodology and pre- and post-intervention designs. The majority of studies focused on EAPs offered by external providers and the counselling service, with the most common limitations being discrepancies in variable definitions and an absent comparable control group. Overall, this review found that utilizing EAPs enhanced employee outcomes, specifically improving levels of presenteeism and functioning. Absenteeism was most commonly investigated but produced mixed results. Presenteeism demonstrated a stronger effect size and greater improvement than absenteeism, suggesting presenteeism as a better variable for assessing EAP effectiveness. This review clarified parameters of existing evidence and highlighted the narrow range of measures used to date, omitting important constructs such as health and well-being and productivity. A broader evaluation capturing a wider range of variables is urgently needed.