Holistic processing and reliance on global viewing strategies in older adults' face perception

There is increasing evidence that face recognition might be impaired in older adults, but it is unclear whether the impairment is truly perceptual, and face specific. In order to address this question we compared performance in same/different matching tasks with face and non-face objects (watches) among young (mean age 23.7) and older adults (mean age 70.4) using a context congruency paradigm (Meinhardt-Injac, Persike & Meinhardt, 2010, Meinhardt-Injac, Persike and Meinhardt, 2011a). Older adults were less accurate than young adults with both object classes, while face matching was notably impaired. Effects of context congruency and inversion, measured as the hallmarks of holistic processing, were equally strong in both age groups, and were found only for faces, but not for watches. The face specific decline in older adults revealed deficits in handling internal facial features, while young adults matched external and internal features equally well. Comparison with non-face stimuli showed that this decline was face specific, and did not concern processing of object features in general. Taken together, the results indicate no age-related decline in the capabilities to process faces holistically. Rather, strong holistic effects, combined with a loss of precision in handling internal features indicate that older adults rely on global viewing strategies for faces. At the same time, access to the exact properties of inner face details becomes restricted.     

Confidence–accuracy resolution in the misinformation paradigm is influenced by the availability of source cues

After witnessing an event, people often report having seen details that were merely suggested to them. Evidence is mixed regarding how well participants can use confidence judgments to discriminate between their correct and misled memory reports. We tested the prediction that the confidence–accuracy relationship for misled details depends upon the availability of source cues at retrieval. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 77) viewed a videotaped staged crime before reading a misleading narrative. After seven minutes or one week, the participants completed a cued recall test for the details of the original event. Prior to completing the test, all participants were warned that the narrative contained misleading details to encourage source monitoring. The results showed that the strength of the confidence–accuracy relationship declined significantly over the delay. We interpret our results in the source monitoring framework. After an extended delay, fewer diagnostic source details were available to participants, increasing reliance on retrieval fluency as a basis for memory and metamemory decisions. We tested this interpretation in a second experiment, in which participants (N = 42) completed a source monitoring test instead of a cued recall test. We observed a large effect of retention interval on source monitoring, and no significant effect on item memory. This research emphasizes the importance of securing eyewitness statements as soon as possible after an event, when witnesses are most able to discriminate between information that was personally seen and information obtained from secondary sources.     

Immediate emotion-enhanced memory dependent on arousal and valence: The role of automatic and controlled processing

The phenomenon that emotional stimuli are better remembered than neutral ones is called emotion-enhanced memory (EEM). Previous studies have shown that both valence and arousal of stimuli contributed to EEM. Kensinger and Corkin (2004) proposed that the EEM dependent on arousal was associated with automatic encoding processes, whereas the EEM dependent on valence was associated with controlled encoding processes. Their experiment with negative words provided some evidence for this associative pattern. However, it is unclear whether the observed association that occurred with negative emotional stimuli could be replicated with positive emotional stimuli. To further examine this issue, two experiments were conducted to investigate the immediate EEM of emotional words in three different attention conditions using a divided attention (DA) paradigm. Results indicated that the immediate EEM dependent on valence was associated with controlled processing, while the immediate EEM dependent on arousal was not always associated with automatic processing. The immediate EEM dependent on arousal for negative stimuli was associated with automatic processing, whereas the immediate EEM dependent on arousal for positive stimuli was associated with controlled processing. Therefore, the immediate EEM dependent on arousal, whether it is associated with automatic or controlled processing, is moderated by the valence of stimuli.     

Gradual proportion congruent effects in the absence of sequential congruent effects

In perceptual filtering tasks, congruency effects vary as a function of proportion congruent (PC), with smaller congruency effects when congruent trials are rare than when they are frequent. This effect is typically larger with extreme differences between high and low proportion congruent conditions (e.g., 80% congruent–20% incongruent) than with intermediate differences (e.g., 60% congruent–40% incongruent; Logan & Zbofroff, 1979; Blais & Bunge, 2010). Some authors have claimed that both PC effects can be explained in terms of the same reactive cognitive control mechanism that is responsible for sequential congruency (SC) effects (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). In fact, in most previous studies there was a systematic confounding between proportion congruent and the proportion of transitions involving an incongruent trial followed by another incongruent trial. In the present study we eliminated this confound and tested directly whether PC effects can still be measured in the absence of SC effects. Once confirmed, we studied the properties of this pure form of PC effect, in particular whether it is conflict-type specific or general, and whether it decreases gradually as a function of changes in proportion congruency (80% vs. 70% vs. 60%). Our results showed significant PC effects in the absence of SC effects, which replicates our previous findings (Torres-Quesada, Milliken, Lupiáñez, & Funes, 2014), and PC effects that can be conflict-type general or specific, depending on the nature of conflict type where they were produced. Importantly, the congruency effect was modulated by the level of proportion congruent, decreasing systematically as the absolute percentage of incongruent trials decreases.     

Involvement of shared resources in time judgment and sequence reasoning tasks

Previous research suggests that time perception is supported by the same attentional resources involved in sequence processing. The present experiment was designed to clarify this connection by examining the relation between timing and reasoning tasks that involved either sequencing or non-sequencing judgments. For the timing task, subjects produced a series of 5-s intervals. For the reasoning tasks, subjects judged whether pairs of statements describing common actions either (a) were presented in the correct temporal order (sequencing), or (b) described similar actions or objects (similarity). Subjects performed the timing and reasoning tasks both separately and concurrently in a series of 3-minute trials. Comparisons of single-task and dual-task performance assessed interference patterns between concurrent tasks. Both reasoning tasks interfered with timing by making temporal productions longer and more variable. Timing had differential effects on the two reasoning tasks. Concurrent timing caused sequencing judgments to become slower, less accurate, and less sensitive relative to sequencing-only conditions. In contrast, similarity judgments were either unaffected or affected to a lesser degree by the concurrent timing task. These results support the notion that timing and sequencing are closely related processes that rely on the same set of cognitive resources or mechanisms.     

“Piensa” twice: On the foreign language effect in decision making

In this article, we assess to what extent decision making is affected by the language in which a given problem is presented (native vs. foreign). In particular, we aim to ask whether the impact of various heuristic biases in decision making is diminished when the problems are presented in a foreign language. To this end, we report four main studies in which more than 700 participants were tested on different types of individual decision making problems. In the first study, we replicated Keysar et al.’s (2012) recent observation regarding the foreign language effect on framing effects related to loss aversion. In the second section, we assessed whether the foreign language effect is present in other types of framing problems that involve psychological accounting biases rather than gain/loss dichotomies. In the third section, we studied the foreign language effect in several key aspects of the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty. In the fourth study, we assessed the presence of a foreign language effect in the cognitive reflection test, a test that includes logical problems that do not carry emotional connotations. The absence of such an effect in this test suggests that foreign language leads to a reduction of heuristic biases in decision making across a range of decision making situations and provide also some evidence about the boundaries of the phenomenon. We explore several potential factors that may underlie the foreign language effect in decision making.     

Evaluating the fakability of a conditional reasoning test of addiction proneness

The quest to assess personality objectively is riddled with challenges. However, conditional reasoning (CR) methodology takes an innovative approach to personality measurement by indirectly evaluating the cognitive biases associated with specific dispositional traits. In addition to demonstrating strong criterion‐related validities, the CR format has been shown to be more resistant to response distortion than traditional self‐report measures so long as indirect measurement is maintained. The present study evaluated the necessity of maintaining the indirect nature of a CR‐based measure of addiction proneness. Results indicated that disclosing the purpose of assessment yielded significant mean shifts on a CR‐based measure of addiction proneness compared to those of an uninformed group. Specifically, when the construct of interest was made explicit, participants could identify the keyed response options when instructed to do so. These findings further underscore the necessity of maintaining indirect measurement when administering CR measures.     

Use and interpretation of test scores from limited cognitive test batteries: How g + Gc can equal g

Single scores from limited and unbalanced test batteries of cognitive ability can be ambiguous to interpret theoretically. In this study, a limited verbally and knowledge‐loaded cognitive test battery, from applicants to the Swedish police academies (N = 1,344), was examined to provide foundations for the use and interpretation of test scores. Three measurement models were compared: one single factor model and two bifactor models, which decomposed the variance of the battery into orthogonal components. The models were evaluated by fit indices and omega coefficients, and then applied to the prediction of academic performance. The overall prediction of all models was similar, although specific abilities also were found to provide substantial predictive validity over and above general intelligence (g). The findings provide support for the use of single scores in applied settings (selection), but suggest that it may be more appropriate to interpret such scores as composites of substantive components, and not just as measures of g.     

Cognitive biases in aggressive drivers: Does illusion of control drive us off the road?

Anger has been shown to be a motivating factor in aggression and it is widely accepted that driving anger may lead to aggressive driving. However, the link between anger and aggressive driving is likely to be mediated by drivers’ pre-existing cognitive biases and the subsequent situational evaluations made. This study investigated the extent to which optimism bias, illusion of control beliefs and driver anger predict self-reported hostile driving behaviours. A total of 220 licensed drivers (106 men; 114 women) completed a self-report questionnaire measuring trait driving anger, optimism bias, illusion of control and driving behaviour. Structural Equation Modelling showed that trait driving anger and illusion of control beliefs account for 37% of the variance in hostile driving behaviour scores. Optimism biases were unrelated to hostile driving behaviours. Thus, driving anger propensities and feelings of control over the situation, but not a general tendency to underestimate the likelihood of adverse outcomes, predict aggressive driving.     

Discovering the Sequential Structure of Thought

Multi‐voxel pattern recognition techniques combined with Hidden Markov models can be used to discover the mental states that people go through in performing a task. The combined method identifies both the mental states and how their durations vary with experimental conditions. We apply this method to a task where participants solve novel mathematical problems. We identify four states in the solution of these problems: Encoding, Planning, Solving, and Respond. The method allows us to interpret what participants are doing on individual problem‐solving trials. The duration of the planning state varies on a trial‐to‐trial basis with novelty of the problem. The duration of solution stage similarly varies with the amount of computation needed to produce a solution once a plan is devised. The response stage similarly varies with the complexity of the answer produced. In addition, we identified a number of effects that ran counter to a prior model of the task. Thus, we were able to decompose the overall problem‐solving time into estimates of its components and in way that serves to guide theory.