The Northwestern-UCLA youth emotion project: Associations of cognitive vulnerabilities, neuroticism and gender with past diagnoses of emotional disorders in adolescents

Neuroticism has been hypothesized to be a non-specific risk factor for both anxiety and unipolar mood disorders whereas some cognitive and personality-cognitive vulnerabilities have been hypothesized to be more specific to depression. Using a retrospective design with a sample of 575 high school juniors, we tested three competing models of the associations among these variables. Both neuroticism and the cognitive and personality-cognitive vulnerabilities had significant zero-order associations with rates of past diagnoses of both anxiety and unipolar mood disorders. Neuroticism had significant unique associations with past anxiety disorders and comorbid anxiety and unipolar mood disorders whereas the other vulnerabilities did not. In addition, gender interacted with neuroticism but not with the other vulnerabilities in associating with past diagnoses of mood disorders, showing that neuroticism is more highly associated with past unipolar mood diagnoses in males than in females. Finally, the cognitive and personality-cognitive vulnerabilities overlapped with substantial portions of the variance that neuroticism shared with diagnoses. These results suggest that, at least for retrospective associations with past anxiety and unipolar mood disorders, the cognitive and other personality-cognitive vulnerabilities are non-specific facets of neuroticism.     

Priming associations between bodily sensations and catastrophic misinterpretations: Specific for panic disorder?

Cognitive models assume that panic disorder is characterised by a tendency to misinterpret benign bodily symptoms (e.g. breathlessness) in a catastrophic fashion (e.g. suffocation). This is a central part of the cognitive model which presents a core focus for treatment. Several studies have supported this hypothesis. These studies have, however, almost always relied on self-report. In addition to susceptibility to biases (e.g. distortions of memory), a limitation of research based on verbal report is its inability to capture the spontaneous/automatic nature that is attributed to these catastrophic interpretations. The present paper reports on two experiments in which a priming procedure was used to test the hypothesis that panic disorder is characterised by spontaneous catastrophic interpretations and whether this effect is ‘specific’ to panic disorder. In line with predictions from the cognitive model, it was observed in the first experiment that the panic group demonstrated facilitated responses to trials consisting of a ‘symptom’ prime and a ‘catastrophic outcome’ target (e.g. breathlessness - suffocate). Similar effects were not observed for an anxious control group and a nonclinical control group, supporting the specificity of this effect. Interestingly, however, significant priming effects were observed for a group of mental health professionals (part of the healthy control group) who had no history of panic disorder. Subsequently, this unexpected observation was explicitly addressed in a second experiment, which confirmed the findings of Experiment 1. Together, these results suggest that associations between mental representations of benign bodily symptoms and catastrophic outcomes might develop as part of professional knowledge and experience, and should not necessarily be viewed as pathogenic. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.     

Extreme thinking in clinically depressed adolescents: Results from the Treatment for Adolescents with Depression Study (TADS)

The purpose of this report is to examine relations between extreme thinking, as measured by the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, and the maintenance of gains among adolescents who participated in the Treatment for Adolescents with Depression Study (TADS). We examine extreme thinking among 327 adolescents (mean age = 14.56, 57% female, 75% White) who received cognitive behavior therapy (CBT), fluoxetine (FLX), or a combination of CBT and FLX (COMB). Among those who met remission status on the Children’s Depression Rating Scale - Revised (CDRS-R ≤ 28; 56 at week 12, 79 at week 18) extreme thinking did not predict failure to maintain remission. This is in contrast to findings with depressed adults. Treatment influenced level of extreme thinking, and this appeared to be driven by greater endorsement of positively valenced beliefs as opposed to a decrease in negatively valenced beliefs. Developmental or investigation characteristics may account for the discrepancy in findings.     

How focus at encoding affects children’s source monitoring

Retention of source information is enhanced by focus on speakers’ feelings about statements even though recognition is reduced for both adults and children. However, does any focus on another person lead to enhanced source monitoring, or is a particular kind of focus required? Does other-focus enhance source monitoring, or does self-focus detract from it? In Experiment 1, 4- and 6-year-olds watched two speakers make statements in a no-focus control or with focus directed on how they (or a speaker) felt about the statements or on perceptual features about themselves (or the speaker). Source monitoring decisions were enhanced by other-focus in both the perceptual and emotional conditions. However, the effect was larger for the emotional condition, and source monitoring exceeded no-focus controls only for this condition. Experiment 2 showed no effect of other-focus versus self-focus on source monitoring when questions were semantic.     

Rats place greater value on rewards produced by high effort: An animal analogue of the “effort justification” effect

The effort justification phenomenon, in which greater value is given to rewards that require more effort to obtain, is frequently explained in terms of cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Here, we employed a novel combination of operant and lick analysis techniques to show that rats place more value on a sucrose reward when it follows high effort than when the same reward follows low effort. This is the first demonstration of a direct analogue of the effort justification phenomenon in nonhuman animals. As the behavior of rats is normally considered in terms of relatively simple mechanisms, the current results question the need for complex cognitive accounts for the effort justification phenomenon (in rats or humans). As an alternative, we examine the possibility that high effort produces an aversive state that enhances reward value by a process of contrast.     

The relative unnaturalness of atheism: On why Geertz and Markússon are both right and wrong

Commonly scholars in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have advanced the naturalness of religion thesis. That is, ordinary cognitive resources operating in ordinary human environments typically lead to some kind of belief in supernatural agency and perhaps other religious ideas. Special cultural scaffolding is unnecessary. Supernaturalism falls near a natural anchor point. In contrast, widespread conscious rejection of the supernatural as in atheism appears to require either special cultural conditions that upset ordinary function, cognitive effort, or a good degree of cultural scaffolding to move people away from their maturationally natural anchor-points. Geertz and Markússon (2009) identify ways to strengthen cognitive approaches to the study of religion and culture, including atheism, but fail to demonstrate that atheism is as natural in a comparable respect as theism.     

Political Conservatism,Need for Cognitive Closure,and Intergroup Hostility

Two studies examined the interaction of political conservatism and the need for cognitive closure in predicting aggressiveness in intergroup conflict and hostility toward outgroups. In the first study, Polish participants indicated their preference for coercive conflict strategies in the context of a real‐life intergroup conflict. Only among participants who identify themselves as conservative, need for cognitive closure was positively and significantly related to preference for aggressive actions against the outgroup. In the second study, the predicted interaction was investigated in the context of the terrorist threat in Poland. The findings indicated that high in need for closure conservatives showed greater hostility against Arabs and Muslims only when they believed that Poland was under threat of terrorist attacks inspired by Islamist fundamentalism.     

A time of change: Behavioral and neural correlates of adolescent sensitivity to appetitive and aversive environmental cues

Adolescence is a developmental period that entails substantial changes in affective and incentive-seeking behavior relative to both childhood and adulthood, including a heightened propensity to engage in risky behaviors and experience persistent negative and labile mood states. This review discusses the emotional and incentive-driven behavioral changes in adolescents and their associated neural mechanisms, focusing on the dynamic interactions between the amygdala, ventral striatum, and prefrontal cortex. Common behavioral changes during adolescence may be associated with a heightened responsiveness to incentives and emotional cues while the capacity to effectively engage in cognitive and emotion regulation is still relatively immature. We highlight empirical work in humans and animals that addresses the interactions between these neural systems in adolescents relative to children and adults, and propose a neurobiological model that may account for the nonlinear changes in adolescent behavior. Finally, we discuss other influences that may contribute to exaggerated reward and emotion processing associated with adolescence, including hormonal fluctuations and the role of the social environment.     

Emotion and object processing in Parkinson’s disease

The neuropsychological literature on the processing of emotions in Parkinson’s disease (PD) reveals conflicting evidence about the role of the basal ganglia in the recognition of facial emotions. Hence, the present study had two objectives. One was to determine the extent to which the visual processing of emotions and objects differs in PD. The other was to assess the impact of cognitive load on the processing of these types of information. Thirty-one patients with idiopathic PD (IPD) under dopamine replacement therapy (DRT) were compared to 30 control subjects on emotion and object recognition tasks. Recognition of objects was more accurate and faster than recognition of facial expressions of emotion, for both groups of subjects. In a second experiment using an N-back procedure with the same stimuli—a more demanding task with a higher cognitive load—patients with IPD were as accurate as control subjects in detecting the correct sequential presentation of stimuli, but were much slower in their decision responses. This indicates that IPD patients under DRT are not impaired in encoding emotion or object information, but that they have difficulty with the processing demands of the N-back task. Thus, patients with IPD appear to be more sensitive to cognitive load than to type of information, whether facial emotions or objects. In this perspective, one must consider that a deafferented dopaminergic system has problems processing more complex information before one can posit the existence of deficits affecting a specific type of information.     

Cortisol,interleukins and S100B in delirium in the elderly

In independent studies delirium was associated with higher levels of cortisol, interleukin(IL)s, and S100B. The aim of this study was to simultaneously compare cortisol, IL-6, IL-8, and S100B levels in patients aged 65 years and older admitted for hip fracture surgery with and without delirium. Cortisol, IL-6, IL-8, and S100B were assayed in repeated blood samples. 120 patients (mean age 84 years, 62 patients with delirium) were included. Highest levels of IL-8 (27.1, 95% Confidence Interval (CI): 13.6–53.1 pg/ml) and cortisol (666, 95% CI: 475–859 nmol/L) were before delirium, but of IL-6 (84.3, 95% CI: 46.5–151.4 pg/mL) and S100B (0.18, 95% CI: 0.12–0.24 μg/L) during delirium. In multivariable analysis cortisol, LogIL-6, and LogS100B were significantly associated with delirium, but adjusted for pre-existing cognitive impairment, only LogS100B remained significantly associated. Cortisol, IL-6 and S100B may have a role in the pathogenesis of delirium, but S100B is the strongest independent marker.