A preliminary investigation of the effect of hypomanic personality on the specificity and speed of autobiographical memory recall

There is some evidence that patients with bipolar disorder recall more overgeneral than specific autobiographical memories, a pattern widely reported in depression. However, there are also theoretical arguments (Barnard, Watkins, & Ramponi, 2006) suggesting that experiential processing should predominate during mania/hypomania, with an associated prediction of an increase in specific rather than overgeneral memories. This hypothesis was explicitly tested using the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT). The specificity and speed of autobiographical recollection was compared for those with high or low levels of hypomanic personality as indexed by the Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS). High HPS scorers recalled specific autobiographical memories in response to unpleasant cues more frequently and faster than low scorers. These results provide partial support for the hypothesis, but only for unpleasant cues.     

Does post-event cognitive load undermine thought suppression and increase intrusive memories after exposure to an analogue stressor?

Ironic process theory has been used in part to explain the phenomenon of intrusive memories in various disorders including post-traumatic stress disorder. How thought suppression interacts with other cognitive processes believed to be instrumental in the development of traumatic intrusive memory was tested. In an analogue design 120 participants were randomised to five conditions, four of which also required participants to attempt to suppress intrusive memories after viewing a film of traumatic content. Participants in three conditions were also required to perform concurrent tasks that acted as a cognitive load during suppression. Intrusive memories were recorded during the experimental phase and at 1-week follow-up. Contrary to predictions, post-film processing did not undermine suppression success. There was some suggestion that post-film processing resulted in those participants experiencing intrusions of shorter duration than the no-suppression control group in two 5-minute intrusion monitoring intervals at the initial and follow-up phase of the experiment, but this was not reflected in a 1-week diary measure of intrusions. All experimental groups performed in a similar fashion in terms of memory testing of the film's content. The findings are discussed in the context of ironic process theory and cognitive models of post-traumatic stress.     

Increasing the number of contacts generated during contact tracing interviews

ABSTRACT

To stem the spread of infectious diseases (e.g., Ebola), epidemiologists conduct contact tracing interviews (CTIs) with infected individuals regarding their contacts who may also be infected. These contact tracing interviews, however, may be vulnerable to deadly errors of omission. A promising technique to maximise recall is the Cognitive Interview (CI), which is grounded in psychological theory. In the present study, participants imagined they were infected with meningococcal meningitis and reported their contacts over the previous three days during either a control interview or a CI. To model the cognitive impairment associated with being sick, half of the participants were interviewed while simultaneously completing a cognitive impairment task. The CI generated more contacts than the control interview. However, when the cognitive impairment task was completed, the CI and the control interview performed similarly. We recommend the CI be considered as an alternative to the control interview, particularly if the interviewee is not temporarily impaired due to distraction or illness.     

PTSD Severity and Cognitive Reactions to Trauma Among a College Sample

ABSTRACT

Two hundred twenty-one undergraduate education students were assessed to determine trauma history and cognitive responses to traumatic events. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire, the Cognitive Distortions Scale, and the PTSD Symptom Scale (for those reporting a trauma history). The most common types of traumatic events were domestic violence, natural disasters, and severe transportation accidents. Differences in cognitive distortions of individuals with and without a trauma history also were assessed. Individuals with a trauma history were significantly higher on Preoccupation with Danger and Self-Blame subscales. Number of previous traumatic events and the subscale of Preoccupation of Danger significantly predicted PTSD severity.     

Children's strategic compensation for size underconstancy: Dependence on distance and relation to reasoning ability

When asked to judge the size of a distant object, older children are more likely than younger ones to report deliberately inflating their judgements to compensate for size underconstancy (Granrud, in press). The current investigation examined whether use of this strategy depends on object distance and whether it is related to individual differences in reasoning, knowledge about size perception, or cognitive style. In two studies, children in Grades 1–3 estimated the size of a distant (61 m away) and near (6.1 m away) disc. In each, half of the children reported inflating their judgement of the distant disc to compensate for a tendency to underestimate its size, but only a few reported using this strategy for the near disc. Self-reported strategy users tended to either judge the distant disc accurately or to overestimate its size, whereas the other children tended to underestimate its size. Strategy reporters obtained higher scores on a test of verbal reasoning, but did not differ from the other children in reflectivity-impulsivity. In Study 1, strategy reporters also showed a better understanding of how distance affects the apparent size of objects in photographs. This understanding was strongly related to verbal reasoning ability. In Study 2, visuospatial reasoning ability was also found to predict who would report strategy use, and this predictive relation was independent of verbal reasoning ability.     

The impact of anxiety on analogical reasoning

The effect of state anxiety on analogical reasoning was investigated by examining qualitative differences in mapping performance between anxious and non-anxious individuals reasoning about pictorial analogies. The working-memory restriction theory of anxiety, coupled with theories of analogy that link complexity of mapping with working-memory capacity, predicts that high anxiety will impair the ability to find correspondences based on relations between multiple objects relative to correspondences based on overlap of attributes between individual objects. Anxiety was induced in one condition by a stressful speeded subtraction task administered prior to the analogy task. Anxious participants produced fewer relational responses and more attribute responses than did non-anxious participants, both in the absence of explicit instructions to find relational mappings (Experiment 1) and after receiving such instructions (Experiment 2). The findings support the postulated links among anxiety, working memory, and the ability to perform complex analogical mapping.     

From a fixation on sports to an exploration of mechanism: The past,present, and future of hot hand research

We review the literature on the hot hand fallacy by highlighting the positive and negative aspects of hot hand research over the past 20 years, and suggesting new avenues of research. Many researchers have focused on criticising Gilovich et al.'s claim that the hot hand fallacy exists in basketball and other sports, instead of exploring the general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human cognition and probabilistic reasoning. Noting that researchers have shown that people perceive hot streaks in a gambling domain in which systematic streaks cannot possibly exist, we suggest that researchers have paid too much attention to investigating the independence of outcomes in various sporting domains. Instead, we advocate a domain-general mechanistic approach to understanding the hot hand fallacy, and conclude by suggesting approaches that might refocus the literature on the important general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human probabilistic reasoning.     

Models of dependence and independence: A two-dimensional architecture of dual processing

This theoretical note proposes a two-dimensional cognitive architecture for dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making. Evans (2007b Evans, J. St. B. T. 2007b. On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 13: 321–339. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2008a Evans, J. St. B. T. 2008a. Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59: 255–278. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2009 Evans, J. St. B. T. and Frankish, K. 2009. In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, Oxford, , UK: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) distinguishes between two types of dual-processing models: parallel-competitive, in which both types of processes operate in parallel, and default-interventionist, in which heuristic processes precede the analytic processes. I suggest that this temporal dimension should be enhanced with a functional distinction between interactionist architecture, in which either type of process influences the content and valence of the other, and independent architecture, in which they do not. Override architecture is a special case of the latter, which postulates statistical interaction, but no interaction of valence and content. I show that this added dimensional distinction casts doubt on two assumptions of statistical modelling that Evans makes: independence and linearity. However, Evans' (2007b Evans, J. St. B. T. 2007b. On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 13: 321–339. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) point, that statistical modelling is underspecified vis-à-vis the verbal theory, is given further support. The functional dimension is crucial to interpreting the statistical model, as well as to theoretical understanding of the cognitive architecture and its educational applications.     

Executive functions in decision making: An individual differences approach

This individual differences study examined the relationships between three executive functions (updating, shifting, and inhibition), measured as latent variables, and performance on two cognitively demanding subtests of the Adult Decision Making Competence battery: Applying Decision Rules and Consistency in Risk Perception. Structural equation modelling showed that executive functions contribute differentially to performance in these two tasks, with Applying Decision Rules being mainly related to inhibition and Consistency in Risk Perception mainly associated to shifting. The results suggest that the successful application of decision rules requires the capacity to selectively focus attention and inhibit irrelevant (or no more relevant) stimuli. They also suggest that consistency in risk perception depends on the ability to shift between judgement contexts.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

Johnson, J.V., & Hohansson, G. (Eds.)- (1991). The psychosocial work environment: Work organization, democratization and health. Essays in memory of Bertil Gar dell. New York: Baywood. pp. 335. ISBN 0-89503-078-0 (hardback). ISBN 0-89503-077-2 (paperback).

Shackel, B., & Richardson, S. (Eds.) (1991). Human factors of informatics usability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 438. ISBN 0-521-36570-8. Hardback £35.00

Frese, M., & Brodbeck, F.C. (1989). Computer in Büro und Verwaltung. Berlin: Springer. Pp. 237. ISBN: 3-540-50774-4. DM 88. Published in German.