Cognitive-emotional dysfunction among noisy minds: Predictions from individual differences in reaction time variability

Mental noise can be defined as less reliable information processing. Individuals with high levels of mental noise are thought to be disadvantaged in cognitive, emotional, and behavioural realms. The present five studies (total N=298) investigated such potential disadvantages among normally functioning college undergraduates. Mental noise was operationalised in terms of the reaction time coefficient of variation (RTCV), a measure of RT variability that corrects for average levels of mental speed. Individuals with higher RTCV exhibited less effective cognitive control (Studies 1 and 5), less controlled behaviour (Study 2), and were more prone to negative emotional experiences (Study 3) and depressive symptoms (Study 4). Study 5 extended these results and found that individuals higher (versus lower) in RTCV were more adversely affected by their attentional lapses in daily life. Results converge on the idea that mental noise is an important individual difference dimension with multiple adverse correlates and consequences.     

Poorer sleep quality is associated with lower emotion-regulation ability in a laboratory paradigm

Theoretical models suggest a positive relationship between sleep quality and individuals' ability to regulate emotion. However, few studies have empirically tested this hypothesised link using standardised laboratory measures of emotion-regulation ability. The present research examined the relationship between sleep quality and the ability to implement a type of emotion regulation that has particularly important implications for psychological health: cognitive reappraisal (cognitively reframing an emotional event so as to dampen its impact). To do so, 156 participants (86 male) reported on their past week's sleep quality. Their ability to implement cognitive reappraisal (CRA) was then measured with a standardised laboratory challenge. Participants with poorer self-reported sleep quality exhibited lower CRA, even after controlling for fourteen potential key confounds (e.g., age, negative affect, mood disorder symptoms, stress). This finding is consistent with the idea that poorer sleep quality impairs individuals' ability to engage in the crucial task of regulating negative emotions.     

Neural predictive mechanisms and their role in cognitive incrementalism

Many neuroscientists view prediction as one of the core brain functions, especially on account of its support of fast movements in complex environments. This leads to the natural question whether predictive knowledge forms the cornerstone of our common-sense understanding of the world. However, there is little consensus as to the exact nature of predictive information and processes, or of the neural mechanisms that realize them. This paper compares procedural versus declarative notions of prediction, examines how the brain appears to carry out predictive functions, and discusses to what degree, and at what level, these neural mechanisms support cognitive incrementalism: the notion that high-level cognition stems from sensorimotor behavior.     

Past decisions do affect future choices: An experimental demonstration

This paper demonstrates experimentally that the mere fact that an alternative was chosen in the past increases the likelihood that it will be re-chosen in the future, when new alternatives are being offered. The experimental design consists of a new variation of the free-choice paradigm that is immune to Chen and Risen’s (2010) criticism of how results have been interpreted in previous studies of post-decision effects. An additional experiment indicates that once participants have chosen a particular alternative they view its characteristics more positively. I suggest that the new design can be used to study various aspects of the effect of past decisions on future ones. In the present paper, I apply it to show that the allocation of limited resources among various uses may be biased in favor of a particular use if it was preferred to another in a previous situation.     

Do you see what I see? The effect of members’ cognitive styles on team processes and errors in task execution

This research investigates the effect of members’ cognitive styles on team processes that affect errors in execution tasks. In two laboratory studies, we investigated how a team’s composition (members’ cognitive styles related to object and spatial visualization) affects the team’s strategic focus and strategic consensus, and how those affect the team’s commission of errors. Study 1, conducted with 70 dyads performing a navigation and identification task, established that teams high in spatial visualization are more process-focused than teams high in object visualization. Process focus, which pertains to a team’s attention to the details of conducting a task, is associated with fewer errors. Study 2, conducted with 64 teams performing a building task, established that heterogeneity in cognitive style is negatively associated with the formation of a strategic consensus, which has a direct and mediating relationship with errors.     

Learning and Affect Following Near‐Miss Outcomes in Simulated Gambling

Gambling near‐misses are non‐rewarded events that resemble a winning configuration. Past research using slot machines has shown that moderate rates of near‐misses increase gambling persistence, but the mechanisms supporting this persistence are unclear. One hypothesis is that near‐misses are mistakenly interpreted as signals of skill acquisition, supporting learning and fuelling the ‘illusion of control’. A slot machine simulation was administered to 60 volunteers, with ratings of the perceived chances of winning, pleasure and motivation to play following particular outcomes. Psychophysiological measures (electrodermal activity and heart rate) were taken, and gambling persistence was measured after 30 trials. Near‐misses were similar to full‐miss outcomes in that they were regarded as unpleasant. However, near‐misses were akin to win outcomes in that they increased motivations to play and electrodermal activity. Learning was evidenced by the expectancy of winning increasing following wins and decreasing after losses. Although there was no overall change in expectancy of winning after near‐misses across all participants, those subjects reporting a greater increase in the expectancy of winning following a near‐miss showed more persistent play, consistent with the learning hypothesis. Greater heart rate acceleration following near‐misses was also associated with persistence. We also observed differential effects of near‐misses where the reel stopped either side of the winning position (‘payline’): motivational effects were restricted to near‐misses stopping before the payline, whereas near‐misses that stopped after the payline were primarily aversive. The payline effects are not predicted by the learning hypothesis and may indicate an affective component to near‐misses, possibly linked to counterfactual processing. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preliminary evidence for low openness to experience as a pre-clinical marker of incipient cognitive decline in older adults

The current study examined self-reported Openness to Experience as a marker of incipient cognitive decline among older adults. Seventy five cognitively-intact, community-dwelling adults ages 58–87 were assessed with the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO PI-R; (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale 2nd edition (DRS-2; (Mattis, Jurica, & Leitten, 1988) to examine association with incipient decline over approximately 1 year. Low Openness to Experience was associated with decline, controlling for baseline screening scores, age, education, and the other four personality factors. Examination of facet-level associations indicated that lower scores on the Values and Aesthetics facets of Openness primarily explained the association. Current findings build on prior research suggesting that exaggerated reaction to novelty may signal pre-clinical cognitive decline.     

MOST intelligent people are accurate and SOME fast people are intelligent.: Intelligence,working memory,and semantic processing of quantifiers from a computational perspective

The paper explores the relationship between intelligence and the semantic processing of natural language quantifiers. The first study revealed that intelligence is positively associated with the subjects' performance when solving a picture verification task with one of the four types of sentences: Aristotelian (e.g. ‘All cars are red’), parity (e.g. ‘An even number of cars are red’), numerical (e.g. ‘More than five cars are red’), and proportional (‘More than half of the cars are red’). The strongest relationship was observed between the cognitive ability and the accuracy of proportional sentences, in accordance with the computational theory which predicts the highest engagement of working memory (WM) within the group of proportional quantifiers. Moreover, individuals with higher intelligence reacted faster, but this was observed only in case of quantifiers with low complexity. Exploring further, in the second study we found that WM and intelligence were both significant predictors of subjects' score on proportional sentences. In the third study, we examined the relationships between quantifiers, intelligence, short-term memory (STM), and executive control function. STM was correlated with all types of quantifiers that need counting and keeping track of elements (parity, numerical, and proportional). Only proportional quantifiers were associated with cognitive control. The obtained results are discussed within the computational paradigm of language processing.     

Adolescent intelligence and socio-economic wealth independently predict adult marital and reproductive behavior

Counter-intuitively, sociobiological and evolutionary theories predict a negative relationship between g and reproduction when applied to modern humans. Although existing research has documented this dysgenic trend, the association between g and socio-economic factors presents a confound that has not systematically been addressed in prior research. Based on a sample of 325,252 individuals drawn from the nationally representative Project Talent database, we examined the unique effects of g and socio-economic wealth, assessed in adolescence, on marital and reproductive behavior over the next 11 years. Results show that both g and socio-economic wealth have unique, independent negative effects on marital and reproductive behavior such that individuals of higher intelligence and higher wealth delay marriage and reproductive longer than those of lower intelligence and wealth. The effect of g was slightly stronger than that of wealth, though for both variables much of their influence was mediated by educational attainment. Consistent with sociobiological theory, these dysgenic effects were stronger among females than males.