Specificity of relations between adolescents’ cognitive emotion regulation strategies and symptoms of depression and anxiety

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study was to examine the extent to which cognitive emotion regulation strategies were “common or transdiagnostic correlates” of symptoms of depression and anxiety and/or “specific correlates” distinguishing one problem category from the other. The sample comprised 582 13- to 16-year-old secondary school students. Symptoms of depression and anxiety were measured by the SCL-90, and cognitive emotion regulation strategies were measured by the CERQ, in a cross-sectional design. Multivariate regression analyses were performed. Before controlling for comorbidity, the same cognitive emotion regulation strategies that were related to symptoms of depression were also related to symptoms of anxiety. However, after controlling for comorbid anxiety symptoms, rumination, self-blame (only girls), positive reappraisal, and positive refocusing (the latter two inversely) were uniquely (and significantly) associated with depression symptoms; and after controlling for comorbid depression symptoms, catastrophising and other-blame were uniquely related to anxiety symptoms. The results supported the cognitive content-specificity model, in which anxiety is supposed to be uniquely characterised by thoughts concerning the overestimation of threats and harm, and depression is supposed to be uniquely characterised by negative evaluations of self, and of past and future events.     

Stereotype Threat Effects on Learning From a Cognitively Demanding Mathematics Lesson

Stereotype threat—a situational context in which individuals are concerned about confirming a negative stereotype—is often shown to impact test performance, with one hypothesized mechanism being that cognitive resources are temporarily co‐opted by intrusive thoughts and worries, leading individuals to underperform despite high content knowledge and ability (see Schmader & Beilock, 2012 ). We test here whether stereotype threat may also impact initial student learning and knowledge formation when experienced prior to instruction. Predominantly African American fifth‐grade students provided either their race or the date before a videotaped, conceptually demanding mathematics lesson. Students who gave their race retained less learning over time, enjoyed the lesson less, reported a diminished desire to learn more, and were less likely to choose to engage in an optional math activity. The detrimental impact was greatest among students with high baseline cognitive resources. While stereotype threat has been well documented to harm test performance, the finding that effects extend to initial learning suggests that stereotype threat's contribution to achievement gaps may be greatly underestimated.     

Stratégies de contrôle adaptatives au fil de l’âge adulte et rôle des ressources cognitives dans leur déploiement

The current study investigated the age-related differences in control strategies deployment, and examined the relations of control strategies with indicators of well-being and cognitive efficiency. Eighty-five participants aged from 18 to 93 years old completed measures of control strategies and anxiety, and were administered several cognitive tests designed to assess processing speed, reasoning and episodic memory. Results showed that (1) middle-aged individuals use more control strategies based on emotional regulation and goal disengagement than younger and older individuals, (2) individuals who deploy more control strategies focused on emotions report lower levels of anxiety, and (3) cognitive resources moderate the relation between age and control strategies deployment. That is, although increased age is associated with lower deployment of control strategies, the current project showed that age effects in control strategies were weaker for people with higher levels of cognitive resources than for people with lower levels of cognitive resources.     

Central load reduces peripheral processing: Evidence from incidental memory of background speech

Is there a trade‐off between central (working memory) load and peripheral (perceptual) processing? To address this question, participants were requested to undertake an n‐back task in one of two levels of central/cognitive load (i.e., 1‐back or 2‐back) in the presence of a to‐be‐ignored story presented via headphones. Participants were told to ignore the background story, but they were given a surprise memory test of what had been said in the background story, immediately after the n‐back task was completed. Memory was poorer in the high central load (2‐back) condition in comparison with the low central load (1‐back) condition. Hence, when people compensate for higher central load, by increasing attentional engagement, peripheral processing is constrained. Moreover, participants with high working memory capacity (WMC) – with a superior ability for attentional engagement – remembered less of the background story, but only in the low central load condition. Taken together, peripheral processing – as indexed by incidental memory of background speech – is constrained when task engagement is high.     

Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias

Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e., that something is not the case) than when it is positive (i.e., that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology.     

The relationship of self-talk frequency to communication apprehension and public speaking anxiety

This research examines how self-talk is related to the nature and prevalence of communication apprehension and public speaking anxiety. In Study 1, we examined the relationship between general communication apprehension (CA) and the frequency and nature of general self-talk. Results showed that higher CA scores were associated with more frequent self-critical self-talk than lower CA scores. In Study 2, we examined how self-talk pertaining to the preparation for an upcoming speech related to public speaking anxiety. Results showed that self-critical and social-assessing self-talk were positively related to people’s anxiety scores, whereas self-reinforcing self-talk was negatively associated with their anxiety. Implications of these results for the management of public speaking anxiety are discussed.     

Life seems different with you around: Differential shifts in cognitive appraisal in the mere presence of others for neuroticism and impression management

How does mere social presence affect cognitive processes? The extant literature has focused on the impact of social presence on cognitive resources. The present study extends this work by focusing on the positivity of cognitive appraisal. Building on recent findings it was predicted that the traits neuroticism and impression management will differentially moderate the effect, such that neuroticism will be associated with a negative shift in appraisal, and impression management with a positive shift. In an experiment, participants (N = 158) formed evaluations of life events either alone or in social presence. The results supported the predictions. The findings advance the knowledge about the effect of social presence on cognition, and about the role of personality in moderating responses in public social contexts.