Stratégies de contrôle adaptatives au fil de l’âge adulte et rôle des ressources cognitives dans leur déploiement

The current study investigated the age-related differences in control strategies deployment, and examined the relations of control strategies with indicators of well-being and cognitive efficiency. Eighty-five participants aged from 18 to 93 years old completed measures of control strategies and anxiety, and were administered several cognitive tests designed to assess processing speed, reasoning and episodic memory. Results showed that (1) middle-aged individuals use more control strategies based on emotional regulation and goal disengagement than younger and older individuals, (2) individuals who deploy more control strategies focused on emotions report lower levels of anxiety, and (3) cognitive resources moderate the relation between age and control strategies deployment. That is, although increased age is associated with lower deployment of control strategies, the current project showed that age effects in control strategies were weaker for people with higher levels of cognitive resources than for people with lower levels of cognitive resources.     

Our Followers Are Lions,Theirs Are Sheep: How Social Identity Shapes Theories About Followership and Social Influence

Two studies examine how self‐categorization theory can be used to refine our understanding of people's implicit theories about followership and social influence. Results from Study 1 show that perceivers regard followers of a group they themselves identify strongly with (rather than not at all) to be more representative of the prototype of effective followers (displaying enthusiasm, industry, good citizenship) and to be less representative of the antiprototype of effective followers (displaying conformity, incompetence, and insubordination). Results are replicated in a second experiment in which we compare the views of those self‐categorizing as either Republican or Democrat responding to followers of the Republican and Democratic Party. Results of Study 2 replicate those of Study 1 and also reveal qualitative differences in the preferred influence strategy for dealing with followers. Specifically, respondents seek to engage in persuasion when trying to change the behavior of ingroup followers, while resorting to coercion when trying to change the behavior of outgroup followers. Our results are the first to provide evidence that perceivers' theories about what followers are like and how they are influenced most effectively are structured by perceivers' identification (and dis‐identification) with the particular groups that leaders are championing.     

Central load reduces peripheral processing: Evidence from incidental memory of background speech

Is there a trade‐off between central (working memory) load and peripheral (perceptual) processing? To address this question, participants were requested to undertake an n‐back task in one of two levels of central/cognitive load (i.e., 1‐back or 2‐back) in the presence of a to‐be‐ignored story presented via headphones. Participants were told to ignore the background story, but they were given a surprise memory test of what had been said in the background story, immediately after the n‐back task was completed. Memory was poorer in the high central load (2‐back) condition in comparison with the low central load (1‐back) condition. Hence, when people compensate for higher central load, by increasing attentional engagement, peripheral processing is constrained. Moreover, participants with high working memory capacity (WMC) – with a superior ability for attentional engagement – remembered less of the background story, but only in the low central load condition. Taken together, peripheral processing – as indexed by incidental memory of background speech – is constrained when task engagement is high.     

Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias

Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e., that something is not the case) than when it is positive (i.e., that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology.     

The relationship of self-talk frequency to communication apprehension and public speaking anxiety

This research examines how self-talk is related to the nature and prevalence of communication apprehension and public speaking anxiety. In Study 1, we examined the relationship between general communication apprehension (CA) and the frequency and nature of general self-talk. Results showed that higher CA scores were associated with more frequent self-critical self-talk than lower CA scores. In Study 2, we examined how self-talk pertaining to the preparation for an upcoming speech related to public speaking anxiety. Results showed that self-critical and social-assessing self-talk were positively related to people’s anxiety scores, whereas self-reinforcing self-talk was negatively associated with their anxiety. Implications of these results for the management of public speaking anxiety are discussed.     

Life seems different with you around: Differential shifts in cognitive appraisal in the mere presence of others for neuroticism and impression management

How does mere social presence affect cognitive processes? The extant literature has focused on the impact of social presence on cognitive resources. The present study extends this work by focusing on the positivity of cognitive appraisal. Building on recent findings it was predicted that the traits neuroticism and impression management will differentially moderate the effect, such that neuroticism will be associated with a negative shift in appraisal, and impression management with a positive shift. In an experiment, participants (N = 158) formed evaluations of life events either alone or in social presence. The results supported the predictions. The findings advance the knowledge about the effect of social presence on cognition, and about the role of personality in moderating responses in public social contexts.     

Anxiety symptom interpretation and performance expectations in high-anxious,low-anxious,defensive high-anxious and repressor individuals

To date, no research has investigated score predictions and anxiety interpretation in high-anxious, low-anxious, defensive high-anxious and repressor individuals. This study examined Eysenck’s (1997) predictions for cognitive biases on future performance expectations in all four groups. This study was conducted in an ecologically-valid sporting environment. Competitive shooters completed the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale and the Sport Anxiety Scale prior to a major competition. Percentile splits identified the four defensiveness/anxiety groups. The modified Competitive Sport Anxiety Inventory-2 was used to assess the intensity and direction of anxiety prior to competition. Participants predicted their expected shooting score. The hypothesis that repressors would interpret their anxiety as more facilitative to performance compared to low-anxious individuals was partially supported. Repressors were more optimistic in their performance prediction in contrast to defensive high-anxious performers who, in turn, were more pessimistic compared to the other two groupings. High-anxious performers, contrary to predictions, demonstrated optimism in their future performance. The findings of this study corroborate the theoretical predictions and the evidence from previous studies with sport performers. Future research should continue to investigate the influence of cognitive biases on performance predictions in sporting environments using Weinberger et al.’s classifications.     

The impact of concurrent visual feedback on coding of on-line and pre-planned movement sequences

The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which participants could effectively switch from on-line (OL) to pre-planned (PP) control (or vice versa) depending on previous practice conditions and whether concurrent visual feedback was available during transfer testing. The task was to reproduce a 2000 ms spatial–temporal pattern of a sequence of elbow flexions and extensions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two practice conditions termed OL or PP. In the OL condition the criterion waveform and the cursor were provided during movement production while this information was withheld during movement production for the PP condition. A retention test and two effector transfer tests were administered to half of the participants in each acquisition conditions under OL conditions and the other half under PP conditions. The mirror effector transfer test required the same pattern of muscle activation and limb joint angles as required during acquisition. The non-mirror transfer test required movements to the same visual–spatial locations as experienced during acquisition. The results indicated that when visual information was available during the transfer tests performers could switch from PP to OL. When visual information was withdrawn, they shifted from the OL to the PP-control mode. This finding suggests that performers adopt a mode of control consistent with the feedback conditions provided during testing.     

Representing time in language and memory: The role of similarity structure

Every day we read about or watch events in the world and can easily understand or remember how long they last. What aspects of an event are retained in memory? And how do we extract temporal information from our memory representations? These issues are central to human cognition, as they underlie a fundamental aspect of our mental life, namely our representation of time. This paper reviews previous language studies and reports a visual learning study indicating that properties of the events encoded in memory shape the representation of their duration. The evidence indicates that for a given event, the extent to which its associated properties or sub-components differ from one another modulates our representation of its duration. These properties include the similarity between sub-events and the similarity between the situational contexts in which an event occurs. We suggest that the diversity of representations that we associate with events in memory plays an important role in remembering and estimating the duration of experienced or described events.     

A bilateral advantage for maintaining objects in visual short term memory

Research has shown that attentional pre-cues can subsequently influence the transfer of information into visual short term memory (VSTM) (Schmidt, B., Vogel, E., Woodman, G., & Luck, S. (2002). Voluntary and automatic attentional control of visual working memory. Perception & Psychophysics, 64(5), 754–763). However, studies also suggest that those effects are constrained by the hemifield alignment of the pre-cues (Holt, J. L., & Delvenne, J.-F. (2014). A bilateral advantage in controlling access to visual short-term memory. Experimental Psychology, 61(2), 127–133), revealing better recall when distributed across hemifields relative to within a single hemifield (otherwise known as a bilateral field advantage). By manipulating the duration of the retention interval in a colour change detection task (1 s, 3 s), we investigated whether selective pre-cues can also influence how information is later maintained in VSTM. The results revealed that the pre-cues influenced the maintenance of the colours in VSTM, promoting consistent performance across retention intervals (Experiments 1 & 4). However, those effects were only shown when the pre-cues were directed to stimuli displayed across hemifields relative to stimuli within a single hemifield. Importantly, the results were not replicated when participants were required to memorise colours (Experiment 2) or locations (Experiment 3) in the absence of spatial pre-cues. Those findings strongly suggest that attentional pre-cues have a strong influence on both the transfer of information in VSTM and its subsequent maintenance, allowing bilateral items to better survive decay.