Spatial memory and explicit knowledge: An effect of instruction on representational momentum

Freyd (1987; Finke & Freyd, 1985) suggested that representational momentum (i.e., forward displacement in memory for the location of a moving target) is impervious to error feedback (i.e., is modular or cognitively impenetrable), but studies supporting this claim might not have allowed sufficient opportunity for learning to occur. In the experiment reported here, participants were (a) naïve regarding representational momentum, (b) informed about representational momentum but not instructed to counteract it, or (c) informed about representational momentum and instructed to counteract it. All participants exhibited significant displacement. However, participants informed about representational momentum exhibited less forward displacement than did naïve participants due to a greater tendency to respond same to probes behind the true–same position. Possible mechanisms of compensation and the notion that displacement reflects both modular (cognitively impenetrable) and nonmodular (cognitively penetrable) components are addressed.     

Impaired task switching performance in children with dyslexia but not in children with autism

Problems with cognitive control in both autism and dyslexia have already been reported in different studies. The present study specifically examined task-switching performance in children with autism and dyslexia. For this purpose, a multiple-trial paradigm was used with cues for colour- and shape-matching tasks presented before a run of trials. The cue could imply a task switch (when the cue changed the task) or a task repetition (when the cue did not change the task). Both reaction times and error rates were measured for switching, restarting, and general task performance. Participants were children with autism (24) and with dyslexia (25) and healthy controls (27) with normal IQ and ages from 12 to 18 years. The main finding was that while similar switching performance was observed between children with autism and the healthy controls, children with dyslexia showed a significant switch-specific delay relative to both healthy controls and children with autism. Furthermore, no deficit in restarting performance was observed for any of the two patient groups. Finally, additional evidence is provided for a more general deficit in information processing in dyslexia. Our data suggest that children with autism are able to switch between tasks in a similar way as do normally developing children as long as the tasks are unambiguously specified. Furthermore, the data imply switch-specific deficits in dyslexia additionally to the deficits in general information processing already reported in the literature. The implications of our data are further discussed in relation to the interpretation of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.     

The 36th Sir Frederick Bartlett Lecture: An associative analysis of spatial learning

The ability of animals to find important goals in their environment has been said to require a form of learning that is qualitatively different from that normally studied in the conditioning laboratory. Such spatial learning has been said to depend upon the construction of a global representation of the environment, and the acquisition of knowledge about the position of goals with reference to this representation is said to be unaffected by the presence of other cues or landmarks. To evaluate the first of these claims, experiments are described that investigated the extent to which the effects of training in one environment transfer to another. To evaluate the second claim, experiments are described that investigated whether cue competition effects normally found in conditioning studies can be found in spatial tasks. Overall, the results indicate that most of the phenomena of spatial learning can be explained by the principles of associative learning. The implications of the reported results for an understanding of the neural mechanisms of spatial learning are considered.     

Error reactivity in self-paced performance: Highly-accurate individuals exhibit largest post-error slowing

Reaction time is typically increased following an erroneous response. This post-error slowing is traditionally explained by a strategic adjustment of response threshold towards more conservative behaviour. A recently proposed orienting account provides an alternative explanation for post-error slowing. According to this account, committing an error evokes an orienting response (OR), which inhibits information processing in the subsequent trial, resulting in slow and inaccurate performance. We tested a straightforward prediction of the orienting account in the context of self-paced performance, adopting an individual-differences approach: Post-error slowing should be larger the less frequent an error is. To this end, participants were classified into three groups differing in overall performance accuracy. Larger post-error slowing and stronger post-error accuracy decrease were observed for the high-accuracy group than for the two other groups. Practice pronounced the post-error accuracy decline, especially for the high-accuracy group. The results are consistent with the orienting account of post-error slowing but are problematic for accounts based on strategic evaluation mechanisms.     

Influence of stimulus type on effects of flanker,flanker position,and trial sequence in a saccadic eye movement task

Using the flanker paradigm in a task requiring eye movement responses, we examined how stimulus type (arrows vs. letters) modulated effects of flanker and flanker position. Further, we examined trial sequence effects and the impact of stimulus type on these effects. Participants responded to a central target with a left- or rightward saccade. We reasoned that arrows, being overlearned symbols of direction, are processed with less effort and are therefore linked more easily to a direction and a required response than are letters. The main findings demonstrate that (a) flanker effects were stronger for arrows than for letters, (b) flanker position more strongly modulated the flanker effect for letters than for arrows, and (c) trial sequence effects partly differed between the two stimulus types. We discuss these findings in the context of a more automatic and effortless processing of arrow relative to letter stimuli.     

Between-task competition for intentions and actions

People can switch quickly and flexibly from one task to another, but suffer the effects of between-task competition when they do so: After switching, they tend to be distracted by irrelevant stimulus information and hampered by incorrect actions associated with recently performed tasks. This competition results in performance costs of switching, as well as a bias against switching when there is choice over which task to perform, particularly when switching from a difficult task to an easier one. Two experiments investigated the locus of these between-task competition effects in voluntary task switching. Participants switched between an easy location classification and a harder shape classification, making two responses on each trial: the first to register their task choice, the second to perform the chosen task on a subsequently presented stimulus. The results indicated that participants chose to perform the difficult shape task more often than the easier location task, evidence that between-task competition affects intentions that are expressed independently of task-specific actions. The bias was stronger in participants with faster choice speed, suggesting that these influences are relatively automatic. Moreover, even though participants had unlimited time to choose and prepare a task before stimulus presentation, their subsequent performance was nonetheless sensitive to persisting effects of between-task competition. Altogether these results indicate the pervasive influence of between-task competition, which affects both the expression of global task intentions and the production of task-specific actions.     

Ageing and attentional control

The research examines the structural bottleneck account and the resource account of the substantial dual-task deficits among older adults. Procedures from two common dual-task methodologies—the psychological refractory period and the relative-priority manipulation—were used to encourage maximization of the joint performance. Performance and time-sharing strategies from subjects between the ages of 20 and 70 years were examined. Age-related declines in time-sharing efficiency and in the precision of the executive control process were observed. The age-related effect was larger when two manual responses were required than when one manual and one vocal response were required, but no evidence for obligatory sequential processing was found. Except for the most demanding conditions, comparable practice effects were observed between the younger and older subjects, suggesting considerable cognitive plasticity in the older subjects. Implications for the two attentional accounts were discussed.     

Exploring conflict- and target-related movement of visual attention

Intermixing trials of a visual search task with trials of a modified flanker task, the authors investigated whether the presentation of conflicting distractors at only one side (left or right) of a target stimulus triggers shifts of visual attention towards the contralateral side. Search time patterns provided evidence for lateral attention shifts only when participants performed the flanker task under an instruction assumed to widen the focus of attention, demonstrating that instruction-based control settings of an otherwise identical task can impact performance in an unrelated task. Contrasting conditions with response-related and response-unrelated distractors showed that shifting attention does not depend on response conflict and may be explained as stimulus-conflict-related withdrawal or target-related deployment of attention.     

Choice both affects and reflects preferences

The free-choice paradigm is a widely used paradigm in psychology. It has been used to show that after a choice between two similarly pleasant stimuli, the pleasantness of the chosen one tends to increase, whereas the pleasantness of the rejected one tends to decrease—a spreading of alternatives. However, the methodological validity of the free-choice paradigm to study choice-induced preference change has recently been seriously questioned [Chen, K. M., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 573–594. doi:10.1037/a0020217]. According to this criticism, the classically reported spreading of alternatives between the first and second rating sessions cannot be unambiguously interpreted to reflect a true change in preferences and can be observed even for completely static preferences. Here, we used two measurement sequences, a classical Rating 1–choice–Rating 2 sequence and a control Rating 1–Rating 2–choice sequence, to disentangle the spreading of alternatives driven by the effect of choice from the artefactual effect highlighted by Chen and Risen. In two studies using different stimulus material (faces and odours), we find that choice has a robust modulatory impact on preferences for rejected odours, but not for chosen odours and not for faces.     

Age differences in associative and strategic processes in human conditional learning

Research indicates associative and strategic deficits mediate age related deficits in memory, whereas simple associative processes are independent of strategic processing and strategic processes mediate resistance to interference. The present study showed age-related deficits in a contingency learning task, although older participants' resistance to interference was not disproportionately affected. Recognition memory predicted discrimination, whereas general cognitive ability predicted resistance to interference, suggesting differentiation between associative and strategic processes in learning and memory, and age declines in associative processes. Older participants' generalisation of associative strength from existing to novel stimulus–response associations was consistent with elemental learning theories, whereas configural models predicted younger participants' responses. This is consistent with associative deficits and reliance on item-level representations in memory during later life.