Cognitive-behavioral therapy of insomnia: A clinical case series study of patients with co-morbid disorders and using hypnotic medications

Cognitive-behavioral therapy for insomnia (CBTi) has demonstrated considerable efficacy within randomized clinical trials and case-series designs. This case-series study in a community sleep medicine clinic assessed the effectiveness of an eight-session CBTi protocol chronic insomnia patients who were allowed to continue their use of hypnotics (intent-to-treat n = 48), administered by a clinical psychology doctoral student receiving training and supervision in CBTi by a behavioral sleep medicine certified clinician. Outcome measures included daily sleep diaries, self-report measures on insomnia severity, dysfunctional beliefs and attitudes about sleep, daytime sleepiness, as well as medication usage. Patients showed significant improvements in sleep onset latency, wake time after sleep onset, sleep efficiency, insomnia severity, and dysfunctional sleep beliefs from pre- to post-treatment. No changes were seen in daytime sleepiness - patients were not excessively sleepy either before or after treatment. Use of sleep medication declined significantly from 87.5% pre-treatment to 54% post-treatment, despite no active efforts to encourage patients to withdraw. Results demonstrate that a CBTi conducted in a community sleep medicine clinic with patients not required to discontinue sleep-related medications can have similar effects as therapy delivered among those not on medication.     

Attempted suppression of social threat thoughts: Differential effects for social phobia and healthy controls?

Thought suppression research in the area of social phobia provides conflicting evidence regarding whether individuals demonstrate a general deficit or successful suppression. This paper reports the outcome of two studies using an online thought suppression paradigm measuring activation of target thoughts. Study 1 examined the effects of suppressing social threat stimuli with a healthy control group. Surprisingly, the results showed that participants demonstrated non-suppression of this stimuli class. Study 2 compared individuals with social phobia to a control group using the same stimuli as Study 1. Results revealed that following instructions to suppress social threat stimuli, individuals with social phobia demonstrated successful suppression, whilst the control group, as in Study 1, did not. The lack of suppression of social threat information by the control group may reflect functional impression-management of social threat stimuli. Whereas, successful suppression of these stimuli by individuals with social phobia, may contribute to diminished habituation to such information.     

Did she mean to do it? Acquiring a folk theory of intentionality

The ability to both identify and explain others’ intentional acts is fundamental for successful social interaction. In two cross-sectional studies, we investigated 3- to 9-year-olds’ (n = 148) understanding of the folk concept of intentionality, using three types of intentionality measures. The relationship between this type of reasoning and false belief and interpretive mind understanding was also examined. Judgment of the appropriateness of an explanation was based on adult responses (n = 20). Overall, the results indicated that the ability to both identify and appropriately explain a range of intentional acts does not fully emerge until 7 years of age or later. The pattern of explanations revealed the gradual development of a folk concept of intentionality. Preschool- and early school-age children focused on the protagonists’ desires and actions, whereas 8- and 9-year-olds and adults were more likely to reference the protagonists’ awareness and skills.     

Bayesian parameter estimation in the Expectancy Valence model of the Iowa gambling task

The purpose of the popular Iowa gambling task is to study decision making deficits in clinical populations by mimicking real-life decision making in an experimental context. Busemeyer and Stout [Busemeyer, J. R., & Stout, J. C. (2002). A contribution of cognitive decision models to clinical assessment: Decomposing performance on the Bechara gambling task. Psychological Assessment, 14, 253-262] proposed an “Expectancy Valence” reinforcement learning model that estimates three latent components which are assumed to jointly determine choice behavior in the Iowa gambling task: weighing of wins versus losses, memory for past payoffs, and response consistency. In this article we explore the statistical properties of the Expectancy Valence model. We first demonstrate the difficulty of applying the model on the level of a single participant, we then propose and implement a Bayesian hierarchical estimation procedure to coherently combine information from different participants, and we finally apply the Bayesian estimation procedure to data from an experiment designed to provide a test of specific influence.     

Religion is natural, atheism is not: On why everybody is both right and wrong

After discussing evidence of irreligion and the rise of the so called “New Atheism”, the authors refute the claim that this poses a problem for the cognitive science of religion and its hypothesis that religion is natural. The “naturalness hypothesis” is not deterministic but probabilistic and thus leaves room for atheism. This, the authors maintain, is true of both the by-product and adaptationist stances within the cognitive science of religion. In this context the authors also discuss the memetic or “unnaturalness” hypothesis, i.e. that religion is a “virus of the mind”. The authors criticize accounts of atheism offered by cognitive scientists of religion as being based on unfounded assumptions about the psychology of atheists, and object to the notion that the natural aspects of religion by corollary make atheism unnatural. By considering human cognition in a semiotic framework and emphasizing its natural ability to take part in semiotic systems of signs, atheism emerges as a natural, cognitive strategy. The authors argue that to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness) hypotheses of religion must be merged. Finally, a preliminary analysis of the “New Atheism” is offered in terms of semiotic and cognitive dynamics.     

The dual pathway to creativity model: Creative ideation as a function of flexibility and persistence

The dual pathway to creativity model argues that creativity—the generation of original and appropriate ideas—is a function of cognitive flexibility and cognitive persistence, and that dispositional or situational variables may influence creativity either through their effects on flexibility, on persistence, or both. This model is tested in a number of studies in which participants performed creative ideation tasks. We review work showing that cognitive flexibility, operationalised as the number of content categories surveyed, directly relates to idea originality, but that originality can also be achieved by exploring a few content categories in great depth (i.e., persistence). We also show that a global processing mode is associated with cognitive flexibility, but only leads to high originality in tasks that capitalise on cognitive flexibility. We finally show that activating positive mood states enhance creativity because they stimulate flexibility, while activating negative mood states can enhance creativity because they stimulate persistence. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Self-control and frequency of model presentation: Effects on learning a ballet passé relevé

The purpose of this experiment was to examine the combined effects of self-control and frequency of model presentation on learning a complex motor skill, i.e., ballet passé relevé. Before practice started self-control participants were asked to choose two viewings or six viewings (before practice and then every five trials) and the externally controlled groups were yoked to their self-control counterparts. All participants completed 15 acquisition trials followed by 5 trials for the immediate and 5 trials for the delayed retention tests 48 hours later. Dependent variables included cognitive representation scores, physical reproduction rankings, and balance time. Statistical analyses indicated that under limited physical practice conditions self-control and higher frequency of model presentation facilitated the development of cognitive representation and did not produce further benefits in movement reproductions and balance time. The results were discussed with respect to the social cognitive theory.     

Disentangling the belief in God and cognitive rigidity/flexibility components of religiosity to predict racial and value-violating prejudice: A Post-Critical Belief Scale analysis

Past research indicates that being religious is associated with prejudice toward racial and value-violating out-groups. However, this past research treated religiosity as a unidimensional construct without taking into account how different components of religiosity—belief in a higher power and the rigidity/flexibility of religious beliefs—are associated with measures of prejudice. Two studies examined the relationship between these two components of religiosity, as measured by the Post-Critical Beliefs Scale, and racial (African Americans, Arabs) and value-violating prejudices (atheists, gay men). As the flexibility of religious beliefs increased (literal vs. symbolic dimension), attitudes toward racial and value-violating out-groups became more positive (Study 1). As belief in God strengthened (exclusion vs. inclusion of transcendence dimension), attitudes toward value-violating out-groups became more negative. Study 2 demonstrated that these two components of religiosity fully mediated the relationship between general religiosity and prejudice toward African Americans, Arabs, and gay men and partially mediated the relationship between religiosity and prejudice toward atheists. Results are discussed in light of reexamining the conclusion that simply being religious is associated with prejudice.