Mental rotation is not easily cognitively penetrable

When participants take part in mental imagery experiments, are they using their “tacit knowledge” of perception to mimic what they believe should occur in the corresponding perceptual task? Two experiments were conducted to examine whether such an account can be applied to mental imagery in general. These experiments both examined tasks that required participants to “mentally rotate” stimuli. In Experiment 1, instructions led participants to believe that they could reorient shapes in one step or avoid reorienting the shapes altogether. Regardless of instruction type, response times increased linearly with increasing rotation angles. In Experiment 2, participants first observed novel objects rotating at different speeds, and then performed a mental rotation task with those objects. The speed of perceptually demonstrated rotation did not affect the speed of mental rotation. We argue that tacit knowledge cannot explain mental imagery results in general, and that in particular the mental rotation effect reflects the nature of the underlying internal representation and processes that transform it, rather than participants’ pre-existing knowledge.     

The role of processes and contents in human memory: An item response theory approach

This study investigated the specificities and communalities of visuospatial and verbal memory contents, as well as short-term memory and working memory (STM and WM) processes with the use of Rasch models as an alternative to the previous studies based on the classical test theory. A sample of 547 undergraduate students executed four computerised tasks, each consisting of verbal-numeric WM, visuospatial WM, verbal-numeric STM, and visuospatial STM content. Confirmatory factor analyses indicated that visuospatial and verbal-numeric memory are distinct, but correlated variables. Findings also support a domain-general view of WM capacity distinct from domain-specific storage. With the use of Rasch models, our results confirm previous experimental, psychometric, and neuropsychological studies, highlighting that memory span tasks can be divided into separate subsystems for content and processes. This study also shows that better results are obtained when models with person parameter estimates (provided from Rasch models) are adopted, rather than summed raw scores.     

The effect of stimulus variability on children's judgements of quantity

This study investigates the effect of stimulus variability on development of the ability to make quantity judgements related to area. Participants were 241 children (aged 4, 5, 6, 8, and 12 years) and 82 university students, who were asked to compare the quantities in 2 sets of 5 chocolate bars of constant width but variable length. Participants indicated which set contained more chocolate or that the amounts of chocolate were equal. Judgement accuracy of 12-year-olds and adults decreased monotonically as the variance of bar lengths increased. In younger children, performance was low when variance was very low or very high, but accuracy was higher for intermediate levels of variance, thus resulting in an inverted U-shaped effect. This pattern was confirmed in a second experiment in which we controlled for a possible age-related response bias against “equal” judgements. Findings suggest that judgements of quantity are based on a mixture of learned heuristics and comparisons of approximate quantity representations, both of which develop throughout childhood.     

Dissonance-induced false memories: Evidence from a free-choice paradigm

People often misremember the past as consistent with the present. Recent research using an induced-compliance paradigm has revealed that cognitive dissonance is one mechanism that can underlie this memory distortion. We sought to replicate and extend this finding using a free-choice paradigm: Participants made either an easy or a difficult choice between two smartphones and, either immediately or two days later, reported their memories for their decision experience. Participants who made a difficult decision produced the spread-of-alternatives effect expected by dissonance theory, and they were also more likely than those in the easy conditions to misremember their initial decision more favourably than they had initially rated it. Overall, our findings replicate the effect of dissonance on memory distortion and, further, show that the effect generalises to other dissonance-inducing situations.     

The cognitive miser's perspective: Social comparison as a heuristic in self-judgements

The metaphor of the cognitive miser is a milestone in the development of social cognitive research. It highlights the limited cognitive resources of the social thinker and the demand for fast and efficient processing of information. In marked contrast to the impact of this metaphor on social cognition research in general, it has so far been mostly overlooked in research on social comparison. In this article we want to lay out the potential of social comparison research if one takes on the perspective of a cognitive miser. Specifically, we consider social comparison as a heuristic for evaluating the self. First, we look for evidence for the ease of comparative self-evaluations. Second, we analyse the standard selection process and identify routine standards that facilitate the comparison process. Third, we investigate the cognitive mechanisms in social comparisons and suggest that comparison mechanisms leading to assimilation are more efficient than mechanisms leading to contrast effects.     

Preoccupied minds feel less control: Sense of agency is modulated by cognitive load

People have little difficulty distinguishing effects they cause and those they do not. An important question is what underlies this sense of agency. A prevailing idea is that the sense of agency arises from a comparison between a predictive representation of the effect (of a given action) and the actual effect that occurs, with a clear match between the two producing a strong sense of agency. Although there is general agreement on this comparison process, one important theoretical issue that has yet to be fully determined is whether these computations are consciously performed. Here, we studied this issue by requiring participants to perform a simple judgment of agency task under conditions of different concurrent working memory load. Working memory operations are known to tax conscious cognitive resources. We found that agency judgments were moderated by working memory load, with lower agency ratings being observed in the high load condition, suggesting that the sense of agency is dependent on the availability of conscious cognitive resources. An examination of the time-course of this load effect suggests that it is the construction of the mental representation of the predicted effect which is particularly dependent on said resources.     

The mirror effect: Self-awareness alone increases suicide thought accessibility

According to objective self-awareness theory, when individuals are in a state of self-awareness, they tend to compare themselves to their standards. Self-to-standard comparison often yields unfavorable results and can be assimilated to a failure, activating an escape motivation. Building on recent research on the link between failure and suicide thought accessibility, the present experiment tested the hypothesis that mirror exposure alone provokes an increase in suicide thought accessibility. Participants were exposed to their mirror reflection (or not) while completing a lexical decision task with suicide-related words. Self-to-standard discrepancy salience was manipulated by asking participants to list actual and ideal traits before versus after the lexical decision task. As predicted, mirror-exposed participants recognized suicide-related words quicker than those unexposed to their mirror image. Self-to-standard discrepancy salience did not moderate this effect. Discussion focuses on the role of the motivation to escape self-awareness in the availability of suicide-related ideas.     

Masked partial priming of letter perception

In three experiments testing 178 subjects, letter targets were preceded by briefly presented, pattern-masked primes formed by deleting pixels in a larger or smaller version of the target stimulus. In Experiment 1A (alphabetic decision)and Experiment 1B (letter naming) a slight advantage was observed for global primes (alternate pixels deleted) compared with junction primes (midsegment information removed). This advantage was stronger at 50 ms prime exposures than at 30 ms exposures in the naming task. In Experiment 2 (letter naming), midsegment primes (with junction information removed) produced faster latencies than did junction primes. This result was replicated in a third experiment and was shown to be independent of target letter case and the relative size of prime and target stimuli. The same midsegment and junction primes did not facilitate performance compared to neutral primes in the alphabetic decision task. These results suggest that masked partial priming of letter naming can be usefully applied to the study of basic processes in letter perception.     

To do or not to do? A cognitive consistency model for drawing conclusions from conditional instructions and advice

This paper investigates a cognitive consistency model of the directionality of conditional instructions and advice that use probability expressions to express uncertainty about the antecedent p. The proposed model combines world knowledge (conveyed by causal direction) with linguistic information (conveyed by polarity and negation), and predicts whether the complex sentence antecedent has a positive or negative directionality, which in turn predicts whether a positive or negative conclusion q will be drawn. The first experiment uses Do q if p conditionals to show that given a consequent q participants complete antecedents p with a probability expression in line with expected sentence directionality. The second experiment uses If p then do q conditionals to show similar effects in a reverse direction. A third experiment uses If p then do q conditionals to show that participants draw conclusions predicted by the cognitive consistency model but not by a decision-theoretic approach to reasoning.     

Motivational determinants of reasoning about social relations: The role of need for cognitive closure

The role of need for cognitive closure (NFCC) in reasoning about social relations was investigated. Participants learned pairwise liking/disliking relations between people who could also be categorised on the basis of nationality and then had to group them into social cliques. The social clique structures were either consistent or inconsistent with the nationality categorisation, and the diagnostic information that was necessary to determine the number of cliques appeared either early or late in the information sequence. We expected participants under conditions of high (vs low) NFCC to rely more on heuristic processing. As predicted, high (vs low) NFCC participants were less accurate in their representations of cliques when the clique structure was inconsistent with the nationality category (Study 1 and 2) and when the diagnostic information was presented late (Study 1). The implications regarding the influence of NFCC on reasoning and the role of specific NFCC manipulations are discussed.