Cognitive model decomposition of the BART: Assessment and application

The Balloon Analogue Risk Task, or BART, aims to measure risk taking behavior in a controlled setting. In order to quantify the processes that underlie performance on the BART, Wallsten, Pleskac, and Lejuez (2005) proposed a series of mathematical models whose parameters have a clear psychological interpretation. Here we examine a 2-parameter simplification of Wallsten et al.’s preferred 4-parameter model. A parameter recovery study shows that — with plausible restrictions on the number of participants and trials — both parameters (i.e., risk taking γ⁺ and response consistency β) can be estimated accurately. To demonstrate how the 2-parameter model can be used in practice, we implemented a Bayesian hierarchical version and applied it to an empirical data set in which participants performed the BART following various amounts of alcohol intake.     

INTRINSIC AESTHETIC VALUE REVISTED

Abstract: Every sentient organism needs constantly to re‐assess its environment in order to adjust to any changes in it and to ascertain which aspects are, or become, salient for its current purposes. Such adaptation is of basic evolutionary importance, but for human beings it can be difficult to achieve in the face of radical novelty or when different frames of reference are in conflict. Art by virtue of its integrated structure presents examples of how a partial unification of experience may be envisaged. Art thus helps to meet our constant need for orientation and re‐orientation, though its operation in this respect is invariably outside consciousness. So art can be said to have intrinsic value only within a strictly subjective, phenomenological perspective; more broadly considered from a third‐person viewpoint, the value of art is instrumental. Questions then arise concerning our motivation for seeking or producing art, about the relation of art to other cultural activities, and about the role of pleasure in connection with aesthetic experience; these are briefly discussed.     

Basic Information Processing Abilities at 11 years Account for Deficits in IQ Associated with Preterm Birth

Although it is well established that preterms as a group do poorly relative to their full-term peers on tests of global cognitive functioning, the basis for this relative deficiency is less understood. The present paper examines preterm deficits in core cognitive abilities and determines their role in mediating preterm/full-term differences in IQ. The performance of 11-year-old children born preterm (birth weight < 1750 g) and their full-term controls were compared on a large battery of 15 tasks, covering four basic cognitive domains — memory, attention, speed of processing and representational competence. The validity of these four domains was established using latent variables and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Preterms showed pervasive deficits within and across domains. Additionally, preterm deficits in IQ were completely mediated by these four cognitive domains in a structural equation model involving a cascade from elementary abilities (attention and speed), to more complex abilities (memory and representational competence), to IQ. The similarity of findings to those obtained with this cohort in infancy and toddlerhood suggests that preterm deficits persist — across time, across task, and from the non-verbal to the verbal period.     

An economic perspective on the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of personality

Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory postulates personality factors of ‘reward sensitivity’ and ‘punishment sensitivity’ linked to neural systems that control approach and avoidance, respectively. In contrast, behavioural economics distinguishes gain (‘reward’) and loss (‘punishment’) valuation systems that are orthogonal to approach/avoidance behaviour. We combined gain and loss with both their presentation and omission and found evidence for separate gain valuation, loss valuation, approach, and avoidance systems. This suggests that it is possible to integrate valuation/input and behaviour/output views of ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ in a way that may be of use to both personality theory and economics and so forge closer links between these two major perspectives on decision-making and behaviour.     

Planning in young children: A review and synthesis

Research on the development of planning is reviewed in the context of a framework that considers the role of three types of cognitive flexibility in planning development: event-independent temporal representation, executive function, and self-projection. It is argued that the emergence of planning abilities in the preschool period is dependent upon the development of event-independent temporal representation. Research on the development of executive function suggests that its sub-components, in particular inhibitory control, may be linked to developmental improvements on planning tasks. Recently, new paradigms have established that self-projection to the future appears to develop over the preschool period. We consider how these different forms of cognitive flexibility may themselves be related in development.     

Regional differences in brain volume predict the acquisition of skill in a complex real-time strategy videogame

Previous studies have found that differences in brain volume among older adults predict performance in laboratory tasks of executive control, memory, and motor learning. In the present study we asked whether regional differences in brain volume as assessed by the application of a voxel-based morphometry technique on high resolution MRI would also be useful in predicting the acquisition of skill in complex tasks, such as strategy-based video games. Twenty older adults were trained for over 20 h to play Rise of Nations, a complex real-time strategy game. These adults showed substantial improvements over the training period in game performance. MRI scans obtained prior to training revealed that the volume of a number of brain regions, which have been previously associated with subsets of the trained skills, predicted a substantial amount of variance in learning on the complex game. Thus, regional differences in brain volume can predict learning in complex tasks that entail the use of a variety of perceptual, cognitive and motor processes.     

Operation-specific encoding in single-digit arithmetic

Solving simple arithmetic problems involves three stages: encoding the problem, retrieving or calculating the answer, and reporting the answer. This study compared the event-related potentials elicited by single-digit addition and multiplication problems to examine the relationship between encoding and retrieval/calculation stages. Results showed that the operation effect appeared as early as the encoding of the first operand and continued to the retrieval/calculation stage: compared to addition, multiplication elicited larger negative potentials in the left anterior electrodes and larger positive potentials in the right posterior electrodes. The consistency of this operation effect across the first two stages of arithmetic processing suggests that encoding of arithmetic problems can be modulated by the nature of representation of the to-be-retrieved arithmetic facts, and thus these two stages are additive rather than interactive.     

Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations

Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side‐effect ( Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006 ). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side‐effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations and provide evidence that their role in moral judgment is mediated by these nonmoral psychological representations. Specifically, the action/omission distinction affects moral judgment primarily via causal attribution, while the means/side‐effect distinction affects moral judgment via intentional attribution. We suggest that many of the specific patterns evident in our moral judgments in fact derive from nonmoral psychological mechanisms, and especially from the processes of causal and intentional attribution.     

The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.     

Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior

Employing a die-under-cup paradigm, we study the extent to which people lie when it is transparently clear they cannot be caught. We asked participants to report the outcome of a private die roll and gain money according to their reports. Results suggest that the degree of lying depends on the extent to which self-justifications are available. Specifically, when people are allowed to roll the die three times to ensure its legitimacy, but only the first roll is supposed to “count,” we find evidence that the highest outcome of the three rolls is reported. Eliminating the ability to observe more than one roll reduces lying. Additional results suggest that observing desired counterfactuals, in the form of additional rolls not meant to determine pay, attenuates the degree to which people perceive lies as unethical. People seem to derive value from self-justifications allowing them to lie for money while feeling honest.