How toddlers represent enclosed spaces

Recent findings indicate that toddlers can use geometric cues to locate an object hidden in a corner of a rectangular room after being disoriented [Cognition 61 (1996) 195]. It has been suggested that locating the object involves reestablishing one's initial heading. The present experiments examine search behavior after disorientation. We find that toddlers go directly to a particular corner, indicating that they do not have to reestablish their original heading. It also has been suggested that toddlers ability to use geometric cues is limited to surrounding spaces. We find that toddlers can locate an object from outside as well as from inside a space, although the task is harder from outside. Based on these results, we argue that while toddlers do not represent their position relative to a particular portion of a space, they nevertheless may represent their position relative to the entire space (i.e., outside vs. inside).     

Domestic hens have declarative representations

It is generally considered that information can be stored either as a procedural or as a declarative representation. A devaluation technique was used to determine whether hens have declarative representations. Individual hens (Gallus gallus domesticus) were fed in an enclosure with two containers, each with a new food type. One of the food types was devalued by pre-feeding with that food, after which the hens were tested with empty food containers. The pre-feeding should only affect the choice of the hens if they have learned where a particular food type was (declarative representation) rather than “go left when coming into the enclosure” (procedural representation). A significant proportion of the hens went to the location previously occupied by the non-devalued food (seven out of eight). This supports the hypothesis that domestic hens can form declarative representations. Received: 6 March 1999 / Accepted after revision: 1 November 2000     

Delusions and theories of belief

Cognitive neuropsychiatry is a branch of cognitive psychology that seeks to explain neuropsychiatric symptoms in terms of disruptions or damage to normal cognitive processes. A key objective of this approach is to use insights derived from the study of pathological symptoms to inform accounts of premorbid cognitive systems. Delusions, in particular, can be considered to represent dysfunction of the cognitive processes underlying belief formation, so studying delusions may provide unique insights into nonpathological belief. While this approach has provided compelling accounts for a range of delusions in terms of putative cognitive dysfunctions, it is less clear that it has achieved progress in its reciprocal goal of informing understanding of belief more generally. In this review, we trace the origins of the cognitive neuropsychiatric approach and consider the reasons for the lack of progress. We propose a tentative framework to overcome these challenges and suggest directions for future research.     

An investigation of expertise in cycling: Eye tracking,Think Aloud and the influence of a competitor

ObjectivesTwo studies investigated expert-novice differences in information-seeking behaviour, cognitions and performance during cycling time trials (TT). Study 1 examined trained and novice cyclist’s cognitions whilst performing a TT, using a Think Aloud (TA) protocol and eye-tracking techniques. Study 2 investigated expertise differences during alone and competitive TTs.Methodsin Study 1, six trained and seven novice cyclists performed a 16.1 km TT. In Study 2, eight trained and ten novice cyclists performed three 16.1 km TT; a baseline TT, an alone TT and a trial against a virtual competitor. In both studies, participants were asked to TA and in Study 1 they also wore mobile gaze-tracking glasses. Performance feedback and a simulated TT course were visually displayed during all trials, as was a virtual avatar during the competitor trial. Verbalisations were coded into primary and secondary themes. Cognitions and pacing strategies were compared between groups and across the duration of the TTs. In Study 1, eye-tracking data for total dwell time and gaze frequency were calculated for each area of interest (Time Elapsed, Power, Heart Rate, Cadence, Distance Covered, Speed and Course Scenery).ResultsIn Study 1, no significant differences were found in information-seeking behaviour between groups, however there were expertise differences in the cognitive strategies used. Trained cyclists’ verbalisations were more performance-relevant (i.e., power output), whereas the untrained group were more focused on task completion (i.e., distance and time) and irrelevant information. Both groups talked more about distance and motivational thoughts in the later stages of the trial, and dwell time on distance feedback also increased in this final 4 km. In Study 2, the trained group performed faster than the untrained group but there were no significant differences in pace or performance between alone and competitive TTs for either group. Differences in cognitions were found between groups and across the TT duration.ConclusionBoth studies demonstrate that cognitive processes differ as a function of expertise during self-paced cycling time trials. There were no differences in information-seeking behaviour between trained and untrained cyclists and there was no effect of an opponent on pace or performance.     

Rethinking priming in social psychology: Insight from James' notions of habits and instincts

Research on priming is commonly taken to establish that much of human behavior is automatic and caused by largely subconscious processes. This research has recently come under increased scrutiny as some classic studies have proved difficult to replicate. In this essay, we bring the views of William James to bear on priming. Though James leaves room for instinct and habit, he rejects the view that human psychology is ultimately mechanistic on the grounds that it is naïvely simplistic. James is also able to explain why priming studies are bound to face replicability issues: human behavior unfolds in a dynamic multifarious constellation of interrelationships among people, consciousness, and the world. To offer researchers a productive direction for studying cognition, we conclude by briefly introducing an approach known as enactivism – an approach that resonates with the ideas James puts forth.     

Dynamics of the knowledge instinct: Effects of incoherence on the cognitive system

We successfully replicated a study about aesthetic emotions in a different socio-cultural environment. The present results suggest that incoherence is a strong inhibitor for aesthetic chills and verify a positive correlation between pleasure and meaning. These results allow for a scientific study of aesthetic emotions as it is now possible for the experimenter to have two groups of subjects, both exposed to the same stimulation, one group experiencing measurable aesthetic emotions whereas the other does not. We review the literature on the problem of both positive and negative psychogenic shivering and relate this phenomenon to the instinct of knowledge. We discuss the implications of our findings, stress the importance of studying the psychological and physiological effects of incoherence on the central nervous system, introduce a series of hypotheses to be tested in further research and conclude with a plausible explanation for the relation between temperature and cognition in humans.     

Direct verbal suggestibility: Measurement and significance

Hypnotic suggestibility is part of the wider psychological trait of direct verbal suggestibility (DVS). Historically, DVS in hypnosis has informed theories of consciousness and of conversion disorder. More recently it has served as a research tool in cognitive science and in cognitive neuroscience in particular. Here we consider DVS as a general trait, its relation to other psychological characteristics and abilities, and to the origin and treatment of clinical conditions. We then outline the distribution of DVS in the population, its measurement, relationship to other forms of suggestibility, placebo responsiveness, personal characteristics, gender, neurological processes and other factors, such as expectancy. There is currently no scale specifically designed to measure DVS outside a hypnotic context. The most commonly used and well-researched of the hypnosis-based scales, the Harvard Group Scale, is described and identified as a basis for a more broadly based measure of DVS for use in psychological research.     

The perception/cognition distincton: Challenging the representational account

A central goal for cognitive science and philosophy of mind is to distinguish between perception and cognition. The representational approach has emerged as a prominent candidate to draw such a distinction. The idea is that perception and cognition differ in the content and the format in which the information is represented —just as perceptual representations are nonconceptual in content and iconic in format, cognitive representations are conceptual in content and discursive in format. This paper argues against this view. I argue that both perception and cognition can use conceptual and nonconceptual contents and be vehiculated in iconic and discursive formats. If correct, the representational strategy to distinguish perception from cognition fails.     

A pilot study investigating cortical haemodynamic and physiological correlates of exercise cognition in trained and untrained cyclists over an incremental self-paced performance test,while thinking aloud

ObjectivesFew studies have directly investigated changes in cortical haemodynamics during a self-paced interval endurance activity, while collecting conscious cognition and physiological performance data. This pilot study used functional Near Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS), while capturing conscious cognition using Think Aloud (TA) during an incremental paced cycling exercise.MethodsA mixed design was implemented with cycling expertise (untrained vs. trained) as the between groups variable and incremental self-paced stage (5 stages of increasing effort) and site (12 optodes across the PFC) as the within groups variables. Dependent measures were the changes in cortical O₂Hb, and physiological indicators (% heart rate max (%HRmax), average power output (APO), peak power output (PPO), rate of perceived exertion (RPE) and blood lactate (Bla)) over time. Participants used TA throughout their second interval trial.ResultsTrained cyclists had higher APO and maximum power output (MPO) from stages 2–5, in addition to a greater increase in PPO over the whole trial. There were significant main effects of stage on %HRmax, Bla and RPE. Differences in cortical haemodynamics were found specifically in areas in the mid left and right PFC. TA data demonstrated that untrained participants verbalised more irrelevant information and feelings of pain and fatigue, in addition to both groups verbalising significantly more motivation-related thoughts during the final stage.ConclusionThis pilot is the first to capture changes in Cox, physiological measures and conscious cognition through the use of TA. We demonstrate the potential role of mid- PFC, and how conscious cognition may change over time. This study has implications for coaches and sport psychologists who may want to understand the cognitions of their athlete during an event and support low level athletes in developing a better understanding of the own cognitions.