More than belief,but not more than belief and desire

Manuel A. Vásquez’ More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion paints a rich picture of what a ‘non-reductive materialist framework for the study of religion’ would look like. Although it receives strong motivation from the inability of the predominant meta-approaches of theorizing religion to take seriously a range of materially grounded religious phenomena, it suffers somewhat from a lack of independent and autonomous argumentation. This article explores a convergence between Vásquez’ main points and the basic elements of one of the most influential positions within philosophical semantics – namely the semantic holism of Donald Davidson. Because Davidson's holism (assuming its correctness) provides constraints on all forms of theorizing, the fact that Vásquez’ position, unlike the ones he critiques, conforms to those constraints lends it a degree of rational presumption.     

Parkinson’s disease disrupts both automatic and controlled processing of action verbs

The problem of how word meaning is processed in the brain has been a topic of intense investigation in cognitive neuroscience. While considerable correlational evidence exists for the involvement of sensory-motor systems in conceptual processing, it is still unclear whether they play a causal role. We investigated this issue by comparing the performance of patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) with that of age-matched controls when processing action and abstract verbs. To examine the effects of task demands, we used tasks in which semantic demands were either implicit (lexical decision and priming) or explicit (semantic similarity judgment). In both tasks, PD patients’ performance was selectively impaired for action verbs (relative to controls), indicating that the motor system plays a more central role in the processing of action verbs than in the processing of abstract verbs. These results argue for a causal role of sensory-motor systems in semantic processing.     

PREDICATION AND EXTENSIONALIZATION

In his 2000 book Logical Properties Colin McGinn argues that predicates denote properties rather than sets or individuals. I support the thesis, but show that it is vulnerable to a type-incongruity objection, if properties are (modelled as) functions, unless a device for extensionalizing properties is added. Alternatively, properties may be construed as primitive intensional entities, as in George Bealer. However, I object to Bealer’s construal of predication as a primitive operation inputting two primitive entities and outputting a third primitive entity. Instead I recommend we follow Pavel Tichy in construing both predication and extensionalization as instances of the primitive operation of functional application.     

AN INTUITIONISTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF CLASSICAL LOGIC

By introducing the intensional mappings and their properties, we establish a new semantical approach of characterizing intermediate logics. First prove that this new approach provides a general method of characterizing and comparing logics without changing the semantical interpretation of implication connective. Then show that it is adequate to characterize all Kripke_complete intermediate logics by showing that each of these logics is sound and complete with respect to its (unique) ‘weakest characterization property’ of intensional mappings. In particular, we show that classical logic has the weakest characterization property , which is the strongest among all possible weakest characterization properties of intermediate logics. Finally, it follows from this result that a translation is an embedding of classical logic into intuitionistic logic, iff. its semantical counterpart has the property .      

Complex demonstratives as quantifiers: objections and replies

In “Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account” (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work, I lay out these objections and respond to them.

组合原则

组合原则是逻辑语义学的基本原则,表现为函项的思想和句法与语义的对应。就构造逻辑系统而言,组合原则是一种方法论。作为延伸到自然语言形式语义学的产物,组合原则起到一种核心灵魂的作用。组合原则在理论层面和应用领域皆获得一些有价值的结果。自然语言违反组合原则的实例主要表现为歧义现象、语用因素和句法与语义不对应的情况,这正是调整组合原则的适用条件从而促进形式语义学发展的契机。     

Algebraic Semantics for Deductive Systems

The notion of an algebraic semantics of a deductive system was proposed in [3], and a preliminary study was begun. The focus of [3] was the definition and investigation of algebraizable deductive systems, i.e., the deductive systems that possess an equivalent algebraic semantics. The present paper explores the more general property of possessing an algebraic semantics. While a deductive system can have at most one equivalent algebraic semantics, it may have numerous different algebraic semantics. All of these give rise to an algebraic completeness theorem for the deductive system, but their algebraic properties, unlike those of equivalent algebraic semantics, need not reflect the metalogical properties of the deductive system. Many deductive systems that don't have an equivalent algebraic semantics do possess an algebraic semantics; examples of these phenomena are provided. It is shown that all extensions of a deductive system that possesses an algebraic semantics themselves possess an algebraic semantics. Necessary conditions for the existence of an algebraic semantics are given, and an example of a protoalgebraic deductive system that does not have an algebraic semantics is provided. The mono-unary deductive systems possessing an algebraic semantics are characterized. Finally, weak conditions on a deductive system are formulated that guarantee the existence of an algebraic semantics. These conditions are used to show that various classes of non-algebraizable deductive systems of modal logic, relevance logic and linear logic do possess an algebraic semantics.     

ATYPICAL DISCOURSES

This essay outlines novel ways of communicating with patients by altering semantics, syntax, word use, or sounds. Language is viewed as a tool for coping with problems rather than a medium with which to mirror external reality or internal human nature. This view of language emerges from a pragmatic critique of truth. The broader goal of this essay is to weave together the philosophy of pragmatism, especially as it has been articulated by Richard Rorty, with the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. Clinical case examples are discussed.     

Nelson's Negation on the Base of Weaker Versions of Intuitionistic Negation

Constructive logic with Nelson negation is an extension of the intuitionistic logic with a special type of negation expressing some features of constructive falsity and refutation by counterexample. In this paper we generalize this logic weakening maximally the underlying intuitionistic negation. The resulting system, called subminimal logic with Nelson negation, is studied by means of a kind of algebras called generalized N-lattices. We show that generalized N-lattices admit representation formalizing the intuitive idea of refutation by means of counterexamples giving in this way a counterexample semantics of the logic in question and some of its natural extensions. Among the extensions which are near to the intuitionistic logic are the minimal logic with Nelson negation which is an extension of the Johansson's minimal logic with Nelson negation and its in a sense dual version — the co-minimal logic with Nelson negation. Among the extensions near to the classical logic are the well known 3-valued logic of Lukasiewicz, two 12-valued logics and one 48-valued logic. Standard questions for all these logics — decidability, Kripke-style semantics, complete axiomatizability, conservativeness are studied. At the end of the paper extensions based on a new connective of self-dual conjunction and an analog of the Lukasiewicz middle value ½ have also been considered.