Eschatological companions: Christian hope in virtual worlds

ABSTRACT

The Christian faith is oriented around the hope that is found in the birth, life, death, resurrection and return of Jesus Christ, and this hope shapes Christian understandings of being human and human flourishing. What then might this Christian hope have to say about our technological developments and, in particular, how those shape our reflection on being human? Moreover, how do the various virtual worlds that we inhabit in continuity with our physical environment shape our thinking on bodies, gender, sexuality, identity and relationships? This article adds constructive theological reflection on technologically shape virtual worlds through the lens of Christian hope, moving beyond only eschatological dimensions to focus also on technological narratives of purpose and novelty and theological thinking around humanity, Christology and salvation. It is our contention that Christian hope provides a unifying theme for fruitful theological reflection on virtual worlds and our lives within them.     

Reason with Baggage

In this article I show that David Novak's natural law theory precedes his encounter with Judaism. That is to say, the theory is the product of a theological viewpoint consisting of three components—createdness, commandedness, and response—that is then found by Novak in a number of areas of Jewish thought and practice that admit of the same three parts. As a result of this interpretation, I posit that Paul Nahme, who argues for a pragmatic reading of Novak's theory, as well as Martin Kavka and Randi Rashkover, who offer a political understanding of it, do not account for the theological richness and metaphysical basis of Novak's natural law theology.     

TWO CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERALISM: Theology,Creation, and Politics in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke1

Constitutional liberal practices are capable of being normatively grounded by a number of different metaphysical positions. Kant provides one such grounding, in terms of the autonomously derived moral law. I argue that the work of Edmund Burke provides a resource for an alternative construal of constitutional liberalism, compatible with, and illumined by, a broadly Thomistic natural law worldview. I contrast Burke's treatment of the relationship between truth and cognition, prudence and rights, with that of his contemporary, Kant. We find that in each case where Kant's system is constructed from the first principle of autonomy, Burke's thought is oriented toward an end that is not of our making. Readings of Burke as a natural law thinker are currently out of fashion among Burke commentators; without relying, for the main thesis, on historical claims about Burke's “Thomism,” I nonetheless explore and challenge some of the assumptions that underlie the current orthodoxy.     

Introduction

The contributors to this reflection on the field consider the legacy of Christian ethics in comparative religious ethics (CRE), particularly in regard to whether the latter has escaped the parochialism and hegemony of the former, whether the legacy is simply vicious or whether it can be virtuous, and the specific ways in which the former has influenced the discipline of CRE in regard to methods and themes. Beyond these methodological questions, the contributors also speak to the historical development of Christian ethics and CRE in the cultural and institutional contexts of late twentieth century America and provide reflections on the politics of CRE as it is now practiced and debated in the field and in the academy.     

On the Legacy of Christian Ethics in Comparative Religious Ethics

This essay is an exploratory inquiry into possible Christian ethical residues in the field of comparative religious ethics (CRE), focusing particularly on the themes of tradition and canon, trajectories of ethical reflection, emancipatory criticism, common morality, and the notion of discipline. It is suggested that even if such traces exist, they may not be detrimental to the field as currently practiced.     

PRAGMATISM,REALISM, AND RELIGION

Pragmatism is often thought to be incompatible with realism, the view that there are knowable mind‐independent facts, objects, or properties. In this article, I show that there are, in fact, realist versions of pragmatism and argue that a realist pragmatism of the right sort can make important contributions to such fields as religious ethics and philosophy of religion. Using William James's pragmatism as my primary example, I show (1) that James defended realist and pluralist views in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion, and (2) that these views not only cohere with his pragmatism but indeed are basic to it. After arguing that James's pragmatism provides a credible and useful approach to a number of basic philosophical and religious issues, I conclude by reflecting on some ways in which we can apply and potentially improve James's views in the study of religion.     

Open "Laicity" and Secularity versus Ideological Secularism: Lessons from Switzerland

In order to avoid both religious intolerance and religious indifference,we need to develop a positive notion of an open laicity or secularitythat permits us to respect our religiously plural as well assecular contemporary situation. Open laicity or secularity isthe practical and political consequence of a Protestant theologyand spirituality. It represents a critical answer to the disasterof secularism and laicism. Most of the difficulties in the discussionbetween traditionalist Christians (Orthodox, Catholic, or Evangelical!)and modern, critical Christians (Protestant, Catholic, and maybesome Orthodox too!) come from a confusion between the dangerof secularism and laicism, that this article criticizes verydeeply, and the positive reality of a secular world, groundedin the very biblical and theological understanding of a createdworld, in which God has given to all human beings the task tobehave in a rational, responsible, creative, and respectfulway.     

(THE IMAGE OF) GOD IN ALL OF US

This essay compares Sikh and Christian thought about and practices of hospitality in light of the global refugee crisis. It aims to show how both practices of hospitality, and religious ethical thought about hospitality, can be enhanced by dialogue between traditions. The refugee crisis arises out of a global failure of hospitality, and the type of hospitality refugees most fundamentally need is that which confers membership in a political community. Comparing Christian and Sikh ethics of hospitality provides guidance toward building rooted religious communities that welcome outsiders, including by incorporating them into political communities. In particular, Christians who hold social power and privilege can better fulfill ethical mandates of hospitality by looking to the example of Sikhs and other marginalized groups. Sikhs have often built communities through acts of hospitality and welcomed outsiders without fear, even in contexts where their own belonging is questioned and their own security is under threat.     

Humanism and Theoretical Pluralism

Christian Smith's What Is a Person? calls for a normative turn in sociology—the grounding of sociology in a theory of human nature. While offering a systematic account of a thick view of personhood—what it should look like, how it can be applied, and why it is needed—the book proposes a critical realist personalism as the best metatheoretical direction for sociology. The author of this essay agrees with the main questions and direction of Smith's project. However, by historicizing the origins and sociological implications of personalist moral theory, the author problematizes the personalism that is one of the foundations of Smith's project. She contrasts personalism with humanism, suggesting that the latter might possess both the normative robustness and comparative potential needed for contemporary sociological theory and practice. She ends her response to Smith's book by raising questions about the relationship between critical realist personalism and theoretical pluralism.     

Normative roles,conceptual variance,and ardent realism about normativity

ABSTRACT

In Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund considers a “variance thesis” about our most fundamental (and seemingly most “authoritative”) normative concepts. This thesis raises the threat of an alarming symmetry between different sets of normative concepts. If this symmetry holds, it would be incompatible with “ardent realism” about normativity. Eklund argues that the ardent realist should appeal to the idea of “referential normativity” in response to this challenge. I argue that, even if Eklund is right in his core arguments on this front, many other important challenges for ardent realism remain that also stem from the issues about possible variance in normative concepts that he considers. Following this, I introduce further issues about conceptual variance. These are issues that arise within the context of the framework that Eklund proposes the ardent realist use to confront the variance theses he considers. In particular, the issues concern what normative role as such is, as well as, relatedly, which roles associated with a concept (or predicate) get to count as part of its normative role. The upshot is that issues about conceptual variance in normative domains might be even more challenging for the ardent realist to deal with than Eklund argues.