Locomotion, assessment, and regulatory fit: Value transfer from “how” to “what”

Regulatory fit is experienced when people pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory orientation. Previous research on promotion and prevention orientations has found that regulatory fit increases people’s perception that a decision they made was “right,” which in turn transfers value to the decision outcome, including being willing to pay more for a product than those who chose the same product without regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000; Higgins et al., in press). We predicted that the effect of regulatory fit on monetary value could be generalized to locomotion and assessment orientations. Participants were willing to pay over 40% more for the same book-light when it was chosen with a strategy that fit their regulatory orientation (assessment/“full evaluation”; locomotion/“progressive elimination”) than when it was chosen with a non-fit strategy.     

Motivational control of impulsive behavior interacts with choice opportunities

Impulsive behavior has been investigated through choice between a smaller/immediate reinforcer and a larger/delayed reinforcer, or through performance on a differential reinforcement of low rate (DRL) schedule. In the present study, we investigated a methodological divergence between these two procedures: in the former procedure, delay is a consequence of the subject's own choice, whereas in the later procedure, subjects are explicitly reinforced for delaying a response. In Experiment 1, 7 rats maintained at 80% of their free-feeding weights showed poorer efficiency of lever-pressing responses on a DRL 30-s schedule than when they were maintained at 90% of free-feeding weight. In Experiment 2, 16 rats were subjected to a concurrent chain schedule: the initial link was concurrent fixed ratio 1 fixed ratio 1, and each of these alternatives was followed by a short-DRL requirement with a one pellet reinforcer or a long-DRL requirement with a three pellet reinforcer. In one block of trials, rats were not allowed to choose between the two terminal links (forced-choice), whereas in the other block of trials rats were allowed to choose freely between the two terminal links (free-choice). Compared with rats maintained at 95% of their free-feeding weights, rats maintained at 80% of their free-feeding weights showed poorer efficiency in the terminal links’ DRL schedule performance (just as in Experiment 1), but this difference was shown only in the forced-choice blocks. These results indicate that motivational control of DRL schedule performance interacts with type of choice-making opportunity and highlight the direct comparison of motivational control of impulsive choice and DRL schedule performance.     

On the benefits of thinking unconsciously: Unconscious thought can increase post-choice satisfaction

This work compares conscious thought and unconscious thought in relation to quality of choice. Earlier work [Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 586-598] has shown that people make better choices after engaging in unconscious thought (i.e., unconscious activity during a period of distraction) rather than in conscious thought. However, the evidence was obtained for choices between hypothetical alternatives with quality of choice operationalized normatively. As quality of decision is essentially subjective, in the current experiment participants chose between real objects with quality operationalized as post-choice satisfaction. In a paradigm based on work by Wilson and colleagues [Wilson, T. D., Lisle, D., Schooler, J. W., Hodges, S. D., Klaaren, K. J., & LaFleur, S. J. (1993). Introspecting about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 331-339], participants were briefly presented with five art posters, and chose one either (a) immediately, (b) after thorough conscious thinking about each poster, or (c) after a period of distraction. Participants took their favorite poster home and were phoned 3-5 weeks later. As hypothesized, unconscious thinkers were more satisfied with their choice than participants in the other two conditions.     

Psychological distance to reward: Effects of S+ duration and the delay reduction it signals

A concurrent-chains procedure was used to examine choice between segmented (two-component chained schedules) and unsegmented schedules (simple schedules) in terminal links with equal inter-reinforcement intervals. Previous studies using this kind of experimental procedure showed preference for unsegmented schedules for both pigeons and humans. In this study, two changes in the experimental procedure were made relative to the usual experimental procedure reported in the literature. The first was that in the segmented schedule the second terminal-link stimulus appeared close to reinforcement presentation and the second was that the change in stimulus was brief, allowing the first stimulus to reappear and to be contiguous with reinforcement. With these changes, preference occurred for the segmented schedule. This result is consistent with principles of conditioned reinforcement, including delay-reduction theory.     

Computational Evidence That Frequency Trajectory Theory Does Not Oppose But Emerges From Age‐of‐Acquisition Theory

According to the age‐of‐acquisition hypothesis, words acquired early in life are processed faster and more accurately than words acquired later. Connectionist models have begun to explore the influence of the age/order of acquisition of items (and also their frequency of encounter). This study attempts to reconcile two different methodological and theoretical approaches (proposed by Lambon Ralph & Ehsan, 2006 and Zevin & Seidenberg, 2002 ) to age‐limited learning effects. The current simulations extend the findings reported by Zevin and Seidenberg (2002) that have shown that frequency trajectories (FTs) have limited and specific effects on word‐reading tasks. Using the methodological framework proposed by Lambon Ralph and Ehsan (2006) , which makes it possible to compare word‐reading and picture‐naming tasks in connectionist networks, we were able to show that FT has a considerable influence on age‐limited learning effects in a picture naming task. The findings show that when the input–output mappings are arbitrary (simulating picture naming tasks), the links formed by the network become entrenched as a result of early experience and that subsequent variations in frequency of exposure of the items have only a minor impact. In contrast, when the mappings between input‐output are quasi‐systematic or systematic (simulating word‐reading tasks), the training of new items was generalized and resulted in the suppression of age‐limited learning effects. At a theoretical level, we suggest that FT, which simultaneously takes account of time and the level of exposure across time, represents a more precise and modulated measure compared with the order of introduction of the items and may lead to innovative hypotheses in the field of age‐limited learning effects.     

When, what, and how much to reward in reinforcement learning-based models of cognition

Reinforcement learning approaches to cognitive modeling represent task acquisition as learning to choose the sequence of steps that accomplishes the task while maximizing a reward. However, an apparently unrecognized problem for modelers is choosing when, what, and how much to reward; that is, when (the moment: end of trial, subtask, or some other interval of task performance), what (the objective function: e.g., performance time or performance accuracy), and how much (the magnitude: with binary, categorical, or continuous values). In this article, we explore the problem space of these three parameters in the context of a task whose completion entails some combination of 36 state-action pairs, where all intermediate states (i.e., after the initial state and prior to the end state) represent progressive but partial completion of the task. Different choices produce profoundly different learning paths and outcomes, with the strongest effect for moment. Unfortunately, there is little discussion in the literature of the effect of such choices. This absence is disappointing, as the choice of when, what, and how much needs to be made by a modeler for every learning model.     

An Outline of a Theory of Action Systems

It is argued that the traditional psychological construal of the distinction between central (“open loop”) and peripheral (“closed loop”) neural processes is no longer tenable. A review of the relevant psychobiological research on the control of movement shows that both the central-peripheral dichotomy and the distinction between sensory and motor systems derived from that dichotomy are incompatible with what is known about the processes underlying action. Based on experimental and comparative data, a new theory of action is proposed. The basic concept of this new theory is the action system: Unlike motor systems, action systems involve sensory as well as motor processes; action systems are not organized into response hierarchies, but rather in coalitional structures of adjustable movements and postures. The phylogeny of action systems is discussed, and the eight most important action systems are distinguished in terms of their evolved distinctive functions. The difficulties of developing a taxonomy of actions for functionally specific types of behavior made up of units that can be controlled is resolved by showing how kinds of action are differentiated by the kinds of affordances their components help to realize.     

Sadness and consumption

Sadness influences consumption, leading individuals to pay more to acquire new goods and to eat more unhealthy food than they would otherwise. These undesirable consumption effects of sadness can occur without awareness, thus representing more than just conscious attempts at “retail therapy.” In an experiment with real food consumption, the present paper examines the hypothesis that sadness' impact on consumption could be attenuated if the choice context counteracted appraisals of helplessness and enhanced a sense of individual control. Results revealed that: (1) sadness elevates self-reports of helplessness in response to the emotion-inducing situation, (2) helplessness mediates the sadness–consumption effect, and (3) inducing a sense of control (via choice) attenuates sadness' effect.     

Refining the dual‐process theory of preference construction: A reply to Gawronski,Martin and Sloman,Stanovich, and Wegener and Chien

Our target article proposed a dual-system framework for understanding context and task effects in choice. In this summary, we address the major points made by each set of commentators and, building on their suggestions, define a more precise dual-system theory of preference construction. We also propose some avenues for future research on a broader dual-system approach to understanding choice.