Fine motor skill proficiency in typically developing children: On or off the maturation track?

Fine motor skill proficiency is an essential component of numerous daily living activities such as dressing, feeding or playing. Poor fine motor skills can lead to difficulties in academic achievement, increased anxiety and poor self-esteem. Recent findings have shown that children’s gross motor skill proficiency tends to fall below established developmental norms. A question remains: do fine motor skill proficiency levels also fall below developmental norms? The aim of this study was to examine the current level of fine motor skill in Irish children. Children (N = 253) from 2nd, 4th and 6th grades (mean age = 7.12, 9.11 and 11.02 respectively) completed the Fine Motor Composite of the Bruininks Oseretsky Test of Motor Proficiency 2nd Edition (BOT-2). Analysis revealed that only 2nd grade children met the expected level of fine motor skill proficiency. It was also found that despite children’s raw scores improving with age, children’s fine motor skill proficiency was not progressing at the expected rate given by normative data. This leads us to question the role and impact of modern society on fine motor skills development over the past number of decades.     

Short-term and long-term relationships between reflection and performance in teams: evidence from a four-wave longitudinal study

Previous theory and research suggest that team reflection is beneficial for team performance. We argue that results remain inconclusive because prior studies have not accounted for the dynamic nature of this relationship. This paper addresses this research gap by examining time-specific relationships among variables and the intra-team variability of changes across time. In a four-wave longitudinal field study with 97 teams (N = 453 team members) performing a business simulation task, short-term (i.e., autoregressive, cross-lagged effects) and long-term (i.e., latent trajectories) relationships between team reflection and performance were explored. We found evidence that reflection had negative autoregressive effects and that there were direct positive short-term relationships between reflection and performance. Reflection trajectories were seen to decline across time and performance trajectories to increase across time. In addition, teams with either low initial reflection or low initial performance showed higher increases in reflection across time, whilst higher increase in reflection was negatively related to change in performance. Findings are discussed with respect to how they extend the previous literature and what directions they suggest for future research.     

Actions and outcomes: two aspects of agency

Agency can be construed as both the manner in which autonomous individuals embark on particular courses of action (or inaction), and the relationship between such agents and the outcomes of the courses of action on which they embark. A promising strategy for understanding both senses of agency consists in the combination of a modal logic of agency and branching time semantics. Such is the strategy behind stit theory, the theory of agentive action developed by Nuel Belnap and others. However, stit theoretic evaluations of the agentive relationship between agents and outcomes that are uncertain—due to either the presence of indeterminism, or the possible intervention of other agents—yield counterintuitive results. This paper develops a pair of alternative operators (the “act” operators) for modeling agency with respect to uncertain outcomes. Unlike the stit-theoretic model, the act-theoretic model of agency with respect to a particular state of affairs does not require that the state of affairs be realized in every possible history. If the state of affairs in fact obtains in the actual history, and its obtaining was dependent on the agent’s pursuing a particular course of action, then the agent is deemed agentive under act theory.     

The Indetermination of Reason and the Roleof the Will in Aquinas's Accountof Human Freedom

Thomas Aquinas argues that human choices are made by the will and reason working together. It is easy to misinterpret his argument and suppose that the reason alone works out what should be done while the will simply ratifies this. Instead Aquinas believes that in practical matters the reason is often undetermined since it arrives at many simultaneous conclusions. This is the often unacknowledged heart of Aquinas's account of freedom. All these simultaneous rational conclusions derive from the objective circumstances of the world; each one could give rise to a different rationally justified course of action; yet only one can be acted upon. The reason cannot decide between them. It is the will that accepts and affirms one of these conclusions and gives force to the reasonableness of one course of action. This is why a choice is always rational and personally willed – which is what makes it free. The indetermination of reason is what allows the future to be open-ended for the deliberating agent; it allows past and present to be interpreted in different ways, each of which has its own coherence and rationality. In this way Aquinas's account of human freedom avoids both an irrational voluntarism and a deterministic intellectualism     

The effect of visual signals on spatial decision making

We examined the effect of an irrelevant visual transient on the decision where to look for a hidden object. Participants also performed a conventional ‘inhibition of return’ localization task. In Experiments 1 and 2 the two tasks were blocked and in Experiments 3 and 4 they were randomly interleaved. In every experiment there was a bias to select the cued location in the spatial decision task. This facilitory effect was greatest when the cue occurred at a strategically unfavored location and even occurred for participants who reported strategically selecting a non-cued location, indicating that the facilitory effect is automatic and independent of other strategic biases. Inhibition of return was observed only when the tasks were blocked and the localization task preceded the decision task. The findings suggests that spatial decisions engage different attentional control settings than those engaged when detecting visual transients; and that this attentional mode affects the processing of visual transients such that they do not inhibit the subsequent speeded detection of onset targets.     

The problem of delayed causation in a video game: Constant, varied, and filled delays

A first-person shooter video game was adapted for the study of causal decision making within dynamic environments. The video game included groups of three potential targets. Participants chose which of the three targets in each group was producing distal explosions. The actual source of the explosion effect varied in the delay between the firing of its weapon and the effect (from 0 to 2 s), whether these programed average delays were constant or varied from shot to shot, and whether the delays were unfilled or filled with an auditory event. In Experiment 1, participants’ choice accuracy was highest with shorter delays, but there was no effect of filling the delay and some beneficial effect of varying the delay. These results were re-examined in Experiment 2 but with participants experiencing the same average delay for seven subsequent decisions before the next average delay was introduced. In this experiment, men showed a strong and consistent benefit of filling a delay whereas women did not. Participants’ behavior is considered within the context of a model that assumes that choice behavior is driven by experienced contiguity for the target and foils.     

From Glossy to Greasy: The Impact of Learned Associations on Perceptions of Food Healthfulness

We demonstrate that consumers have learned that unhealthy snacks such as potato chips tend to be sold in glossy packages, whereas healthier snacks such as crackers tend to be sold in matte packages (in studies 1–3). As a result, consumers who see a snack food package with a glossy [matte] surface will infer lesser [greater] healthfulness of its contents (study 4), consume less [more] of it (study 5), and be more likely to choose a glossy [matte] package from an assortment of snack packages if motivated to engage in tasty [healthful] eating (study 6). Theoretical and managerial implications as well as future research opportunities are discussed.     

Increasing task precision demands reveals that the reach and grasp remain subject to different perception-action constraints in 12-month-old human infants

The reach and grasp follow different developmental trajectories, but are often considered to have achieved nearly adult-like precision and integration by 12 months of age. This study used frame-by-frame video analysis to investigate whether increasing precision demands, by placing small reaching targets on a narrow pedestal rather than on a flat table, would influence the reach and grasp movements of 12-month-old infants in a complementary or differential fashion. The results reveal that placing the target atop a pedestal impaired the infants’s ability to direct an appropriate digit towards the small target, but did not produce a corresponding decrease in the frequency with which they used an index-thumb pincer grip to grasp the target. This was due to the fact that, although infants were more likely to contact the target with a suboptimal part of the hand in the pedestal condition, a greater proportion of these suboptimal contacts ultimately transitioned to a successful index-thumb pincer grip. Thus, increasing task precision demands impaired reach accuracy, but facilitated index-thumb grip formation, in 12-month-old infants. The differential response of the reach and grasp to the increased precision demands of the pedestal condition suggests that the two movements are not fully integrated and, when precision demands are great, remain sensitive to different perception-action constraints in 12-month-old infants.     

Erroneous choice and foregone gains in hoarding gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis)

Under the conventional assumption that natural selection favors choice behavior that maximizes some fitness-related currency, a forager making repeated binary choices should consistently choose the more valuable option. Under the alternative assumption that natural selection favors choice behavior that minimizes costly errors, erroneous choice is not only expected but is expected to be common when the cost of errors is low. This cost depends on the potential rate of return: the higher this rate, the smaller the cost of choosing the less valuable option. When this rate is very high, a forager may err frequently and yet forego no appreciable fitness gain. Errors should thus be more common when interruptions to foraging are shorter. Our experimental results supported this prediction: gray jays chose the less valuable option more frequently when subjected to shorter interruptions (experimentally imposed delays to access to food rewards). This tendency is consistent with the idea that an adaptive decision-making process may routinely produce errors, not because errors are in some way adaptive but because their fitness cost is minimal, particularly when delays are short. From a proximate perspective, this tendency to commit errors more frequently following shorter delays may be due to constraints on the jays’ information-processing capacity. In general, choice behavior should be viewed as the joint byproduct of adaptive decision making and cognitive constraints. Received: 8 June 2000 / Accepted after revision: 21 October 2000     

Power and loss aversion

Four experiments tested the prediction that power reduces loss aversion by increasing the anticipated value of gains and shrinking the negative anticipated value of losses. Experiment 1 provided initial support for the prediction that those in power are less loss averse by replicating a classic paradigm of loss aversion in riskless choice and demonstrating moderation by power. Experiments 2 and 3 expanded on this finding by breaking apart the components of loss aversion to determine how power may reduce it: via gains, losses, or both. Across two scenarios and two different measures of anticipated value, power reduced the anticipated threat associated with a loss. However, the prediction that power increases the anticipated value of gains was not supported. Finally, Experiment 4 replicated the results of Experiments 2 and 3 in the context of a choice with real consequences for the participants. Implications of these findings are discussed.