Keep or trade? An experimental study of the exchange paradox

The “exchange paradox”—also referred to in the literature by a variety of other names, notably the “two-envelopes problem”—is notoriously difficult, and experts are not all agreed as to its resolution. Some of the various expressions of the problem are open to more than one interpretation; some are stated in such a way that assumptions are required in order to fill in missing information that is essential to any resolution. In three experiments several versions of the problem were used, in each of which the information given was sufficient to determine an optimal choice strategy when it exists or to justify indifference regarding keeping or trading when such a strategy does not exist. College students who were presented with the various versions of the problem tended to base their choices on simple heuristics and to give little evidence of understanding the probabilistic implications of the differences in the problem statements.     

Choice both affects and reflects preferences

The free-choice paradigm is a widely used paradigm in psychology. It has been used to show that after a choice between two similarly pleasant stimuli, the pleasantness of the chosen one tends to increase, whereas the pleasantness of the rejected one tends to decrease—a spreading of alternatives. However, the methodological validity of the free-choice paradigm to study choice-induced preference change has recently been seriously questioned [Chen, K. M., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 573–594. doi:10.1037/a0020217]. According to this criticism, the classically reported spreading of alternatives between the first and second rating sessions cannot be unambiguously interpreted to reflect a true change in preferences and can be observed even for completely static preferences. Here, we used two measurement sequences, a classical Rating 1–choice–Rating 2 sequence and a control Rating 1–Rating 2–choice sequence, to disentangle the spreading of alternatives driven by the effect of choice from the artefactual effect highlighted by Chen and Risen. In two studies using different stimulus material (faces and odours), we find that choice has a robust modulatory impact on preferences for rejected odours, but not for chosen odours and not for faces.     

Age differences in maximization

Studies have shown the existence of inter-individual differences in choice behavior, some people seeking for the best (maximizers) and others for a good enough option (satisficers). Here, we explored whether these inter-individual differences are influenced by aging and common personality traits (i.e., Big Five model). Young (n = 125; 19 years old) and elderly adults (n = 101; 86 years old) completed different scales assessing – among others – maximization and Big Five traits. Our results indicated a greater proportion of maximizers in elderly than in young adults. We also found a minor association between maximization and Big Five traits in both groups. In sum, aging influences choice behavior, but this cannot be explained by changes of common personality traits.     

The lack of dominance and choice deferral: Choosing to defer to cope with the feeling of being out of control

The present study aimed to explore whether emotional dominance can also account for choice deferral. This research manipulated emotional dominance through the difference in attractiveness among current alternatives in Experiment 1 and the readability of fonts for describing current options in Experiment 2, to investigate the role of dominance in choice deferral. The results revealed that increasingly submissive decision environments were related to more choice of deferral options. Mediation analyses indicated that dominance could mediate the effects of experimental manipulations on choice deferral, and that the actual choice of a deferral option was associated with more increase in dominance of retrospective emotion. The results indicate that dominance plays an important role in choice deferral and that choosing to defer can minimize the explicit confrontation of being out of control.     

A memory-based model of Hick's law

We propose and evaluate a memory-based model of Hick’s law, the approximately linear increase in choice reaction time with the logarithm of set size (the number of stimulus–response alternatives). According to the model, Hick’s law reflects a combination of associative interference during retrieval from declarative memory and occasional savings for stimulus–response repetitions due to non-retrieval. Fits to existing data sets show that the model accounts for the basic set-size effect, changes in the set-size effect with practice, and stimulus–response-repetition effects that challenge the information-theoretic view of Hick’s law. We derive the model’s prediction of an interaction between set size, stimulus fan (the number of responses associated with a particular stimulus), and stimulus–response transition, which is subsequently tested and confirmed in two experiments. Collectively, the results support the core structure of the model and its explanation of Hick’s law in terms of basic memory effects.     

Dazed and confused by choice: How the temporal costs of choice freedom lead to undesirable outcomes

We propose that individuals underestimate the costs of making choices relative to the benefits of finding the best option. Specifically, we demonstrate that research participants make systematic mistakes in predicting the effect of having more, vs. less, choice freedom on task performance and task-induced affect. Even when participants have the information to understand that the costs of choice freedom outweigh its benefits, they still predict that choice freedom will lead to better performance and more positive affect. As a result, those who have the option to choose exercise it, yet end up performing worse and feeling worse than those who do not have that option.     

Inferring latent class lexicographic rules from choice data

A lexicographic rule orders multi-attribute alternatives in the same way as a dictionary orders words. Although no utility function can represent lexicographic preference over continuous, real-valued attributes, a constrained linear model suffices for representing such preferences over discrete attributes. We present an algorithm for inferring lexicographic structures from choice data. The primary difficulty in using such data is that it is seldom possible to obtain sufficient information to estimate individual-level preference functions. Instead, one needs to pool the data across latent clusters of individuals. We propose a method that identifies latent clusters of subjects, and estimates a lexicographic rule for each cluster. We describe an application of the method using data collected by a manufacturer of television sets. We compare the predictions of the model with those obtained from a finite-mixture, multinomial-logit model.     

Free Choice

In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can, however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice. Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism.