Variety‐Seeking and Perceived Expertise

People often infer expertise from the choice of unique, rare, or sophisticated options. But might mere variety‐seeking also serve as a signal of expertise, and if so, how? Six studies show that the relationship between variety‐seeking and perceived expertise is not unidirectional and depends on the perceiver's own level of expertise. Category experts perceive lower variety‐seeking as indicative of discernment, which in turn increases perceived expertise in that category. Consequently, experts choose less variety to portray themselves as experts. In contrast, novices perceive high variety‐seeking as indicative of category breadth knowledge, which in turn increases their perception of category expertise. Consequently, novices choose more variety to portray themselves as experts. The findings make novel theoretical contributions to research on variety‐seeking, consumer expertise, and social perception, as well as practical contributions for marketers of product assortments and bundles.     

Rationales Handeln und historische Erklärung

Summary   Rational Choice and Historical Explanation. The dichotomy between narrative and causal approaches is one of the most discussed problems in historical explanation. The main problem seems to be that many philosophers and historians do not agree with the argument of analytical philosophy of history that explanations demand law-like assumptions. Even Arthur C. Danto, however, who is often regarded as the founder of narrative explanatory approaches, did not leave causality behind. Contrarily, he defended the covering-law-scheme against unfounded criticism and showed that causality and narration can be reconciled. But Danto did not say which laws should play a major role in historical explanations. This gap could be bridged by one of the most successful research programs in the social sciences over the last decades, the Rational Choice approach. This approach should, however, be reduced to its basic assumption, the presumption of subjective rationality (which principally corresponds an older hermeneutic tradition), and be integrated into the “model of a sociological explanation” (which is very popular among European sociologists). The result is a concept of a historical explanation that does justice to the linguistic turn (in its formulation by Willard Van Orman Quine), to the demands of the covering-law-scheme and to the ambitions of historians to narrate and explain a historical phenomenon at the same time.     

High school students’ career decision-making process: Consequences for choice implementation in higher education

This study investigated consequences of high school students’ career decision-making process for choice implementation in higher education. A sample of adolescents participated at the end of Grade 12 and was followed during the first and second year in higher education. Linear and logistic regression analyses revealed that students’ coping with career decisional tasks at the end of Grade 12 significantly contributed to the several aspects of early choice implementation (i.e., choice actualization, academic adjustment, commitment to the chosen study) during the first trimester in higher education. The importance of these aspects of early choice implementation is demonstrated through their relationship with academic achievement during the first year in higher education.     

How something can be said about telling more than we can know: on choice blindness and introspection

The legacy of Nisbett and Wilson’s classic article, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes (1977), is mixed. It is perhaps the most cited article in the recent history of consciousness studies, yet no empirical research program currently exists that continues the work presented in the article. To remedy this, we have introduced an experimental paradigm we call choice blindness [Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., &; Olsson, A. (2005). Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science, 310(5745), 116–119.]. In the choice blindness paradigm participants fail to notice mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome they are presented with, while nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way they did. In this article, we use word-frequency and latent semantic analysis (LSA) to investigate a corpus of introspective reports collected within the choice blindness paradigm. We contrast the introspective reasons given in non-manipulated vs. manipulated trials, but find very few differences between these two groups of reports.     

The latent structure of decision styles

Responding to calls for theoretical development in research on decision styles, this article focuses on their structural relationships. A two-component model of decision styles is proposed. One component, pertaining to dual process theories of thinking, is concerned with the processes people use to make decisions, and the other is concerned with processes used to regulate decisions (e.g. whether they should be made immediately or delayed). The results of a first study (N = 629) using items from a comprehensive decision style measure (the Decision Styles Questionnaire), support the two-component model. The results of a second study (N = 305), based on an alternative set of style measures, provide support for an extended version of the model. Implications of the theory and research findings for future work on decision styles are discussed.     

The role of epistemic motivation in individuals’ response to decision complexity

Integrating findings on the effects of more alternatives with findings on the effects of more attributes, we offer a motivational decision-making model, suggesting that epistemic motivation moderates individuals’ responses to complex information. Study 1 empirically investigated the shared essence of four conceptualizations of epistemic motivation, further distinguishing it from the maximizing/satisficing motivation. A series of experiments indicate that epistemic motivation moderates the effect of complex information on one’s discomfort with a decision (Studies 2–4) and on the tendency to implement one’s choice in action (Study 3). Taken together, our findings indicate that individuals with low epistemic motivation experience more discomfort and are less likely to implement their decision when faced with complex information whereas those high on epistemic motivation portray a weaker or even an opposite effect. The consistent findings across conceptualizations (dispositional Need-for-Cognitive-Closure and manipulated Openness vs. Conservation values) indicate the robustness of the findings and the important role of epistemic motivation in complex decisions.     

Choice theories: What are they good for?

Simonson et al. present an ambitious sketch of an integrative theory of context. Provoked by this thoughtful proposal, I discuss what is the function of theories of choice in the coming decades. Traditionally, choice models and theory have attempted to predict choices as a function of the attributes of options. I argue that to be truly useful, they need to generate specific and quantitative predictions of the effect of the choice environment upon choice probability. To do this, we need to focus on rigorously modeling and measuring the underlying processes causing these effects, and use the Simonson et al. proposal to provide some examples. I also present some examples from research in decision-making and decision neuroscience, and argue that models that fail, and fail spectacularly are particularly useful. I close with a challenge: How would consumer researcher aid the design of real world choice environments such as the health exchanges under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act?     

What should we expect from a dual-process theory of preference construction in choice?

Dhar and Gorlin (2013) proposed a dual-process framework for understanding the effects of preference construction in choice. Drawing on the distinction operating principles and operating conditions, it is argued that their emphasis on cognitive elaboration fails to specify the mental operations involved in preference construction. This limitation makes their dual-process framework circular and susceptible to the criticism of single-process alternatives. The distinction between associative and propositional processes has the potential to fill this conceptual gap, thereby providing a more thorough understanding of preference construction effects in choice.     

Same destination,different paths: When and how does observing others' choices and reasoning alter confidence in our own choices?

Seeing others make the same decision we do does not always increase choice confidence or tell the whole story of social influence when consumers expect to have to publically discuss their choice and reasoning. Instead, consumers' confidence in their publically stated choices can be diminished if observed others make the same choice but justify the choice using different reasoning. This effect occurs because confidence in one's own reasoning is thrown into doubt, rather than due to a desire to affiliate with the observed other. These effects are eliminated in both private choice contexts and in rejection versus selection tasks.