The effects of stimulus type,training, and chronological age on children's identification and recoding of multidimensional stimuli

Kindergarten and second-grade children (75 and 99 months of age, respectively) were first taught that the two stimuli within each of four pairs of multidimentional stimuli differed with respect to their values on every one of three bivalued dimensions: color, size, and form. Each of the eight stimuli was then presented twice, one at a time, and the child was asked either to find its duplicate (eight encoding trials) or to find its complementary mate (eight recoding trials) among the complete set of eight stimuli. Next, each of the eight stimulus compounds was presented twice as a display stimulus for 5 sec and, after a delay of 10 to 15 sec, the child was asked to find the display stimulus (eight trials of encoding plus memory) or its complement (eight trials of recoding plus memory) among the complete set. The stimuli for half the children in each age group were standard unitary compounds (e.g., a large red circle, a small blue square, etc.) and for the other half they were partitioned stimuli with their dimensional values spatially separated (e.g., large arrow, circle outline, and patch of color). Half of the children in each of these subgroups were given a basic pretraining, and the other half received extended pretraining, in recoding the stimulus attributes. The results indicated that unitary stimuli were easier to encode but the partitioned stimuli were easier to recode, that recoding was much more difficult than encoding, that extended training improved recoding performance, and that second graders were slightly better at encoding and much better at recoding than the kindergarten children. The patterns of performance on the tasks involving memory were similar to those just described. The results were discussed in terms of children's abilities to analyze multidimensional stimuli into their dimensional components.     

Actors' and observers' attributions for success and failure: A comparative test of predictions from Kelley's cube,self-serving bias,and positivity bias formulations

An experiment was conducted to test implications of Kelley's cube, self-serving bias, and positivity bias formulations for attributions associated with success and failure on a test of “abstract reasoning.” Subjects either experienced or observed outcomes on three tasks. They then made attributions for only the third outcome, which was either a success or a failure. The first task was of the same type and had the same outcome as the third task, thus providing the information that the outcome being attributed was high in consistency. The second task was of a different type than the first and third tasks, and its outcome either did or did not differ from their outcomes, thus varying information about the distinctiveness of the outcome being attributed. Consensus was manipulated by presenting false norms, ostensibly from a previous experiment. In contrast to previous research, the present study included thorough checks on all of these informational manipulations. Regardless of attributor role (actor or observer), subjects attributed success more to internal than to external factors and attributed failure more to external than to internal factors. These findings indicate a general bias toward positive evaluations. Discussion centers on possible alternative interpretations of these findings, restrictions on their generality, and the limitations that they seem to impose on the applicability of the other two formulations.     

Coalition formation in characteristic function games: Competitive tests of three theories

Two experiments tested the bargaining, minimum resource, and minimum power theories of coalition formation in situations involving different payoffs for some of the winning coalitions (characteristic function games). In the first experiment, a triadic resource distribution was employed and payoffs for the coalitions were specified in such a way that each of the three theories predicted the formation of a different coalition. The coalition predicted by minimum power theory formed the most frequently, and the mean divisions of the payoffs among coalition members were also closest to the predictions of minimum power theory. However, the most frequent coalition was not only the one predicted by minimum power theory, it was also the one having the largest payoff per member. There-fore, a second experiment was conducted, which employed a tetradic resource distribution and specified the coalition payoffs in such a way that (a) each of the theories predicted the formation of a different coalition and (b) none of the predicted coalitions was the one with the largest payoff per member. Although the mean payoff divisions in the coalitions in this experiment were closest to those predicted by bargaining theory, the coalition that formed most frequently was not one of those predicted by any of the theories. Rather, it was the one having the largest payoff per member. None of the three theories is able to account adequately for the results of both experiments. The difficulties that the theories have in dealing with coalition formation in situations in which there are different payoffs for winning are discussed.     

The Impossibility of Local Skepticism

According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know even if they are true. My argument focuses on one popular form of local skepticism, ethical skepticism, but I believe that the argument generalizes to cover other forms as well.

Charles F. Mackenzie,Popery, Guns,and Colonial Conflict

Charles F. Mackenzie was an Anglican archdeacon in the 19th century in the newly formed Diocese of Natal. He was consecrated a missionary bishop for Central Africa in Cape Town in 1861, which was a significant development for the Anglican Church at the time. Mackenzie struggled to read the social landscape, becoming embroiled in colonial conflict. Consequently, congregants, colleagues, and historians have characterized him in markedly different ways, rendering a disputed legacy. This paper brings Mackenzie into conversation with another figure who is not without his own controversy: Martyn Percy. Applying Percy's implicit theological approach provides an important lens with which to view the social complexities, ecclesial conflicts and missional contexts which Mackenzie sought to navigate.     

ON WEAK POSTPOSITIVISM: AHISTORICAL REJECTIONS OF THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE

Abstract: Postpositivists have lately joined post‐Husserlians in arguing that the deepest problem with Descartes' legacy is that it fosters the objectivist illusion that philosophers might actually come to think “from Nowhere,” or at least that they can self‐consciously choose whatever presuppositions they do accept. Yet this argument is easier to express than to incorporate into one's own thinking. It is perfectly possible to oppose the View from Nowhere, and even to criticize others for failing to understand its impossibility, and still do so … as if from Nowhere. This article is concerned with such compromised opposition—that is, with critics who reject, in ahistorical terms and from an ahistorical standpoint, an ahistorical conception of philosophy. It focuses on two figures from the empiricist‐positivist side of the Cartesian legacy, Rorty and Taylor, but their story is in important ways typical. Though their criticisms are certainly more radical and considerably more successful than those of many of their analytic colleagues, each retains in his own thinking more of the ahistorical or standpointless ideal than he realizes.     

A PEIRCEAN RESPONSE TO THE EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE

The evolutionary debunking argument advanced by Sharon Street, Michael Ruse, and Richard Joyce employs the logic of Paul Griffiths and John Wilkins to contend that humans cannot have knowledge of moral truths, since the evolutionary process that has produced our basic moral intuitions lacks causal connections to those (putative) truths. Yet this argument is self‐defeating, because its aim is the categorical, normative claim that we should suspend our moral beliefs in light of the discoveries about their non‐truth‐tracking origins, when it is precisely this claim that relies upon the normativity under attack. This article cites Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) to argue that such self‐defeat can be avoided by expanding upon the basic structure of the argument put forth by Griffiths and Wilkins, provided that one embraces a version of realism that corresponds with Peirce's doctrine of final causation. So construed, final causation reconciles real generals (including real moral values) with natural selection and undergirds further speculation of moral facts within values per se.     

PROSPECTS FOR THE FIELD OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION: AN OCTOPUS VIEW

The organic unity between the head and the vital arms of the octopus is proposed as a metaphor for science and religion as an academic field. While the specific object of the field is to pursue second‐order reflections on existing and possible relations between sciences and religions, it is argued that several aspects of realism and normativity are constitutive to the field. The vital arms of the field are related to engagements with distinctive scientific theories, specialized philosophy of science, representative theological proposals, and the input from the study of world religions.