A Summary of Michael Ruse's Darwin and Design

Michael Ruse's Darwin and Design: Science, Philosophy, Religion explains the history and philosophical arguments of the design metaphor of evolution. It recounts the historical uses of the metaphor from Plato to twentieth-century American science. Ruse explores the criticisms of the design metaphor and ultimately concludes that it is a beneficial term. The chief contribution of Darwin and Design is that it offers a clear understanding and comparison of the argument from design and the argument to design.     

The Extended Mind Rehabilitates The Metaphysical Hegel

The nonmetaphysical interpretation of Hegel's philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading is not credible and so his philosophy must be rationally reconstructed so as to elide its metaphysical aspects. This article shows that the thesis of the extended mind approaches the metaphysical reading, thereby undermining denials of its credibility and providing the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel's philosophy. This fully rehabilitates the metaphysical Hegel. The article does not argue for the truth of the metaphysical Hegel's claims. Rather, it defends the correctness of reading his philosophy as metaphysical.     

Distraction,amnesia, and the next-in-line effect

Two studies use a free recall task to track, moment by moment, cognitive repercussions of an upcoming performance. As in earlier research, subjects display impaired recall for events which immediately precede an anticipated public performance. This “next-in-line effect” occurs even if the “performance” consists of reading a word to oneself. However, subjects show no memory deficit if their performance is not anticipated, and they have generally poor recall if they know they will be performing—but not when. Distraction and amnesia accounts of these recall deficits are discussed. Ancillary findings illuminate the organization of memory in social settings.     

THE METAPHOR OF THE ARCHITECT IN DARWIN: CHANCE AND FREE WILL

In The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, published in 1868, Darwin used the metaphor of the architect to argue in favor of natural autonomy and to clarify the role of chance in his theory of adaptive change by variation and natural selection. In this article, I trace the history of this important heuristic instrument in Darwin's writings and letters and suggest that this metaphor was important to Darwin because it helps him to explain the role of chance, and gives an argument in favor of the free will.     

The Straw Thing of Fallacy Theory: The Standard Definition of 'Fallacy'

Hamblin held that the conception of 'fallacy' as an argument that seems valid but is not really so was the dominant conception of fallacy in the history of fallacy studies. The present paper explores the extent of support that there is for this view. After presenting a brief analysis of 'the standard definition of fallacy,' a number of the definitions of 'fallacy' in texts from the middle of this century – from the standard treatment – are considered. This is followed by a review of the definitions of 'fallacy' in the earlier history of logic books, including those of Aristotle, Whately, Mill and De Morgan. The essay concludes that there is scarcely any support for Hamblin's view that this particular definition of 'fallacy' was widely held.     

History and Method of Charles V. Gerkin’s Pastoral Theology: Toward an Identity-Embodied and Community-Embedded Pastoral Theology,Part I. History

The purpose of this article is to explore the legacy of Charles V. Gerkin’s pastoral theology and to construct a method of pastoral theology. In Part I, I will trace within a larger context of pastoral theology the history of Gerkin’s pastoral theology since his early clinical praxis. In Part II, I will explore his method of developing pastoral theology and construct a renewed critical and constructive method of pastoral theology, reflecting on the implications of exploring the history and method of his pastoral theology.     

Introduction to symposium on Philosophy and the art of writing by Richard Shusterman

This introductory piece provides context for this symposium on Richard Shusterman's new book, Philosophy and the Art of Writing. The piece reflects on the symposium genre from Plato's classic dialogue to its form today. It claims that Shusterman's work asks us to take this kind of philosophical writing more seriously, and for that reason the symposium itself has taken on a different structure. The piece discusses how each of the contributors responding to the book (with Shusterman leading the way), Eli Kramer, Randall Auxier, and Charles Johnson, have engaged in practicing, nurturing, and supporting broad modes of philosophical writing, and in turn why they have chosen to do so in this context.     

Effects of socialization on the physiological detection of deception

Effects of socialization on the physiological detection of deception using the control question test (CQT) were explored in three mock crime experiments. Subjects were 168 volunteers from criminal, community, and college student populations. Socialization was measured by the Socialization (So) scale of the California Psychological Inventory. All subjects were given a CQT using standard field techniques. The physiological data were blindly evaluated by a semiobjective field scoring technique and previously developed discriminant function. There were no effects of socialization on the accuracy of classification by the semiobjective field scoring or the discriminant function. A modest negative relationship was found between socialization scores and differential reactivity in the CQT as indicated by correlations with the semiobjective (r = −.22) and discriminant scores (r = −.17). It was concluded that socialization is not an important variable for field applications of the CQT.     

The miscommunication of deception: An adaptive perspective

Undergraduates were videotaped as they told lies and truths about their last job. Later, these undergraduates viewed the videotape and tried to guess which of their fellow subject were lying. Monetary incentives had been offered for successful lying and lie detection. Our subjects showed a “demeanor bias”—some looked honest even when they were lying; others looked dishonest even when they were telling the truth. These differences in apparent honesty were the primary determinant of deception judgments; perceivers' detection skills played a lesser role. Honest-looking subjects were predisposed to perceive others as dishonest. In general, our liars used hand gestures, maintained eye contact, and refrained from smiling. Perceivers misconstrued these behaviors as signs of honesty and could not often detect deceit—unless the lie was being told by a subject who had earlier told the truth. We draw on sociobiological concepts and offer an adaptive perspective on human deceit.     

Modeling: An analysis in terms of category accessibility

It is proposed that many of the releasing or disinhibiting effects caused by models can be accounted for by information-processing mechanisms, without recourse to the concept of reinforcement. More specifically, it is suggested that the process of viewing a model's behavior involves the activation of an interpretive schema. This renders the information the schema incorporates more accessible for subsequent use. If the schema incorporates (or is closely related to) behavior-specifying information, that information becomes more accessible as well, thus making it more likely to influence overt behavior. Two studies are reported that assessed the plausibility of this reasoning. In Experiment 1 subjects who had viewed an aggressive model perceived greater hostility in the behavior of an ambiguous stimulus person that they subsequently encountered than did control subjects. This finding is consistent with the assumption that the model's behavior activated a conceptual schema for use in interpretation. In Experiment 2 subjects in whom an aggressive schema had been activated under a guise displayed greater aggression in their subsequent behavior in a different context than did control subjects. This finding is consistent with the assumption that activating the conceptual schema also activated behavioral information. The discussion centers on the implications of the findings.