Comparative validity of traditional versus S-R format inventories of interpersonal behavior

The comparative validity of two “S-R format” inventories of interpersonal behavior, Kinnane et al.'s (1969) Schedule of Interpersonal Response and a newly developed Rational S-R Inventory, and two “traditional” inventories, the Personality Research Form and the Interpersonal Check List, was examined with respect to 14 self-report and peer rating criteria selected to broadly tap the interpersonal domain. Sixty-four male and female high school seniors served as Ss.In spite of the situational specificity inherent in the S-R inventories, the traditional inventories substantially outperformed the S-R inventories and, in contrast to previous findings, also outperformed simple self-ratings. The results are discussed not only in terms of the relative advantages of various inventory construction strategies but also in reference to the problem of criterion measurement and theoretical and methodological issues in the assessment of situational parameters.     

Transfer of training: Effects of successive pretraining of components in a dimension-abstracted oddity task

An experiment was conducted investigating the effects of training two components of a dimension-abstracted oddity problem, oddity responding and attention. All Ss were given a series of three problems. Type of oddity training was manipulated on Problem 1, and Ss learned (1) an oddity response in a problem whose format was the same as the final transfer problem, (2) an oddity response in a problem whose format was different from the final problem, or (3) no oddity response. Attention training was manipulated on Problem 2. The results indicated that Ss given same format oddity training and appropriate attention training were able to integrate that information on the final problem, that the probability of transferring the oddity response learned on Problem 1 to Problem 3 depended upon the similarity of the task formats, and that the two trained components tended to combine in an interactive fashion.     

The role of control processes and structural constraints in models of memory and social judgment

Six experiments examining a recent model of memory and social judgment are reported. In particular, the theoretical concept of a Work Space is examined in terms of both its structural properties and a variety of control processes that govern its operation. In Experiment 1, subjects were given information about a stimulus person and told that they would later be asked to recall it as well as possible. The length of the actual delay before recall and the length of the anticipated delay were factorially varied. Under short delay conditions, subjects anticipating a short delay recalled more of the information than those anticipating a long delay. The reverse was true under actual long delay conditions. Other results suggest that the anticipated length of the delay has an effect on processes related to both encoding and storage/retrieval. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that, relative to no delay conditions, a long actual delay or a long anticipated delay produces polarization in social judgments. Both of these results are predicted by the model. Experiments 4–6 examine the effect of interpolated cognitive activity on memory and social judgment. As predicted by the model, relatively complicated cognitive activity leads to lower levels of recall and a greater polarization of judgments than less complicated intervening cognitive activity. It is argued that all of these results can be accounted for by the concept of a Work Space as a temporary repository devoted to the current information processing activities of the subject. It is thought that such a concept must be kept theoretically distinct from long-term memory. Implications of the results for models of memory and social judgment are discussed.     

The effects of feedback about self and others on the recall and judgments of feedback-relevant information

After people have received feedback about the outcome of their behavior, their responses to information bearing on the validity of this feedback may be influenced by their desire to maintain a favorable self-image. This experiment investigated the cognitive mediators of these responses. Subjects who received negative feedback about their performance on an intelligence test disparaged intelligence tests in general and judged a report they had read to be unfavorable to intelligence tests. Nevertheless, they recalled more arguments in the report that were favorable to intelligence tests than did positive feedback recipients. These results contradicted the hypothesis that subjects selectively attend to information that helps them to maintain a positive self-concept in light of negative information about themselves. Rather, they may attempt to refute arguments that support the validity of the negative feedback they receive, and this relatively greater processing may facilitate the recall of these arguments later on. In contrast, there was no evidence that subjects try to refute information that calls the validity of positive feedback into question. Results had implications for two additional issues: first, whether the effect of performance feedback depends on whether it is received before or after information bearing on its validity; second, whether feedback has similar effects on recall and judgments by persons to whom it does not directly pertain.     

Forgetting of conditioned fear inhibition

Three experiments assessed retention of conditioned fear and of fear inhibition over long-term retention intervals (35 days in two experiments, 25 days in the third). Although excitatory conditioning was retained well, conditioned inhibition was not. This effect occurred when inhibition was assessed by compounding stimuli on an appetitive baseline and when it was assessed by testing cues on a baseline of unsignalled avoidance responding. Inhibition was also forgotten when the initial conditioning treatment was designed to reduce the role of possible proactive interference processes.     

Relevance of genotype and its environmental counterpart to the theory,interpretation, and nomenclature of ability measures

While the constructs of aplitude and achievement, which are here defined as genotypic and environmental constructs, are potentially useful in psychological theory and in the development of predictors and weights for predictors, the use of these terms for psychological tests is highly misleading. When used for tests, the terms lead to invalid inferences concerning the constructs and to erroneous predictions of later criteria. All psychological tests measure current performance levels which are phenotypic characteristics. Practically all such tests can be used to estimate both genotypic and environmental constructs with nonzero accuracy. The basic error is to use a term which denotes a genetic or an environmental construct for a phenotypic measure. Implications of this position for inferences concerning group differences in aptitude and for construct validity of tests are briefly discussed.     

On construct validity: A critique of Miniard and Cohen's paper

Miniard and Cohen's conclusion that our measures of attitudes and subjective norms lack construct validity is rejected. It is shown that the data from their study are entirely consistent with data from previous investigations and that the data provide additional evidence for the predictive validity of our theory and for the construct validity of our operations.     

The effects of consensus requirements and multiple decisions on mock juror verdict preferences

After watching a simulated rape trial, prerecorded on videotape, mock jurors either did or did not expect to sentence a defendant following deliberation with or without a group verdict required. Both sentencing expectation and verdict requirement significantly elevated jurors' preference for conviction (and average ratings of guilt likelihood). Closer analyses of personal changes (before and after deliberation) in the distribution of opinions suggested that majorities favoring not guilty were more influential than guilty-favoring majorities; and, somewhat unexpectedly, minorities in juries which deliberated without a verdict required were more likely to change personal opinions than minorities in juries required to render a verdict. The overall social decision scheme confirmed earlier observations about the importance of the initial majority in determining the verdict; but the majority did not always prevail and there was a marked asymmetry (“defendant protection”) in its action.     

Maintenance and generalization of trained metamnemonic awareness by educable retarded children

The majority of educable retarded children (young group, MA 6; old group, MA 8) required to estimate their memory span was found to be unrealistic estimators. Following training in span estimation the older subjects improved under both explicit and implicit feedback conditions, while younger children only benefited from explicit feedback. Three posttests of the effects of training revealed long-term (1-year) maintenance of training for older subjects but younger subjects showed post-test improvement only on an immediate test. While long-term maintenance was found for older subjects, generalization to similar span-estimation tests was not found. The utility of training metamnemonic knowledge which does not generalize was questioned and alternate training procedures were proposed.     

Causes of racial and socioeconomic differences in cognitive tests

Correlations among profiles of means based upon 75 cognitive variables from Project TALENT are presented for groups defined by race, socioeconomic status, sex, area of the country, and grade in high school. Sex makes by far the largest contribution to differences in shape of profiles. Race and socioenconomic status, in turn, make much larger contributions to differences than grade and area. Sex differences in shapes of profiles are a function primarily of race and, to a lesser extent, of social class. Race differences are larger than socioeconomic differences and the former, in particular, are also a function of sex. Black males differ more from white patterns than black females. There is lack of substantial overlap in the causes of race and socioeconomic differences in shape of cognitive profiles.