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31.
Thomas D. Bontly 《Synthese》2006,151(2):177-200
Philosophical accounts of causation have traditionally been framed as attempts to analyze the concept of a cause. In recent
years, however, a number of philosophers have proposed instead that causation be empirically reduced to some relation uncovered
by the natural sciences: e.g., a relation of energy transfer. This paper argues that the project of empirical analysis lacks
a clearly defined methodology, leaving it uncertain how such views are to be evaluated. It proposes several possible accounts
of empirical analysis and argues that the most promising approach would treat it as a contingent identity discovered by identifying
the relation (or relations) that most nearly approximate the inferential role of causal concepts in a psychological theory
of causal judgment. 相似文献
32.
Forms of emergent interaction in General Process Theory 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Johanna Seibt 《Synthese》2009,166(3):479-512
General Process Theory (GPT) is a new (non-Whiteheadian) process ontology. According to GPT the domains of scientific inquiry
and everyday practice consist of configurations of ‘goings-on’ or ‘dynamics’ that can be technically defined as concrete,
dynamic, non-particular individuals called general processes. The paper offers a brief introduction to GPT in order to provide ontological foundations for research programs such as interactivism
that centrally rely on the notions of ‘process,’ ‘interaction,’ and ‘emergence.’ I begin with an analysis of our common sense
concept of activities, which plays a crucial heuristic role in the development of the notion of a general process. General
processes are not individuated in terms of their location but in terms of ‘what they do,’ i.e., in terms of their dynamic
relationships in the basic sense of one process being part of another. The formal framework of GPT is thus an extensional
mereology, albeit a non-classical theory with a non-transitive part-relation. After a brief sketch of basic notions and strategies
of the GPT-framework I show how the latter may be applied to distinguish between causal, mechanistic, functional, self-maintaining,
and recursively self-maintaining interactions, all of which involve ‘emergent phenomena’ in various senses of the term. 相似文献
33.
Jay F. Rosenberg 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):167-188
The argument of Kant's Second Analogy provides only for causal connections between successive appearances, but, as Kant himself immediately notes, in many cases cause and effect are simultaneous. This essay examines Kant's solution to the resulting problem of simultaneous causation. I argue that there are, in fact, at least two distinct problems falling together under the rubric 'simultaneous causation', both reflecting significant features of paradigmatic causal-explanatory scenarios within Newtonian mechanics - a problem about the 'persisting simultaneity' of a continuous or sustaining cause with its effect, and a problem about the 'instantaneous simultaneity' of what Kant calls the causality of a cause with the onset of its effect. An exploration of the ingenious conceptual resources which Kant brings to bear on these problems turns out to yield interesting and important insights regarding his philosophy of mathematics as well. 相似文献
34.
This research examines the relationship between the concept of CAUSE as it is characterized in psychological models of causation and the meaning of causal verbs, such as the verb cause itself. According to focal set models of causation (; ), the concept of CAUSE should be more similar to the concepts of ENABLE and PREVENT than either is to each other. According to a model based on theory of force dynamics, the force dynamic model, the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT should be roughly equally similar to one another. The relationship between these predictions and the meaning of causal verbs was examined by having participants sort causal verbs and rate them with respect to the dimensions specified by the two models. The results from five experiments indicated that the force dynamic model provides a better account of the meaning of causal verbs than do focal set models of causation. Implications for causal inference and induction are discussed. 相似文献
35.
Four studies explored people's judgments about whether particular types of behavior are compatible with determinism. Participants read a passage describing a deterministic universe, in which everything that happens is fully caused by whatever happened before it. They then assessed the degree to which different behaviors were possible in such a universe. Other participants evaluated the extent to which each of these behaviors had various features (e.g., requiring reasoning). We assessed the extent to which these features predicted judgments about whether the behaviors were possible in a deterministic universe. Experiments 1 and 2 found that people's judgments about whether a behavior was compatible with determinism were not predicted by their judgments about whether that behavior relies on physical processes in the brain and body, is uniquely human, is unpredictable, or involves reasoning. Experiment 3, however, found that a distinction between what we call “active” and “passive” behaviors can explain people's judgments. Experiment 4 extended these findings, showing that we can measure this distinction in several ways and that it is robustly predicted by two different cues. Taken together, these results suggest that people carve up mentally guided behavior into two distinct types—understanding one type to be compatible with determinism, but another type to be fundamentally incompatible with determinism. 相似文献
36.
Kenneth P. Winkler 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):477-501
Locke is what present-day aestheticians, critics, and historians call an intentionalist. He believes that when we interpret
speech and writing, we aim—in large part and perhaps even for the most part—to recover the intentions, or intended meanings,
of the speaker or writer. Berkeley and Hume shared Locke’s commitment to intentionalism, but it is a theme that recent philosophical
interpreters of all three writers have left largely unexplored. In this paper I discuss the bearing of intentionalism on more
familiar themes in empiricist reflections on language, among them the signification of things (as opposed to ideas); the signifying
role of whole propositions; and the possibility of reference to an “external” world.
相似文献
Kenneth P. WinklerEmail: |
37.
Walter Ott 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):459-470
How can Hume account for the meaning of causal claims? The causal realist, I argue, is, on Hume's view, saying something nonsensical. I argue that both realist and agnostic interpretations of Hume are inconsistent with his view of language and intentionality. But what then accounts for this illusion of meaning? And even when we use causal terms in accordance with Hume’s definitions, we seem merely to be making disguised self-reports. I argue that Hume’s view is not as implausible as it sounds by exploring his conception of language. 相似文献
38.
Colin Klein 《Philosophical Psychology》2017,30(1-2):1-20
Contrastive neuroimaging is often taken to provide evidence about the localization of cognitive functions. After canvassing some problems with this approach, I offer an alternative: neuroimaging gives evidence about regions of the brain that bear difference-making relationships to psychological processes of interest. I distinguish between the specificity and what I call the systematicity of a difference-making relationship, and I show how at least some neuroimaging experiments can give evidence for systematic difference-making. 相似文献
39.
Robert Northcott 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):111-123
I argue that causation is a contrastive relation: c-rather-than-C* causes e-rather-than-E*, where C* and E* are contrast classes associated respectively with actual events c and e. I explain why this is an improvement on the traditional binary view, and develop a detailed definition. It turns out that
causation is only well defined in ‘uniform’ cases, where either all or none of the members of C* are related appropriately
to members of E*.
相似文献
Robert NorthcottEmail: |
40.
Jason Brennan 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):207-217
Carl Hoefer has argued that determinism in block universes does not privilege any particular time slice as the fundamental
determiner of other time slices. He concludes from this that our actions are free, insofar as they are pieces of time slices
we may legitimately regard as fundamental determiners. However, I argue that Hoefer does not adequately deal with certain
remaining problems. For one, there remain pervasive asymmetries in causation and the macroscopic efficacy of our actions.
I suggest that what Hoefer may have shown us is that causation, not determinism, was the threat to free will all along. Additionally,
Hoefer might avoid the problem of the asymmetry of macroscopic efficacy by noting we have a very small region of space-time
completely determined by our choices. However, this move implies our freedom to act is freedom to do very little, given that
the region is trivial. I suggest that Hoefer should instead claim that we do have pervasive macroscopic efficacy toward the
past, though I am unsure of how well this thesis works. Regardless, there remains a problem that the inside-out perspective
requires us to see our choices as brute facts or random occurrences. Attempts to resolve this problem seem to require either
a theory of agent causation or a traditional compatibilist argument, making Hoefer’s thesis extraneous, unless he can show
us that these require the inside-out perspective. However, Hoefer has not yet shown us this, so there is work to be done.
相似文献
Jason BrennanEmail: |