Developmental changes in children's inductive inferences for biological concepts: implications for the development of essentialist beliefs

We examined developmental changes in children's inductive inferences about biological concepts as a function of knowledge of properties and concepts. Specifically, 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds and 9‐ to 10‐year‐olds were taught either familiar or unfamiliar internal, external, or functional properties about known and unknown target animals. Children were asked to infer whether each of four probes, varying in categorical and perceptual similarity to the target, also shared that property. Overall, children made more inferences for known concepts and familiar properties. Older children were more likely to use categorical than perceptual information when making inferences about internal and functional properties of known concepts; however, younger children, in general, made no distinction for property type, and they weighted categorical and perceptual information similarly. Both age groups utilized appearance when making inferences about external properties. Results are discussed in terms of developmental changes in children's appreciation of essentialism. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From personality disorders to the fact-value distinction

Louis Charland’s claim that DSM Cluster B personality disorders are moral rather than clinical kinds has recently triggered a lively debate. In order to deliver a reliable report of the latter, both (1) Charland’s arguments concerning the impossibility of identifying and treating personality disorders without applying a morally laden conceptual framework and (2) some critical responses they provoked are discussed. Then, in turn, the conceptual history of the notion of personality disorder is traced, including not only well-recognized contributions from (3) medical psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and DSM nosology, but also (4) an important, but often neglected, tradition of virtue and moral character. Finally, (5) the idea of a normatively neutral concept of personality disorder is scrutinized in the context of its logical dependence on the fact-value distinction. The latter dichotomy’s recent criticism, in particular, is employed to support Charland’s argument and to suggest that the normative character of personality disorders may go much deeper than this or that DSM formulation.     

Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out?

According to the embodied cognition hypothesis, the mental symbols used for higher cognitive reasoning, such as the making of deductive and inductive inferences, both originate and reside in our sensory-motor-introspective and emotional systems. The main objection to this view is that it cannot explain concepts that are, by definition, detached from perception and action, i.e., abstract concepts such as TRUTH or DEMOCRACY. This objection is usually merely taken for granted and has yet to be spelled out in detail. In this paper, I distinguish three different versions of this objection (one semantic and two epistemic versions). Once these distinctions are in place, we can begin to see the solutions offered in the literature in a new, more positive, light.     

Psychological Essentialism: A Review Of E. Margolis And S. Laurence (Eds.), Concepts: Core Readings.

Concepts: Core Readings (1999) is an edited volume of articles representing five major theories of concepts within cognitive psychology. Of the five, only the prototype theory can be interpreted in terms arising from a behavioral analysis. Two conceptual problems pervade nearly all of the papers in the volume. The first is an implicit commitment to essentialism; concepts are reified and are commonly discussed as though they have essential properties. Second, the theories suffer from a defective theory of verbal behavior. No distinction is made between verbal operants and words drawn from a hat.     

Failure to find evidence of stimulus generalization within pictorial categories in pigeons

Pigeons' key pecks were reinforced in the presence of pictures from one of two categories, cats or cars. A single picture associated with reinforcement was used in Experiment 1, and 20 pictures from the same category were associated with reinforcement in Experiment 2. Pigeons then were presented with novel test pictures from the training category and from the other, previously unseen, category. During Session 1 of testing, pigeons pecked no more often at pictures from the reinforced category than at pictures from the previously unseen category. When pigeons were trained with pictures associated with reinforcement or its absence from different categories in Experiment 3, differential responding to novel pictures from different categories appeared during Session 1. These findings argue against a process of automatic stimulus generalization within natural categories and in favor of the position that category distinctions are not made until members of at least two categories are compared with one another.     

多变量追踪研究的模型整合与拓展：考察往复式影响与增长趋势

追踪研究当中, 交叉滞后模型可以探究多变量之间往复式影响, 潜增长模型可以探究个体增长趋势。对两类模型进行整合, 例如同时关注往复式影响与个体增长趋势, 同时可以定义测量误差、随机截距等变异成分, 衍生出随机截距交叉滞后模型、特质-状态-误差模型、自回归潜增长模型、结构化残差潜增长模型等。以交叉滞后模型和潜增长模型分别作为基础模型, 从个体间/个体内变异分解的角度对上述各类模型梳理, 整合出此类模型的分析框架, 并拓展建立“因子结构化潜增长模型(factor latent curve model with structured reciprocals)”作为统合框架。通过实证研究(早期儿童的追踪研究-幼儿园版, ECLS-K), 建立21049名儿童的阅读和数学能力的往复式影响与增长趋势。研究发现, 分离了稳定特质的模型拟合最优。研究也对模型建模思路和模型选择提供了建议。     

Keeping track of what’s right

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that ordinary judgments about core normative topics purport to attribute stable, objective properties and relations. Our strategy is first to analyze the structures and practices characteristic of paradigmatically representational concepts such as concepts of objects and natural kinds. We identify three broad features that ground the representational purport of these concepts. We then argue that core normative concepts exhibit these same features.     

Moral supervenience

Abstract

It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.