A rating measure of ADHD-related neuropsychological impairment in children and adolescents: Data from the Cognition and Motivation in Everyday Life (CAMEL) Scale from population and clinical samples

A new parent-completed questionnaire, the Cognition and Motivation in Everyday Life (CAMEL) scale, was developed to provide a comprehensive assessment of neuropsychological impairment in children related to attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) across diverse cognitive, motivational and energetic domains. Its psychometric properties were investigated. A total of 60 items were generated to cover a wide range of putative ADHD-related neuropsychological processes. A clinical (n = 142) and community (n = 810) sample of parents with children between 6 and 16 years of age completed the questionnaire. Data on ADHD symptoms were also collected with a commonly-used, validated parent rating scale to explore the associations between CAMEL scores and dimensional measures of child ADHD and conduct problems. Factor analysis identified six factors which we labeled (i) Cognition, (ii) Self-Direction and Organization, (iii) Effort Engagement, (iv) Arousal Regulation, (v) Motivational Responsiveness, and (vi) Cautiousness. Self-Direction and Organization and Arousal Regulation were the strongest predictors for ADHD symptomatology. Self-Direction and Organization was strongly associated with inattention and Arousal Regulation with hyperactivity-impulsivity symptoms. Parents distinguished between broad neuropsychological domains in reliable and plausible ways, making distinctions between key aspects of functioning. However, the boundaries between these domains did not map directly onto the distinctions drawn within traditional models of ADHD deficits. Further research is required to examine the predictive validity and cost-effectiveness of the CAMEL scale compared to direct objective testing using laboratory measures in predicting prognosis and treatment outcome.     

Must God Be Dead? Reinventing the Sacred

Newton became a death knell for a theistic God and for a non-epiphenominal mind. The culprit is the deterministic causal closure of classical physics. Two major revolutions are taking us beyond this closure. The first is Quantum Mechanics, which is non-deterministic. The second revolution may just be happening. The emergence and evolution of life in our or any biosphere is governed by no law at all. This freedom suggests one sense of God as the natural creativity of the Universe.     

Causal perception of action-and-reaction sequences in 8- to 10-month-olds

Four experiments with 202 8- to 10-month-old infants studied their sensitivity to causation-at-a-distance in schematic events seen as goal-directed action and reaction by adults and whether this depends on attributes associated with animate agents. In Experiment 1, a red square moved toward a blue square without making contact; in “reaction” events blue moved away while red was approaching, whereas in “delay” events blue started after red stopped. Infants were habituated to one event and then tested on its reversal. Spatiotemporal features reversed for both events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. Infants dishabituated more to reversed reaction events than to reversed delay events. Squares moved rigidly or in a nonrigid animal-like fashion. Infants discriminated these, but motion pattern did not affect responses to reversal. Infants also discriminated reactions from launching and dishabituated to reversed reactions lacking self-initiated motion. These results suggest that sensitivity to causation-at-a-distance depends on the event structure but not pattern or onset typical of animal motion.     

Tubes,tables and traps: great apes solve two functionally equivalent trap tasks but show no evidence of transfer across tasks

Previous studies on tool using have shown that presenting subjects with certain modifications in the experimental setup can substantially improve their performance. However, procedural modifications (e.g. trap table task) may not only remove task constraints but also simplify the problem conceptually. The goal of this study was to design a variation of the trap-table that was functionally equivalent to the trap-tube task. In this new task, the subjects had to decide where to insert the tool and in which direction the reward should be pushed. We also administered a trap-tube task that allowed animals to push or rake the reward with the tool to compare the subjects' performance on both tasks. We used a larger sample of subjects than in previous studies and from all the four species of great apes (Gorilla gorilla, Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, and Pongo pygmaeus). The results showed that apes performed better in the trap-platform task than in the trap-tube task. Subjects solved the tube task faster than in previous studies and they also preferred to rake in rather than to push the reward out. There was no correlation in the level of performance between both tasks, and no indication of interspecies differences. These data are consistent with the idea that apes may possess some specific causal knowledge of traps but may lack the ability to establish analogical relations between functional equivalent tasks.     

Abnormality, cognitive virtues, and knowledge

Causal analyses of one’s knowing that p have recently emphasized the involvement of cognitive virtues in coming to believe that p. John Greco suggests that in order to deal with Gettier-type cases, a virtue analysis of knowing should include a requirement that one’s knowing does not in a certain way involve abnormality. Yet Greco’s emphasis on statistical abnormality either renders his analysis subject to a generality problem or to objections regarding certain Gettier-type cases. When we instead consider abnormality in the sense of a causally differentiating factor in relation to a causal contrast situation, the account remains unclear concerning its application to an interesting non-Gettier-type case concerning chance. The exploration of these shortcomings casts doubt on the epistemological usefulness of the schema, ‘If you know, then there is no abnormality in your being right.’     

Existence questions

I argue that thinking of existence questions as deep questions to be resolved by a distinctively philosophical discipline of ontology is misguided. I begin by examining how to understand the truth-conditions of existence claims, by way of understanding the rules of use for ‘exists’ and for general noun terms. This yields a straightforward method for resolving existence questions by a combination of conceptual analysis and empirical enquiry. It also provides a blueprint for arguing against most common proposals for uniform substantive ‘criteria of existence’, whether they involve mind-independence, possession of causal powers, observability, etc., and thus for showing that many arguments for denying entities (numbers, ordinary objects, fictional characters, propositions…) on grounds of their failure to meet one or more of these proposed existence criteria are mistaken.

The Causal Chain Problem

This paper addresses a problem that arises when it comes to inferring deterministic causal chains from pertinent empirical data. It will be shown that to every deterministic chain there exists an empirically equivalent common cause structure. Thus, our overall conviction that deterministic chains are one of the most ubiquitous (macroscopic) causal structures is underdetermined by empirical data. It will be argued that even though the chain and its associated common cause model are empirically equivalent there exists an important asymmetry between the two models with respect to model expansions. This asymmetry might constitute a basis on which to disambiguate corresponding causal inferences on non-empirical grounds.

Misconvergence to the stimulus plane causes apparent displacement of the stimulus elements seen monocularly1

Abstract: When one binocularly views a group of vertical lines through a ring, the outermost line segments (one on each side) seen within the ring are seen monocularly while the segments of the same lines outside the ring are seen binocularly. The monocular segments appear to be displaced outward with respect to the center of the ring and with respect to the corresponding binocular segments outside the ring. Three experiments examined the extent and direction of this illusory displacement as a function of viewing distance, fixation disparity created by varying the angles of the two arms of a haploscope, and fixation disparity created by a stereoscope and different Nonius stimuli. The results of the experiments confirmed the hypothesis that the apparent displacement is due to misconvergence in accordance with Wells‐Hering's laws of visual direction.