Causal Information-Seeking Strategies Change Across Childhood and Adolescence

Intervening on causal systems can illuminate their underlying structures. Past work has shown that, relative to adults, young children often make intervention decisions that appear to confirm a single hypothesis rather than those that optimally discriminate alternative hypotheses. Here, we investigated how the ability to make informative causal interventions changes across development. Ninety participants between the ages of 7 and 25 completed 40 different puzzles in which they had to intervene on various causal systems to determine their underlying structures. Each puzzle comprised a three- or four-node computer chip with hidden wires. On each trial, participants viewed two possible arrangements of the chip's hidden wires and had to select a single node to activate. After observing the outcome of their intervention, participants selected a wire configuration and rated their confidence in their selection. We characterized participant choices with a Bayesian measurement model that indexed the extent to which participants selected nodes that would best disambiguate the two possible causal structures versus those that had high causal centrality in one of the two causal hypotheses but did not necessarily discriminate between them. Our model estimates revealed that the use of a discriminatory strategy increased through early adolescence. Further, developmental improvements in intervention strategy were related to changes in the ability to accurately judge the strength of evidence that interventions revealed, as indexed by participants' confidence in their selections. Our results suggest that improvements in causal information-seeking extend into adolescence and may be driven by metacognitive sensitivity to the efficacy of previous interventions in discriminating competing ideas.     

Can the Mind Command the Body?

People naturally intuit that an agent's ethereal thoughts can cause its body to move. Per intuitive physics; however, one body can only interact with another. Are people, then, covertly puzzled by the capacity of thoughts to command the body? Experiment 1 first confirms that thoughts (e.g., thinking about a cup) are indeed perceived as ethereal—as less detectible in the body (brain), and more likely to exist in the afterlife relative to matched percepts (e.g., seeing a cup). Experiments 2–5 show that thoughts are considered less likely to cause behavior than percepts (e.g., thinking of a cup vs. seeing one). Furthermore, mind–body causation is more remarkable when its bodily consequences are salient (e.g., moving an arm vs. brain activation). Finally, epistemic causes are remarkable only when they are ascribed to mental- (e.g., “thinking”) but not to physical states (“activation”). Together, these results suggest that mind–body interactions elicit a latent dualist dissonance.     

Divine Activity and Motive Power in Descartes's Physics

This paper is the first of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some scholars – including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber – take Descartes to be a `partial' Occasionalist, who thinks that God alone is the cause of all natural motion. Contra this interpretation, I agree with literature that links Descartes to the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. This paper surveys this literature, and argues that it has failed to provide an interpretation of Descartes's view that both distinguishes his position from that of his later, Occasionalist followers and is consistent with his broader metaphysical commitments. I provide an analysis that tries to address these problems with earlier `Concurentist' readings of Descartes. On my analysis, Occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. As I read him, Descartes thinks that bodies have active causal powers that are partly grounded in their intrinsic natures. But I argue – pace a recent account by Tad Schmaltz – that Descartes also thinks that God immediately causes all motion in the created world. On the picture that emerges, Descartes's position is both continuous with, and a subtle departure from, the Thomisitic theory of divine concurrence.     

Causal attributions in premenstrual syndrome

Abstract

The relationship between causal attributions and symptoms was investigated with self-report inventories in patients with premenstrual syndrome (n=38) and controls (n=26) during the premenstrual as well as the intermenstrual phase of the cycle. Patients with prospectively confirmed premenstrual exacerbations of physical and psychological symptoms more frequently attributed their complaints during premenstruum to the cycle than was the case during the intermenstrual period. Controls showed no differences in types of explanations for complaints in either phase of the cycle. It appeared that patients used not only the menstrual cycle, but also psychological distress and physical exertion, more often then controls as an explanation for complaints during both phases of the cycle. Implications of the finding that patients used medical as well as non-medical explanations for complaints during the cycle are discussed with regard to treatment strategies for PMS.     

Gravity is not the only ruler for falling events: Young children stop making the gravity error after receiving additional perceptual information about the tubes mechanism

Young children seem to operate under the assumption that objects always fall in a straight vertical line. When asked to search for a ball dropped down an S-shaped opaque tube, they repeatedly search directly below. Hood proposed that children have difficulty in inhibiting their prepotent expectation that objects fall in a straight line (Hood, 1995). We asked whether the inability to inhibit this prepotent response is the only factor determining children’s performance on the tubes task. In one condition the openings to the tubes were covered by chimneys, whereas in another condition the openings were visible. When first tested with the apparatus, children performed better when the openings were visible. Furthermore, children’s performance on equally complex configurations (i.e., with or without chimneys) was modulated by their previous experience. Thus, children’s understanding of the tubes mechanism seems to play an important role in addition to inhibitory control.     

Children's imitation of causal action sequences is influenced by statistical and pedagogical evidence

Children are ubiquitous imitators, but how do they decide which actions to imitate? One possibility is that children rationally combine multiple sources of information about which actions are necessary to cause a particular outcome. For instance, children might learn from contingencies between action sequences and outcomes across repeated demonstrations, and they might also use information about the actor’s knowledge state and pedagogical intentions. We define a Bayesian model that predicts children will decide whether to imitate part or all of an action sequence based on both the pattern of statistical evidence and the demonstrator’s pedagogical stance. To test this prediction, we conducted an experiment in which preschool children watched an experimenter repeatedly perform sequences of varying actions followed by an outcome. Children’s imitation of sequences that produced the outcome increased, in some cases resulting in production of shorter sequences of actions that the children had never seen performed in isolation. A second experiment established that children interpret the same statistical evidence differently when it comes from a knowledgeable teacher versus a naïve demonstrator. In particular, in the pedagogical case children are more likely to “overimitate” by reproducing the entire demonstrated sequence. This behavior is consistent with our model’s predictions, and suggests that children attend to both statistical and pedagogical evidence in deciding which actions to imitate, rather than obligately imitating successful action sequences.     

Equilibria of the Rescorla-Wagner model

The Rescorla-Wagner model has been a leading theory of animal causal induction for nearly 30 years, and human causal induction for the past 15 years. Recent theories (especially Psychol. Rev. 104 (1997) 367) have provided alternative explanations of how people draw causal conclusions from covariational data. However, theoretical attempts to compare the Rescorla-Wagner model with more recent models have been hampered by the fact that the Rescorla-Wagner model is an algorithmic theory, while the more recent theories are all computational. This paper provides a detailed derivation of the long-run behavior of the Rescorla-Wagner model under a wide range of parameters and experimental setups, so that the model can be compared with computational theories. It also shows that the model agrees with competing theories on a wider range of cases than had previously been thought. The paper concludes by showing how recently suggested modifications of the Rescorla-Wagner model impact the long-run behavior of the model.     

What Poetry Brings to the Table of Science and Religion

Ever since Plato's famous attack on artists and poets in Book 10 of The Republic, lovers of literature have felt pressed to defend poetry, and indeed from ancient times down to the present, literature and art have had to fight various battles against philosophy, religion, and science. After providing a brief overview of this conflict and then arguing that between poetry and science there are some noteworthy similarities—that is, that some of the basic mental structures with which the scientist studies the “text” of nature (facts, laws, theories) find their counterparts in ways an informed reader studies the poetic text, I develop what I see as the most important differences between poetry, on the one hand, and science, philosophy, and theology, on the other. These differences lie chiefly in two areas: (1) in the stance that each takes toward language itself and (2) in the stance each takes toward that ancient polarity between the one and the many. The aim of my argument is neither to privilege poetry over the other modes of knowing the world nor to grant, particularly to science in its reductive “objectivity,” a higher epistemological status than that accorded to poetry and the arts. Instead, I wish to argue that science, by pushing the boundaries of knowledge about the material world, shows the poet, as well as the theologian, some of the more important work to be done and that poetry, with its emphasis on the particular over the abstract and on the ambiguities and paradoxes of language as inherently metaphorical, serves science and religion by providing a caution against the naive acceptance of language as literal and the consequent enthrallment to the power of absolutes and totalizing abstractions.     

Adjusting for the correspondence bias: Effects of causal uncertainty, cognitive busyness, and causal strength of situational information

This research examined the conditions under which people who have more chronic doubt about their ability to make sense of social behavior (i.e., are causally uncertain; [Weary and Edwards, 1994] and [Weary and Edwards, 1996]) are more likely to adjust their dispositional inferences for a target’s behaviors. Using a cognitive busyness manipulation within the attitude attribution paradigm, we found in Study 1 that higher causal uncertainty predicted increased correction of dispositional inferences, but only when participants had sufficient attentional resources to devote to the task. In Study 2, we found that higher-causal uncertainty predicted greater inferential correction, but only when the additional information provided a more compelling alternative explanation for the observed behavior. Results of this research are discussed in terms of their relevance to the Causal Uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and dispositional inference models.     

汉字阅读的语义神经回路及其与语音回路的协作机制

从神经网络的角度研究词汇阅读的大脑神经机制, 需要揭示语义和语音神经回路的动态协作机制, 而语义加工神经回路是探讨该问题的一个亟待解决的瓶颈问题。利用汉字表义的独特性, 以形旁语义作用的神经机制为切入点, 计划开展的4个fMRI实验拟探讨汉字阅读的语义神经回路及其与语音回路的动态协作机制。实验1利用多参数相关分析技术, 识别与汉字语义和语音属性相关的功能脑区; 实验2和实验3集中考察形旁语义加工的大脑神经机制, 深入探讨形旁语义作用的实质, 揭示汉字阅读中语义加工的神经回路; 实验4通过建构汉字阅读的动态因果模型, 考察在刺激驱动和任务调节下, 阅读相关脑区联结模式的动态变化, 阐明语义和语音神经回路的相互协作机制。研究结果将从跨语言的角度, 阐明阅读神经网络的内部动态机制, 为联结主义理论提供神经生理方面的直接证据; 并为基于脑科学的教育教学和阅读障碍矫治等实践应用提供理论依据。