The role of feature type and causal status in 4–5-year-old children's biological categorizations

The present study investigated the role of the causal status of features and feature type in biological categorizations by young children. Study 1 showed that 5-year-olds are more strongly influenced by causal features than effect features; 4-year-olds exhibit no such tendency. There therefore appears to be a conceptual change between the ages of 4 and 5 in the evaluation of the causal relations between features that characterize biological categories. The aim of Study 2 was to identify the nature of the abstract beliefs that underlie children's categorial choices. Results show that 5-year-olds base category choices on causal features only when the status of the cause is associated with an internal feature and not if the feature is merely a surface feature. Children thus use biological knowledge to perform the task.     

Covariation and quantifier polarity: what determines causal attribution in vignettes?

Tests of causal attribution often use verbal vignettes, with covariation information provided through statements quantified with natural language expressions. The effect of covariation information has typically been taken to show that set size information affects attribution. However, recent research shows that quantifiers provide information about discourse focus as well as covariation information. In the attribution literature, quantifiers are used to depict covariation, but they confound quantity and focus. In four experiments, we show that focus explains all (Experiment 1) or some (Experiment 2-4) of the impact of covariation information on the attributions made, confirming the importance of the confound. Attribution experiments using vignettes that present covariation information with natural language quantifiers may overestimate the impact of set size information, and ignore the impact of quantifier-induced focus.     

Do We “do”?

A normative framework for modeling causal and counterfactual reasoning has been proposed by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993; cf. Pearl, 2000). The framework takes as fundamental that reasoning from observation and intervention differ. Intervention includes actual manipulation as well as counterfactual manipulation of a model via thought. To represent intervention, Pearl employed the do operator that simplifies the structure of a causal model by disconnecting an intervened-on variable from its normal causes. Construing the do operator as a psychological function affords predictions about how people reason when asked counterfactual questions about causal relations that we refer to as undoing, a family of effects that derive from the claim that intervened-on variables become independent of their normal causes. Six studies support the prediction for causal (A causes B) arguments but not consistently for parallel conditional (if A then B) ones. Two of the studies show that effects are treated as diagnostic when their values are observed but nondiagnostic when they are intervened on. These results cannot be explained by theories that do not distinguish interventions from other sorts of events.     

The perception of causality in chimpanzees (Pan spp.)

Chimpanzees (Pan spp.) were tested on a habituation/dishabituation paradigm that was originally developed to test for comprehension of causality in very young human infants. Three versions of the test were used: a food item being moved by a hand, a human pushing another human off a chair to obtain a food item, and a film clip of natural chimpanzee behaviour (capturing and eating a monkey). Chimpanzees exhibited similar results to those obtained with human infants, with significantly elevated levels of looking on the dishabituation trials. Since the level of response was significantly greater on natural/unnatural sequences than on unnatural/natural sequences, we conclude that the chimpanzees were not responding just to novelty but rather to events that infringed their sense of natural causation.     

THE WEAK ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT

Abstract. The design argument for God's existence was critically assessed when in the growth of modern science the cognitive value of ideological categories was called into question. In recent discussions dealing with anthropic principles there has appeared a new version of the design argument, in which cosmic design is described without the use of ideological terms. The weak anthropic principle (WAP), a most critical version of all these principles, describes the fine-tuning of physical parameters necessary lo the genesis of carbon-based life. It defines no physical mechanisms of the observed coordination between physical parameters. If in a future unified physical theory such mechanisms are discovered, the weak anthropic principle should be replaced by the strong anthropic principle, which asserts the physical necessity of fine-tuning. Neither of the versions can be regarded as physically trivial unless one accepts strong assumptions of the existence of parallel universes. Consequently, a new version of the philosophical design argument can be developed on the basis of the weak anthropic principle.     

Non-bayesian inference: causal structure trumps correlation

The study tests the hypothesis that conditional probability judgments can be influenced by causal links between the target event and the evidence even when the statistical relations among variables are held constant. Three experiments varied the causal structure relating three variables and found that (a) the target event was perceived as more probable when it was linked to evidence by a causal chain than when both variables shared a common cause; (b) predictive chains in which evidence is a cause of the hypothesis gave rise to higher judgments than diagnostic chains in which evidence is an effect of the hypothesis; and (c) direct chains gave rise to higher judgments than indirect chains. A Bayesian learning model was applied to our data but failed to explain them. An explanation-based hypothesis stating that statistical information will affect judgments only to the extent that it changes beliefs about causal structure is consistent with the results.     

污染效应在消费者行为领域的表现及其心理机制

随着健康问题越来越受到消费者的重视, 学者们对污染效应的研究和兴趣也与日俱增, 特别是在消费者的感知和偏好方面。在消费者行为研究中, 污染效应是指消费者会降低对他人接触过产品的感知价值。本研究主要回顾了在消费行为中污染效应的定义和特性, 然后从接触因素、位置因素、产品因素和社会因素等方面来探讨污染效应的前因, 并进一步归纳了污染效应对消费者行为的消极影响和积极影响。最后, 探讨了污染效应的理论基础和边界条件。在此基础上, 对污染效应在消费者行为领域的未来研究方向进行了展望。     

Dealing with Wicked Problems: Conducting a Causal Layered Analysis of Complex Social Psychological Issues

Causal layered analysis (CLA) is an emerging qualitative methodology adopted in the discipline of planning as an approach to deconstruct complex social issues. With psychologists increasingly confronted with complex, and “wicked” social and community issues, we argue that the discipline of psychology would benefit from adopting CLA as an analytical method. Until now, the application of CLA for data interpretation has generally been poorly defined and overwhelming for the novice. In this paper we propose an approach to CLA that provides a method for the deconstruction and analysis of complex social psychological issues. We introduce CLA as a qualitative methodology well suited for psychology, introduce the epistemological foundations of CLA, define a space for it adoption within the discipline, and, outline the steps for conducting a CLA using an applied example.     

What is “Intervention”?

I begin by noting that several theologians and others object to special divine action (divine intervention and action beyond conservation and creation) on the grounds that it is incompatible with science. These theologians are thinking of classical Newtonian science; I argue that in fact classical science is in no way incompatible with special divine action, including miracle. What is incompatible with special divine action is the Laplacean picture, which involves the causal closure of the universe. I then note that contemporary, quantum mechanical science doesn't even initially appear to be incompatible with special divine action. Nevertheless, many who are well aware of the quantum mechanical revolution (including some members of the Special Divine Action Project) still find a problem with special divine action, hoping to find an understanding of it that doesn't involve divine intervention. I argue that their objections to intervention are not sound. Furthermore, it isn't even possible to say what intervention is, given the quantum mechanical framework. I conclude by offering an account of special divine action that isn't open to their objections to intervention.     

Extinction in human learning and memory

In two experiments, participants were given extinction training in a human causal learning task. In both experiments, three critical experimental cues were paired with different outcomes in a first phase of training and were then extinguished in a second phase. Three control cues were given the same treatment in the first phase of training, but were not then presented in the second phase. Participants' ability to correctly identify the outcome with which each cue had been paired in the first phase was lower for extinguished than for control cues. Causal attributions to the extinguished cues were also lower than those to the control cues, a difference that correlated with outcome memory. These data are consistent with the idea that extinction in causal judgement is due, at least in part, to a failure to remember the cue–outcome relationship encoded in the first phase of training.