Time and order effects on causal learning

Five experiments were conducted to explore trial order and retention interval effects upon causal predictive judgments. Experiment 1 found that participants show a strong effect of trial order when a stimulus was sequentially paired with two different outcomes compared to a condition where both outcomes were presented intermixed. Experiment 2 found that a 48-h retention interval eliminates the trial order effect, so that participants gave a global judgment about the relationship between the stimulus and the two outcomes equivalent to the one given by participants that received the two phases intermixed. This result was replicated in Experiment 3 in a situation in which the probability of the outcome in the presence of the cue was changed from .5 for both outcomes (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5) to .75 and .25 for outcomes 1 and 2, respectively. Experiment 4 found that retention intervals ranging from 45 min to 48 h eliminated the trial order effect similarly. Experiment 5 found that a 10-min retention interval replicated the effect of time upon sequential training found in precedent experiments, regardless of whether participants remained within the laboratory during the retention interval or spent it outside. The combined results of this experimental series suggest that retention intervals reduce retroactive interference in causal learning by allowing participants to use all the information presented across phases, rather than differentially increasing or decreasing retrieval of information about each of them.     

Hidden consequences of the group-serving bias: Causal attributions and the quality of group decision making

A long stream of research in attribution theory suggests that groups are biased toward attributing their success to factors that are internal to their group. However, the existing research has confounded two types of attributions that are both internal to the group, but theoretically distinct: (1) attributions that differentiate between the contributions made by each individual group member and (2) attributions that focus on the group as a whole. This dichotomy is important because, drawing on theories of social influence, we predict that different types of attributions will have different consequences for the quality of group decision making. In Experiment 1, individually focused attributions for past success caused groups to consider more divergent alternatives prior to making a shared decision. In Experiment 2, individually focused attributions for past success facilitated the sharing of unique information and improved decision accuracy. These findings suggest that the group-serving tendency to internalize success may have important consequences for group performance that have not yet been considered in current research.     

Beyond control of variables: What needs to develop to achieve skilled scientific thinking?

We identify three aspects of scientific thinking beyond the control-of-variables strategy that we claim are essential for students to master as a foundation for skilled scientific thinking. The first is strategic and involves the ability to coordinate effects of multiple causal influences on an outcome. The second is a mature understanding of the epistemological foundations of science, recognizing scientific knowledge as constructed by humans rather than simply discovered in the world. The third is the ability to engage in skilled argumentation in the scientific domain, with an appreciation of argumentation as entailing the coordination of theory and evidence. We present new empirical data with respect to the first two of these competencies, supporting the claim that they are not well developed by early adolescence and warrant attention and provision of effective kinds of scaffolding.     

Idealizations and Concretizations in Laws and Explanations in Physics

The paper tries to provide an alternative to Hempel’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation as given in his D-N model. It starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel’s approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. By way of solution, it analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. Finally, it compares this reconstruction with the approaches of J. Woodward and C. Hitchcock, C. Liu and with the views of M. Thalos on analytic mechanics.

The Metaphysics of Causal Models

This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late pre?mption and other cases that have proved problematic for causal models.

WHETHER SPIES TOO CAN BE SAVED

Spies, like soldiers, do a job and employ tactics that need justifying. I offer an argument for how Christian ethics may handle the moral problems of spying and do so by looking at the morally troubling tactics used by spies through the eyes of those who played an important role in shaping Christian theology and philosophy and have become normative in Christian moral thinking on the use of force. I argue that spying may be justifiable when we conceive the profession as a kind of use of force that is governed by the just war criteria. Spying is a particular kind of use of force that takes its moral character from those who authorize it, with what justification, to what ends, and with what methods. Particular attention is given to the tactics of disregarding the rules of war, the telling and living of lies, running covert operations, and assassinating military and political leaders.     

THE DIVINE CONJECTURES: A CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNT OF HUMAN ORIGINS AND DESTINY

Six “divine conjectures” frame the place of Theóne (The One to Whom we pray) in the creation of our universe and for its continuing development in five subsequent stages into a loving universe. The first stage, the cosmological universe, establishes the laws of nature, understood by scientists as the “standard model”. The second stage introduces life and death into the universe by a process we are only now beginning to understand. Stage 3 requires certain life forms to become conscious with a subset of those life‐forms acquiring language that results in that subset becoming self‐conscious. The next stage, Conjecture 4, identifies certain persons who become addicted to learning in their unrelenting effort to learn as much of what can be known as possible. The fifth conjecture requires individual persons to act as agents of Theóne in achieving Conjecture 6—a universe that is both loving and lawful. During the course of the exposition subsidiary discussions of the concepts of conjecture and hypothesis explicate the function of each in the advancement of knowledge and understanding. There are brief discussions of prayer and purpose in relation to the Divine.     

Assigning biological functions: making sense of causal chains

A meaningful distinction can be made between functions and mere effects in biological systems without resorting to teleological arguments: (i) biological systems must cope with a multitude of problems or they will cease to exist; (ii) the solutions to these problems invariably depend on circular causal chains (“feedback loops”); and (iii) biological functions are attributes of elements in biological systems that have an effect which, by contributing to the correcting behavior of a feedback control system, assists in solving a biological problem. The analysis is applied to several biological systems. The proposed solution is discussed primarily in its relation to two popular approaches to the concept of biological function, i.e., the “causal role accounts” and the “selected effect accounts”.     

La représentation des causes de l’état de santé par les infirmiers et les points de vue envisagés des patients et des aidants naturels : une approche socionormative

This study examines the representation of the determining factors of patients’ states of health in therapeutic care situations. We describe the average representation of experienced hospital nurses (n=44) and the differences which they consider to exist between their own and their patients’ points of view. Taking as our starting point the purpose of the care provided and the asymmetry of the carer/patient relationship, we hypothesize, on the one hand, that nurses will have a representation of their patients’ state of health which is based on the care to be provided, with the factors determining the state of health being necessarily perceived as having a general impact on patients’ lives while still being remediable, i.e. capable of changing and being controlled by the provided care. On the other hand, we expect them to attribute a passive position and attitude to their patients, with the factors determining their state of health being necessarily perceived as being out of their own control. The results and the analysis of the representations reported as being those of the patients and their families seem to justify this perception and role of carer: the supposed representations of the latter would appear to be convergent but less focused on health problems and would tend to minimize the patient’s involvement, in particular when the state of health declines. The results are discussed with reference to the Health Belief Model and the social norm of internality as well as the professional practices observed in hospital environments.     

Why ‘non-mental’ won’t work: on Hempel’s dilemma and the characterization of the ‘physical’

Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification that the physical is non-mental is irrelevant to the task of formulating physicalism as a substantive, controversial thesis.