The Duty to Support Nationalistic Policies

We demonstrate that citizens perceive a duty to support policies that benefit their nation, even when they themselves judge that the consequences of the policies will be worse on the whole, taking outsiders into account. In terms of actions, subjects think they would do their perceived duty rather than violate it for the sake of better consequences. The discrepancy between duty and judged consequences does not seem to result from self‐interest alone. When asked for reasons, many subjects felt an obligation to help their fellow citizens before others, and they also thought that they owed something to their nation, in return for what it did for them. The obligation to help fellow citizens was the strongest predictor of perceived duty. In an experiment with Israeli and Palestinian students, group membership affected both perceived overall consequences and duty, but the effect of group on perceived consequences did not account for the effect on perceived duty. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Normative and Descriptive Models of Military Decisions to Deploy Precision Strike Capabilities

Precision strike capabilities represent a significant and highly controversial part of present day military operations. And yet, there is a surprising dearth of empirical research on military decision making in this domain. In this article, we therefore review different psychological perspectives on how these decisions can be made. Specifically, we compare the application of normative models of judgment and choice against the empirical research on human decision making, which suggests that people are more likely to employ heuristic strategies. We suggest that several features of decision tasks in the precision strike domain evoke the use of intuitive (heuristic) decision making whereas other features such as the sometimes unfamiliar (or novel) nature of the decision task requires analytic strategies to generate good solutions. Therefore, decisions about precision strike capabilities are best made with a mixture of intuitive and analytic thought, a mode of thinking known as quasirationality.     

人格判断的准确性:特质特性的作用

特质特性是影响人格判断准确性的重要调节变量。已有的研究表明,可观察性高的特质容易判断,判断的准确性和一致性也更高;特质的可评估性干扰了自我知觉的准确性,与中性特质相比,可评估性特质的自我—他人一致性更低;与清晰特质相比,模糊特质的自我—同伴判断间的一致性更低,且随特质模糊性的增加而递减。不仅如此,特质特性经常与其他因素如熟悉度交互作用于人格判断的准确性,在考查特质特性的作用时,必须提高研究的生态效度,将该变量与特性匹配、特质分类、个体差异及文化差异等因素综合起来考虑。     

跨文化判断与决策(英文)

本文对判断和决策研究领域所发现的跨文化差异进行了回顾。鉴于大多数判断和决策的跨文化研究都集中于对亚洲和西方文化的比较,本文也主要关注这方面的研究发现。具体来说,本文回顾了在概率判断及信心、风险知觉、冒险行为、消费者行为以及经济判断和决策中所存在的跨文化差异。综述结果表明尽管亚洲人和西方人的判断和决策行为存在很大的跨文化差异,研究也发现了显著的文化内差异。目前关于判断和决策的跨文化差异的研究还相对匮乏,未来还需要更多的研究来进一步了解判断和决策行为的跨文化差别及机制。     

Visual impressions of force exerted by one object on another when the objects do not come into contact

Simple animations in which one object contacts another give rise to visual impressions that the former object causes the outcome for the latter, and that the former object is exerting force on the latter. How does the impression of force relate to the impression of causality? The main aim of this research was to investigate this issue using stimuli in which there is a gap between the objects at closest approach. Delay between the first object stopping and the second object starting to move had a strong effect on reported force impressions, which is consistent with findings of research on the causal impression. However, the reported force impression was little affected by either the size of the gap or the presence and features of an object in the gap, whereas the causal impression was strongly affected by both. The findings support the conclusion that the force impression and the causal impression are distinct components of the visual interpretation of the stimulus.     

Inhibiting beliefs demands attention

Research across a variety of domains has found that people fail to evaluate statistical information in an atheoretical manner. Rather, people tend to evaluate statistical information in light of their pre-existing beliefs and experiences. The locus of these biases continues to be hotly debated. In two experiments we evaluate the degree to which reasoning when relevant beliefs are readily accessible (i.e., when reasoning with Belief-Laden content) versus when relevant beliefs are not available (i.e., when reasoning with Non-Belief-Laden content) differentially demands attentional resources. In Experiment 1 we found that reasoning with scenarios that contained Belief-Laden content required fewer attentional resources than reasoning with scenarios that contained Non-Belief-Laden content, as evidenced by smaller costs on a secondary memory load task for the former than the latter. This trend was reversed in Experiment 2 when participants were instructed to ignore their beliefs when reasoning with Belief-Laden and Non-Belief-Laden scenarios. These findings provide evidence that beliefs automatically influence reasoning, and attempting to ignore them comes with an attentional cost.     

Alternative motivation: a new challenge to moral judgment internalism

Internalists argue that there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment. The examination of cases plays an important role in philosophical debate about internalism. This debate has focused on cases concerning the failure to act in accordance with a moral judgment, for one reason or another. I call these failure cases. I argue that a different sort of case is also relevant to this debate. This sort of case is characterized by (1) moral judgment and (2) behavior that accords with the content of the moral judgment but that has been performed not because of the moral judgment. Instead it is due to some other source of motivation. I call these alternative motivation cases. I distinguish two sorts of alternative motivation cases, and I argue that externalists have natural explanations of these cases. By contrast, extant internalist accounts of failure cases are inadequate when applied to alternative motivation cases.     

Generality of the summation effect in human causal learning

Considerable research has examined the contrasting predictions of the elemental and configural association theories proposed by Rescorla and Wagner (1972) and Pearce (1987), respectively. One simple method to distinguish between these approaches is the summation test, in which the associative strength attributed to a novel compound of two separately trained cues is examined. Under common assumptions, the configural view predicts that the strength of the compound will approximate to the average strength of its components, whereas the elemental approach predicts that the strength of the compound will be greater than the strength of either component. Different studies have produced mixed outcomes. In studies of human causal learning, Collins and Shanks (2006) suggested that the observation of summation is encouraged by training, in which different stimuli are associated with different submaximal outcomes, and by testing, in which the alternative outcomes can be scaled. The reported experiments further pursued this reasoning. In Experiment 1, summation was more substantial when the participants were trained with outcomes identified as submaximal than when trained with simple categorical (presence/absence) outcomes. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that summation can also be obtained with categorical outcomes during training, if the participants are encouraged by instruction or the character of training to rate the separately trained components with submaximal ratings. The results are interpreted in terms of apparent performance constraints in evaluations of the contrasting theoretical predictions concerning summation.     

Choosing optimal causal backgrounds for causal discovery

In two experiments, we studied the strategies that people use to discover causal relationships. According to inferential approaches to causal discovery, if people attempt to discover the power of a cause, then they should naturally select the most informative and unambiguous context. For generative causes this would be a context with a low base rate of effects generated by other causes and for preventive causes a context with a high base rate. In the following experiments, we used probabilistic and/or deterministic target causes and contexts. In each experiment, participants observed several contexts in which the effect occurred with different probabilities. After this training, the participants were presented with different target causes whose causal status was unknown. In order to discover the influence of each cause, participants were allowed, on each trial, to choose the context in which the cause would be tested. As expected by inferential theories, the participants preferred to test generative causes in low base rate contexts and preventative causes in high base rate contexts. The participants, however, persisted in choosing the less informative contexts on a substantial minority of trials long after they had discovered the power of the cause. We discuss the matching law from operant conditioning as an alternative explanation of the findings.     

Positive and negative mediation as a function of whether the absent cue was previously associated with the outcome

After presenting two cues, A and B, together, later pairings of one of the cues alone with an outcome can generate changes in the associative value of the absent cue. These changes can be in the same direction as the present cue (i.e., positive mediation) or in the opposite direction to the present cue (i.e., negative mediation). We found both mediational effects in a human contingency task. In addition, we found that the direction of the change was determined by the existence of a prior association between the absent cue and the outcome. When a prior association exists, the absent cue tends to change its value in the opposite direction to the present cue, whereas when there is no prior association, the absent cue tends to change its value in the same direction as the present cue. Recent associative models (Stout & Miller, 2007 Stout, S. C. and Miller, R. R. 2007. Sometimes-competing retrieval (SOCR): A formalization of the comparator hypothesis. Psychological Review, 114: 759–783.  [Google Scholar]) can explain our results.