Are Newcomb problems really decisions?

Richard Jeffrey long held that decision theory should be formulated without recourse to explicitly causal notions. Newcomb problems stand out as putative counterexamples to this ‘evidential’ decision theory. Jeffrey initially sought to defuse Newcomb problems via recourse to the doctrine of ratificationism, but later came to see this as problematic. We will see that Jeffrey’s worries about ratificationism were not compelling, but that valid ratificationist arguments implicitly presuppose causal decision theory. In later work, Jeffrey argued that Newcomb problems are not decisions at all because agents who face them possess so much evidence about correlations between their actions and states of the world that they are unable to regard their deliberate choices as causes of outcomes, and so cannot see themselves as making free choices. Jeffrey’s reasoning goes wrong because it fails to recognize that an agent’s beliefs about her immediately available acts are so closely tied to the immediate causes of these actions that she can create evidence that outweighs any antecedent correlations between acts and states. Once we recognize that deliberating agents are free to believe what they want about their own actions, it will be clear that Newcomb problems are indeed counterexamples to evidential decision theory.     

Paul Tillich's Perspectives on Ways of Relating Science and Religion

Where do Paul Tillich's views of the relationship between religion and science fit in Ian Barbour's four classifications of conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration? At different levels of analysis, he fits in all of them. In concrete religions and sciences, some conflict is evident, but religion and science can be thought of as having parallel perspectives, languages, and objectives. Tillich's method of correlation itself is a form of dialogue. His theology of nature in “Life and the Spirit” (Part 4 of his Systematic Theology) fits the integration type. His strong “Two Types of Philosophy of Religion” (in Theology of Culture) is a latent natural theology. His system of the sciences is a form of synthesis, a type of integration.     

Back to the future: Temporal perspective in the explanation of events

Prospective hindsight involves generating an explanation for a future event as if it had already happened; i.e., one goes forward in time, and then looks back. In order to examine how shifts in perspective might influence people's perceptions of events, we investigated two possible factors: temporal perspective (whether an event is set in the future or past) and uncertainty (whether the event's occurrence is certain or uncertain). In the first experiment, temporal perspective showed little influence while outcome uncertainty strongly affected the nature of explanations for events. Explanations for sure events tended to be longer, to contain a higher proportion of episodic reasons, and to be expressed in past tense. Evidence from the second experiment supports the view that uncertainty mediates not the amount of time spent explaining, but rather subjects' choice of explanation type. The implications of these findings for the use of temporal perspective in decision aiding are discussed.     

Who caused it? Interpersonal causal inferences in young children

Three experiments were designed to test 4- and 6-year-old children's causal inferences in interpersonal settings where emotions (glad, angry, and sad) were effect responses. The results showed that emotion and orientation (towards or away from) were central cues, and that sex and age also were used to some extent. Cues related to regularity philosophic notions (e.g. David Hume), such as contiguity in time and space, and time order of cause and effect were little used by comparison. The results raise questions about the basic role attributed to regularity cues both by philosophers and psychologists, and suggest a multiple cue contribution rather than a basic cue generalization approach to causal cognition development.     

Correspondence analysis and association models constrained by a conditional independence graph

The manner in which the conditional independence graph of a multiway contingency table effects the fitting and interpretation of the Goodman association model (RC) and of correspondence analysis (CA) is considered.Estimation of the row and column scores is presented in this context by developing a unified framework that includes both models. Incorporation of the conditional independence constraints inherent in the graph may lead to equal or additive scores for the corresponding marginal tables, depending on the topology of the graph. An example of doubly additive scores in the analysis of a Burt subtable is given.Thanks are due to anonymous referees who substantially improved the original draft of this paper.     

Effect analysis and causation in linear structural equation models

This paper considers total and direct effects in linear structural equation models. Adopting a causal perspective that is implicit in much of the literature on the subject, the paper concludes that in many instances the effects do not admit the interpretations imparted in the literature. Drawing a distinction between concomitants and factors, the paper concludes that a concomitant has neither total nor direct effects on other variables. When a variable is a factor and one or more intervening variables are concomitants, the notion of a direct effect is not causally meaningful. Even when the notion of a direct effect is meaningful, the usual estimate of this quantity may be inappropriate. The total effect is usually interpreted as an equilibrium multiplier. In the case where there are simultaneity relations among the dependent variables in tghe model, the results in the literature for the total effects of dependent variables on other dependent variables are not equilibrium multipliers, and thus, the usual interpretation is incorrect. To remedy some of these deficiencies, a new effect, the total effect of a factorX on an outcomeY, holding a set of variablesF constant, is defined. When defined, the total and direct effects are a special case of this new effect, and the total effect of a dependent variable on a dependent variable is an equilibrium multiplier.For helpful comments, I am grateful to G. Arminger, K. Bollen, W. Faris, R. m. Hauser, T. Petersen, three anonymous Psychometrikas reviewers, and the Editor. For computational assistance, I am grateful to B. D. Kim.     

Concurrent performances: rate constancies without changeover delays

Pigeons' pecks on two keys were maintained, without changeover delays, by independent variable-interval schedules of food reinforcement. Four regularly cycling 2-min components scheduled reinforcement respectively for both keys, left key only, both keys, and right key only. Initially, reinforcement scheduled for one key alone produced more responding on that key than reinforcement scheduled concurrently for both keys. Continued sessions reduced this difference; response rate on a given key approached constancy, or invariance with respect to the performance on and schedule for the other key. When extinction replaced the reinforcement schedule on either key, responding on that key decreased more during components that scheduled reinforcement for the other key than during those that did not. This demonstration that responses on one key were not supported by reinforcers on the other key suggested that the alternation of concurrent responding and either-key-alone responding prevented concurrent superstitions from developing.     

The effects of concurrent responding and reinforcement on behavioral output

Four birds key pecked on concurrent variable-interval one-minute variable-interval four-minute schedules with a two-second changeover delay. Response rates to the variable-interval one-minute key were then reduced by signaling its reinforcer availability and later by providing its reinforcers independently of responding. Each manipulation increased response rates to the variable-interval four-minute key even though relative reinforcement rates were unchanged. In a final phase, eliminating the variable-interval one-minute key and its schedule produced the highest rates of all to the variable-interval four-minute key. These results show that both reinforcement and response rates to one schedule influence response rates to another schedule. These results join those of Guilkey, Shull, & Brownstein (1975) in failing to replicate Catania (1963). Moreover, they violate the predictions of the equation for simple action (de Villiers & Herrnstein, 1976). In terms of a median-rate measure (reciprocal of the median interresponse time), rates to the variable-interval four-minute key were high when responding was not reduced to the variable-interval one-minute key and were low when it was reduced. This rate difference suggests a process difference between concurrent-schedule procedures that maintain high concurrent response rates versus those that do not. This process difference jeopardizes attempts to integrate single- and concurrent-operant performances within a single formulation.     

On the influence of causal beliefs on the feeling of agency

The sense of agency is the experience of being the origin of a sensory consequence. This study investigates whether contextual beliefs modulate low-level sensorimotor processes which contribute to the emergence of the sense of agency. We looked at the influence of causal beliefs on ‘intentional binding’, a phenomenon which accompanies self-agency. Participants judged the onset-time of either an action or a sound which followed the action. They were induced to believe that the tone was either triggered by themselves or by somebody else, although, in reality, the sound was always triggered by the participants. We found that intentional binding was stronger when participants believed that they triggered the tone, compared to when they believed that another person triggered the tone. These results suggest that high-level contextual information influences sensorimotor processes responsible for generating intentional binding.     

Prime and probability: causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences

Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action–outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their (combined) contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal knowledge that was either relevant or irrelevant by varying the probability of co-occurrence (50% or 80%) of specific actions and outcomes. Afterwards, we measured self-agency experiences in an action–outcome task where outcomes were primed or not. Results showed that motor prediction only affected self-agency when relevant actions and outcomes were learned to be causally related. Interestingly, however, inference effects also occurred when no relevant causal knowledge was acquired.