Can unpredicted outcomes be intended? The role of outcome-beliefs in children's judgments of intention

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one's action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding outcome. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inaccurate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.     

Event completion: event based inferences distort memory in a matter of seconds

We present novel evidence that implicit causal inferences distort memory for events only seconds after viewing. Adults watched videos of someone launching (or throwing) an object. However, the videos omitted the moment of contact (or release). Subjects falsely reported seeing the moment of contact when it was implied by subsequent footage but did not do so when the contact was not implied. Causal implications were disrupted either by replacing the resulting flight of the ball with irrelevant video or by scrambling event segments. Subjects in the different causal implication conditions did not differ on false alarms for other moments of the event, nor did they differ in general recognition accuracy. These results suggest that as people perceive events, they generate rapid conceptual interpretations that can have a powerful effect on how events are remembered.     

The mental representation of causal conditional reasoning: mental models or causal models

In this paper, two experiments are reported investigating the nature of the cognitive representations underlying causal conditional reasoning performance. The predictions of causal and logical interpretations of the conditional diverge sharply when inferences involving pairs of conditionals—such as if P₁then Q and if P₂then Q—are considered. From a causal perspective, the causal direction of these conditionals is critical: are the P_icauses of Q; or symptoms caused byQ. The rich variety of inference patterns can naturally be modelled by Bayesian networks. A pair of causal conditionals where Q is an effect corresponds to a “collider” structure where the two causes (P_i) converge on a common effect. In contrast, a pair of causal conditionals where Q is a cause corresponds to a network where two effects (P_i) diverge from a common cause. Very different predictions are made by fully explicit or initial mental models interpretations. These predictions were tested in two experiments, each of which yielded data most consistent with causal model theory, rather than with mental models.     

Where science starts: spontaneous experiments in preschoolers' exploratory play

Probabilistic models of expected information gain require integrating prior knowledge about causal hypotheses with knowledge about possible actions that might generate data relevant to those hypotheses. Here we looked at whether preschoolers (mean: 54 months) recognize “action possibilities” (affordances) in the environment that allow them to isolate variables when there is information to be gained. By manipulating the physical properties of the stimuli, we were able to affect the degree to which candidate variables could be isolated; by manipulating the base rate of candidate causes, we were able to affect the potential for information gain. Children’s exploratory play was sensitive to both manipulations: given unambiguous evidence children played indiscriminately and rarely tried to isolate candidate causes; given ambiguous evidence, children both selected (Experiment 1) and designed (Experiment 2) informative interventions.     

Inferring hidden causal structure

We used a new method to assess how people can infer unobserved causal structure from patterns of observed events. Participants were taught to draw causal graphs, and then shown a pattern of associations and interventions on a novel causal system. Given minimal training and no feedback, participants in Experiment 1 used causal graph notation to spontaneously draw structures containing one observed cause, one unobserved common cause, and two unobserved independent causes, depending on the pattern of associations and interventions they saw. We replicated these findings with less-informative training (Experiments 2 and 3) and a new apparatus (Experiment 3) to show that the pattern of data leads to hidden causal inferences across a range of prior constraints on causal knowledge.     

A sufficient condition for pooling data

We consider the problems arising from using sequences of experiments to discover the causal structure among a set of variables, none of whom are known ahead of time to be an “outcome”. In particular, we present various approaches to resolve conflicts in the experimental results arising from sampling variability in the experiments. We provide a sufficient condition that allows for pooling of data from experiments with different joint distributions over the variables. Satisfaction of the condition allows for an independence test with greater sample size that may resolve some of the conflicts in the experimental results. The pooling condition has its own problems, but should—due to its generality—be informative to techniques for meta-analysis.     

Immediate and delayed effects of causal uncertainty inductions on uncertainty accessibility

Previous research has focused on enhanced processing as a response to causal uncertainty (CU), but relatively little empirical attention has been given to how CU is activated and the temporal unfolding of this activation. The current research investigates the counterintuitive idea that people inhibit causal uncertainty immediately after its activation. We find that this inhibition weakens over time. Study 1 demonstrates this inhibition effect with self-report uncertainty. Study 2 demonstrates this effect with an implicit accessibility measure. Temporary inhibition of uncertainty may be a general response when uncertainty is activated.     

Combining additive representations on subsets into an overall representation

Many traditional conjoint representations of binary preferences are additively decomposable, or additive for short. An important generalization arises under rank-dependence, when additivity is restricted to cones with a fixed ranking of components from best to worst (comonotonicity), leading to configural weighting, rank-dependent utility, and rank- and sign-dependent utility (prospect theory). This paper provides a general result showing how additive representations on an arbitrary collection of comonotonic cones can be combined into one overall representation that applies to the union of all cones considered. The result is applied to a new paradigm for decision under uncertainty developed by Duncan Luce and others, which allows for violations of basic rationality properties such as the coalescing of events and other framing conditions. Through our result, a complete preference foundation of a number of new models by Luce and others can be obtained. We also show how additive representations on different full product sets can be combined into a representation on the union of these different product sets.     

Bird and the Dispositional Essentialist Account of Spatiotemporal Relations

The basic principles of dispositional essentialism do not require that the fundamental spatiotemporal relations are dispositional in nature. Nevertheless, Bird (who defends dispositional monism) argues that they possess dispositional essences in virtue of the fact that the obtaining of these relations can be characterised by the satisfaction of a certain counterfactual. In this paper I argue that his suggestion fails, and so, despite his attempt, the case of the spatiotemporal relations remains the ‘big bad bug’ for the thesis of dispositional monism.

Second-order conditioning of human causal learning

This article provides the first demonstration of a reliable second-order conditioning (SOC) effect in human causal learning tasks. It demonstrates the human ability to infer relationships between a cause and an effect that were never paired together during training. Experiments 1a and 1b showed a clear and reliable SOC effect, while Experiments 2a and 2b demonstrated that first-order extinction did not affect SOC. These results were similar to those found in animal and human conditioning and suggested that a similar associative mechanism could explain these effects. However, they can also be used to look into the underlying causal mental model people build and store while they are learning this task. From a cognitive view, overall results suggest that an independent rather than a chain causal mental model is stored after second-order learning in human causal tasks.