Do the right thing: The assumption of optimality in lay decision theory and causal judgment

Human decision-making is often characterized as irrational and suboptimal. Here we ask whether people nonetheless assume optimal choices from other decision-makers: Are people intuitive classical economists? In seven experiments, we show that an agent’s perceived optimality in choice affects attributions of responsibility and causation for the outcomes of their actions. We use this paradigm to examine several issues in lay decision theory, including how responsibility judgments depend on the efficacy of the agent’s actual and counterfactual choices (Experiments 1–3), individual differences in responsibility assignment strategies (Experiment 4), and how people conceptualize decisions involving trade-offs among multiple goals (Experiments 5–6). We also find similar results using everyday decision problems (Experiment 7). Taken together, these experiments show that attributions of responsibility depend not only on what decision-makers do, but also on the quality of the options they choose not to take.     

高中生认知方式特点及其与学绩关系的研究

采用认知方式图形测验,对94名普通高中生进行实验研究,探讨了当前普通高中生认知方式特点及其与学绩的关系。结果表明：随着年级的增高,高中生的场独立性增强。高中生的认知方式场依存性、场独立性与学习成绩的相关不显著。在初中毕业刚进入高中,学生的认知方式存在显著的性别差异,但随着年级增长、个体成熟,这种差异逐渐缩小。文理分科对高中生的认知方式发展没有明显的影响。     

Non-bayesian inference: causal structure trumps correlation

The study tests the hypothesis that conditional probability judgments can be influenced by causal links between the target event and the evidence even when the statistical relations among variables are held constant. Three experiments varied the causal structure relating three variables and found that (a) the target event was perceived as more probable when it was linked to evidence by a causal chain than when both variables shared a common cause; (b) predictive chains in which evidence is a cause of the hypothesis gave rise to higher judgments than diagnostic chains in which evidence is an effect of the hypothesis; and (c) direct chains gave rise to higher judgments than indirect chains. A Bayesian learning model was applied to our data but failed to explain them. An explanation-based hypothesis stating that statistical information will affect judgments only to the extent that it changes beliefs about causal structure is consistent with the results.     

Dealing with Wicked Problems: Conducting a Causal Layered Analysis of Complex Social Psychological Issues

Causal layered analysis (CLA) is an emerging qualitative methodology adopted in the discipline of planning as an approach to deconstruct complex social issues. With psychologists increasingly confronted with complex, and “wicked” social and community issues, we argue that the discipline of psychology would benefit from adopting CLA as an analytical method. Until now, the application of CLA for data interpretation has generally been poorly defined and overwhelming for the novice. In this paper we propose an approach to CLA that provides a method for the deconstruction and analysis of complex social psychological issues. We introduce CLA as a qualitative methodology well suited for psychology, introduce the epistemological foundations of CLA, define a space for it adoption within the discipline, and, outline the steps for conducting a CLA using an applied example.     

Two kings and two kingdoms: the Church of Scotland,the monarchy,national identity and establishment

The debate about Scottish independence raises questions about church–state relations and religious establishment in Scotland as well as about national identity. This article surveys and summarises attitudes in the Church of Scotland on these subjects over the 450 years since the Scottish Reformation. It identifies and explores several key themes, notably the spiritual independence of the church and national recognition of religion. They were hotly debated topics during the reign of King James VI, enshrined in law in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution and prompted the use of the royal veto by Queen Victoria. The Articles Declaratory of the Church of Scotland, embodied in the Church of Scotland Act of 1921, which provide a unique definition of church establishment, will have to be renegotiated in the event of Scottish independence. There are competing views within the Kirk about the constitutional position of Christianity and more specifically of the Church of Scotland in an independent Scotland.     

What is “Intervention”?

I begin by noting that several theologians and others object to special divine action (divine intervention and action beyond conservation and creation) on the grounds that it is incompatible with science. These theologians are thinking of classical Newtonian science; I argue that in fact classical science is in no way incompatible with special divine action, including miracle. What is incompatible with special divine action is the Laplacean picture, which involves the causal closure of the universe. I then note that contemporary, quantum mechanical science doesn't even initially appear to be incompatible with special divine action. Nevertheless, many who are well aware of the quantum mechanical revolution (including some members of the Special Divine Action Project) still find a problem with special divine action, hoping to find an understanding of it that doesn't involve divine intervention. I argue that their objections to intervention are not sound. Furthermore, it isn't even possible to say what intervention is, given the quantum mechanical framework. I conclude by offering an account of special divine action that isn't open to their objections to intervention.     

Extinction in human learning and memory

In two experiments, participants were given extinction training in a human causal learning task. In both experiments, three critical experimental cues were paired with different outcomes in a first phase of training and were then extinguished in a second phase. Three control cues were given the same treatment in the first phase of training, but were not then presented in the second phase. Participants' ability to correctly identify the outcome with which each cue had been paired in the first phase was lower for extinguished than for control cues. Causal attributions to the extinguished cues were also lower than those to the control cues, a difference that correlated with outcome memory. These data are consistent with the idea that extinction in causal judgement is due, at least in part, to a failure to remember the cue–outcome relationship encoded in the first phase of training.     

When is a cause the “same”? Incoherent generalization across contexts

A theory or model of cause such as Cheng's power (p) allows people to predict the effectiveness of a cause in a different causal context from the one in which they observed its actions. Liljeholm and Cheng demonstrated that people could detect differences in the effectiveness of the cause when causal power varied across contexts of different outcome base rates, but that they did not detect similar changes when only the cause–outcome contingency, ?p, but not power, varied. However, their procedure allowed participants to simplify the causal scenarios and consider only a subsample of observations with a base rate of zero. This confounds p, ?p, and the probability of an outcome (O) given a cause (C), P(O|C). Furthermore, the contingencies that they used confounded p and P(O|C) in the overall sample. Following the work of Liljeholm and Cheng, we examined whether causal induction in a wider range of situations follows the principles suggested by Cheng. Experiments 1a and 1b compared the procedure used by Liljeholm and Cheng with one that did not allow the sample of observations to be simplified. Experiments 2a and 2b compared the same two procedures using contingencies that controlled for P(O|C). The results indicated that, if the possibility of converting all contexts to a zero base rate situation was avoided, people were sensitive to changes in P(O|C), p, and ?p when each of these was varied. This is inconsistent with Liljeholm and Cheng's conclusion that people detect only changes in p. These results question the idea that people naturally extract the metric or model of cause from their observation of stochastic events and then, reasonably exclusively, use this theory of a causal mechanism, or for that matter any simple normative theory, to generalize their experience to alternative contexts.     

Locating Potential Leverage Points In A Systems Thinking Causal Loop Diagram Toward Policy Intervention

Outcomes depending on various interacting and adaptive parts and actors in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) world are challenging to analyze using traditional thinking. Hence, Systems Thinking (ST) can be applied as a tool to aid policy makers in designing interventions that anticipates various ways in which a system might react to policy changes through the practice of integrating multiple perspectives into a causal loop diagram (CLD). We formalize criteria for identifying potential leverage points (PLP) in a CLD. Identifying PLPs enable policy makers to apply ST tools to devise strategies that are capable of addressing VUCA problems.