Conflicts of interest in science and medicine: the physician's perspective

The various statements and declarations of the World Medical Association that address conflicts of interest on the part of physicians as (1) researchers, and (2) practitioners, are examined, with particular reference to the October 2000 revision of the Declaration of Helsinki. Recent contributions to the literature, notably on conflicts of interest in medical research, are noted. Finally, key provisions of the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics (2000–2001 Edition) that address the various forms of conflict of interest that can arise in the practice of medicine are outlined. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an International Conference on “Conflict of Interest and its Significance in Science and Medicine” held in Warsaw, Poland on 5–6 April, 2002. The World Medical Association (WMA) is a global federation of National Medical Associations representing the millions of physicians worldwide. Acting on behalf of patients and physicians, the WMA endeavours to achieve the highest possible standards of medical care, ethics, education and health-related human rights for all people.     

Barbour's Fourfold Way: Problems with His Taxonomy of Science-religion Relationships

In this paper several problems are raised concerning Ian Barbour's four ways of interrelating science and religion—Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and Integration—as put forward in such publications as his highly influential Religion in an Age of Science (1990) and widely adopted by other writers in this field. The authors argue that this taxonomy is not very useful or analytically helpful, especially to historians seeking to understand past engagements between science and religion.     

Realism in energy transition processes: an example from Bohmian quantum mechanics

In this paper we study in details a system of two weakly coupled harmonic oscillators from the point of view of Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. This system may be viewed as a simple model for the interaction between a photon and a photodetector. We obtain exact solutions for the general case. We then compute approximate solutions for the case where one oscillator is initially in its first excited state (a single photon) reaching the other oscillator in its ground state (the photodetector). The approximate solutions represent the state of both oscillators after the interaction, which is not an eigenstate of the individual hamiltonians for each oscillator, and therefore the energies for each oscillator do not exist in the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. We use the approximate solutions that we obtained to compute Bohmian trajectories and to study the energy transfer between the oscillators. We conclude that, even using the Bohmian view, the energy of each individual oscillator is not well defined, as the nonlocal quantum potential is not negligible even after the coupling is turned off.     

Structural equations and causation

Structural equations have become increasingly popular in recent years as tools for understanding causation. But standard structural equations approaches to causation face deep problems. The most philosophically interesting of these consists in their failure to incorporate a distinction between default states of an object or system, and deviations therefrom. Exploring this problem, and how to fix it, helps to illuminate the central role this distinction plays in our causal thinking.

Rule following and rule use in the balance-scale task

Quinlan et al. [Quinlan, p., van der Mass, H., Jansen, B., Booij, O., & Rendell, M. (this issue). Re-thinking stages of cognitive development: An appraisal of connectionist models of the balance scale task. Cognition, doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2006.02.004] use Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to criticize a connectionist model of development on the balance-scale task, arguing that LCA shows that this model fails to capture a torque rule and exhibits rules that children do not. In this rejoinder we focus on the latter problem, noting the tendency of LCA to find small, unreliable, and difficult-to-interpret classes. This tendency is documented in network and synthetic simulations and in psychological research, and statistical reasons for finding such unreliable classes are discussed. We recommend that LCA should be used with care, and argue that its small and unreliable classes should be discounted. Further, we note that a preoccupation with diagnosing rules ignores important phenomena that rules do not account for. Finally, we conjecture that simple extensions of the network model should be able to achieve torque-rule performance.     

Compound cue processing within the fast and frugal heuristics approach in nonlinearly separable environments

Three experiments investigated whether participants used Take The Best (TTB) Configural, a fast and frugal heuristic that processes configurations of cues when making inferences concerning which of two alternatives has a higher criterion value. Participants were presented with a compound cue that was nonlinearly separable from its elements. The compound was highly valid in Experiments 1 and 2, but invalid in Experiment 3. Participants’ causal mental models were manipulated via instructions: participants were either told that cues acted through the same causal mechanism (configural causal model), through different causal mechanisms (elemental causal model), or the causal mechanisms were not specified (neutral causal model). A high percentage of participants used TTB-Configural when they had a configural causal model and a highly valid compound existed, suggesting that causal knowledge can be incorporated in otherwise very basic cognitive mechanisms to allow fine-grained adaptation to complex task structures.     

Combining versus analyzing multiple causes: how domain assumptions and task context affect integration rules

In everyday life, people typically observe fragments of causal networks. From this knowledge, people infer how novel combinations of causes they may never have observed together might behave. I report on 4 experiments that address the question of how people intuitively integrate multiple causes to predict a continuously varying effect. Most theories of causal induction in psychology and statistics assume a bias toward linearity and additivity. In contrast, these experiments show that people are sensitive to cues biasing various integration rules. Causes that refer to intensive quantities (e.g., taste) or to preferences (e.g., liking) bias people toward averaging the causal influences, whereas extensive quantities (e.g., strength of a drug) lead to a tendency to add. However, the knowledge underlying these processes is fallible and unstable. Therefore, people are easily influenced by additional task-related context factors. These additional factors include the way data are presented, the difficulty of the inference task, and transfer from previous tasks. The results of the experiments provide evidence for causal model and related theories, which postulate that domain-general representations of causal knowledge are influenced by abstract domain knowledge, data-driven task factors, and processing difficulty.     

Priming interdependence affects processing of context information in causal inference—But not how you might think

Cultural mindset is related to performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. In particular, studies of both chronic and situationally-primed mindsets show that individuals with a relatively interdependent mindset (i.e., an emphasis on relationships and connections among individuals) are more sensitive to background contextual information than individuals with a more independent mindset. Two experiments tested whether priming cultural mindset would affect sensitivity to background causes in a contingency learning and causal inference task. Participants were primed (either independent or interdependent), and then saw complete contingency information on each of 12 trials for two cover stories in Experiment 1 (hiking causing skin rashes, severed brakes causing wrecked cars) and two additional cover stories in Experiment 2 (school deadlines causing stress, fertilizers causing plant growth). We expected that relative to independent-primed participants, those interdependent-primed would give more weight to the explicitly-presented data indicative of hidden alternative background causes, but they did not do so. In Experiment 1, interdependents gave less weight to the data indicative of hidden background causes for the car accident cover story and showed a decreased sensitivity to the contingencies for that story. In Experiment 2, interdependents placed less weight on the observable data for cover stories that supported more extra-experimental causes, while independents' sensitivity did not vary with these extra-experimental causes. Thus, interdependents were more sensitive to background causes not explicitly presented in the experiment, but this sensitivity hurt rather than improved their acquisition of the explicitly-presented contingency information.     

Comparing score tests and other local dependence diagnostics for the graded response model

Score tests for identifying locally dependent item pairs have been proposed for binary item response models. In this article, both the bifactor and the threshold shift score tests are generalized to the graded response model. For the bifactor test, the generalization is straightforward; it adds one secondary dimension associated only with one pair of items. For the threshold shift test, however, multiple generalizations are possible: in particular, conditional, uniform, and linear shift tests are discussed in this article. Simulation studies show that all of the score tests have accurate Type I error rates given large enough samples, although their small‐sample behaviour is not as good as that of Pearson's Χ² and M₂ as proposed in other studies for the purpose of local dependence (LD) detection. All score tests have the highest power to detect the LD which is consistent with their parametric form, and in this case they are uniformly more powerful than Χ² and M₂; even wrongly specified score tests are more powerful than Χ² and M₂ in most conditions. An example using empirical data is provided for illustration.     

Explaining prompts children to privilege inductively rich properties

Four experiments with preschool-aged children test the hypothesis that engaging in explanation promotes inductive reasoning on the basis of shared causal properties as opposed to salient (but superficial) perceptual properties. In Experiments 1a and 1b, 3- to 5-year-old children prompted to explain during a causal learning task were more likely to override a tendency to generalize according to perceptual similarity and instead extend an internal feature to an object that shared a causal property. Experiment 2 replicated this effect of explanation in a case of label extension (i.e., categorization). Experiment 3 demonstrated that explanation improves memory for clusters of causally relevant (non-perceptual) features, but impairs memory for superficial (perceptual) features, providing evidence that effects of explanation are selective in scope and apply to memory as well as inference. In sum, our data support the proposal that engaging in explanation influences children’s reasoning by privileging inductively rich, causal properties.