Trumping the causal influence account of causation

Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example

Agency,Consciousness, and Executive Control

On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper role of consciousness in agency. In this paper we criticize Schroeter’s analysis of the type of consciousness involved in executive control and examine the way in which the conscious self allegedly intervenes in action. We argue that Schroeter’s proposal should not be preferred over recent versions of CTA.     

Causal-based property generalization

A central question in cognitive research concerns how new properties are generalized to categories. This article introduces a model of how generalizations involve a process of causal inference in which people estimate the likely presence of the new property in individual category exemplars and then the prevalence of the property among all category members. Evidence in favor of this causal-based generalization (CBG) view included effects of an existing feature's base rate (Experiment 1), the direction of the causal relations (Experiments 2 and 4), the number of those relations (Experiment 3), and the distribution of features among category members (Experiments 4 and 5). The results provided no support for an alternative view that generalizations are promoted by the centrality of the to-be-generalized feature. However, there was evidence that a minority of participants based their judgments on simpler associative reasoning processes.     

Bridging the gap: Causality-at-a-distance in children's categorization and inferences about internal properties

Previous research has shown that preschoolers extend labels and internal properties of objects based on those objects’ causal properties, even when the causal properties conflict with the objects’ perceptual appearance [Nazzi, T., & Gopnik, A. (2000). A shift in children's use of perceptual and causal cues to categorization. Developmental Science, 3, 389–396; Sobel, D. M., Yoachim, C. M., Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Blumenthal, E. J. (2007). The blicket within: Preschoolers’ inferences about insides and causes. Journal of Cognition and Development, 8, 159–182]. These studies, however, only presented causal relations that acted on contact. In two studies, contact causality was replaced by distance causality. In contrast to the contact causality case, 4- and 5-year-olds extended labels to objects with similar perceptual properties over objects with similar causal properties when those properties acted at a distance. When children were asked to make inferences about object's internal properties, they were more likely to make causal responses, with 5-year-olds doing so to a greater extent than 4-year-olds. In a second study, 4-year-olds registered causal properties that acted at a distance and used them to make inferences when no perceptual conflict was present. These results support a hypothesis that young children develop an understanding of the specific mechanisms that link causal relations.     

The role of feature type and causal status in 4–5-year-old children's biological categorizations

The present study investigated the role of the causal status of features and feature type in biological categorizations by young children. Study 1 showed that 5-year-olds are more strongly influenced by causal features than effect features; 4-year-olds exhibit no such tendency. There therefore appears to be a conceptual change between the ages of 4 and 5 in the evaluation of the causal relations between features that characterize biological categories. The aim of Study 2 was to identify the nature of the abstract beliefs that underlie children's categorial choices. Results show that 5-year-olds base category choices on causal features only when the status of the cause is associated with an internal feature and not if the feature is merely a surface feature. Children thus use biological knowledge to perform the task.     

Learning to infer the time of our actions and decisions from their consequences

Research shows that people infer the time of their actions and decisions from their consequences. We asked how people know how much time to subtract from consequences in order to infer their actions and decisions. They could either subtract a fixed, default, time from consequences, or learn from experience how much time to subtract in each situation. In two experiments, participants’ actions were followed by a tone, which was presented either immediately or after a delay. In Experiment 1, participants estimated the time of their actions; in Experiment 2, the time of their decisions to act. Both actions and decisions were judged to occur sooner or later as a function of whether consequences were immediate or delayed. Estimations tended to be shifted toward their consequences, but in some cases they were shifted away from them. Most importantly, in all cases participants learned progressively to adjust their estimations with experience.     

Summarizing information by means of causal sentences through causal graphs

The objective of this work is to propose a complete system able to extract causal sentences from a set of text documents, select the causal sentences contained, create a causal graph in base to a given concept using as source these causal sentences, and finally produce a text summary gathering all the information connected by means of this causal graph. This procedure has three main steps. The first one is focused in the extraction, filtering and selection of those causal sentences that could have relevant information for the system. The second one is focused on the composition of a suitable causal graph, removing redundant information and solving ambiguity problems. The third step is a procedure able to read the causal graph to compose a suitable answer to a proposed causal question by summarizing the information contained in it.     

Historical Origins of Argumentum ad Consequentiam

What are the historical origins of the argumentum ad consequentiam, the argument from (or literally, to) consequences, sometimes featured as an informal fallacy in logic textbooks? As shown in this paper, knowledge of the argument can be traced back to Aristotle (who did not treat it as a fallacy, but as a reasonable argument). And this type of argument shows a spotty history of recognition in logic texts and manuals over the centuries. But how it got into the modern logic textbooks as a fallacy remains somewhat obscure. Its modern genesis is traced to the logic text of James McCosh (1879).     

Covariation and quantifier polarity: what determines causal attribution in vignettes?

Tests of causal attribution often use verbal vignettes, with covariation information provided through statements quantified with natural language expressions. The effect of covariation information has typically been taken to show that set size information affects attribution. However, recent research shows that quantifiers provide information about discourse focus as well as covariation information. In the attribution literature, quantifiers are used to depict covariation, but they confound quantity and focus. In four experiments, we show that focus explains all (Experiment 1) or some (Experiment 2-4) of the impact of covariation information on the attributions made, confirming the importance of the confound. Attribution experiments using vignettes that present covariation information with natural language quantifiers may overestimate the impact of set size information, and ignore the impact of quantifier-induced focus.     

Language in benign childhood epilepsy with centro-temporal spikes abbreviated form: rolandic epilepsy and language

Although Benign Childhood Epilepsy with Centrotemporal Spikes (BECTS) has a good prognosis, a few studies have suggested the existence of language disorders relating to the interictal dysfunction of perisylvian language areas. In this study, we focused on language assessment in 16 children aged 6-15 currently affected by BECTS or in remission. An important proportion of children showed moderate or more severe language impairment. The most affected domains were expressive grammar and literacy skills. We found linguistic deficits during the course of epilepsy but also persistent deficits in children in remission, suggesting possible long-term effects. Our results support the hypothesis that BECTS may be associated with impairment to language and suggest the possibility of a direct link between epileptic activity and language development, and the existence of long-term consequences.