Distinguishing Between Causes and Enabling Conditions—Through Mental Models or Linguistic Cues?

The mental model theory of naive causal understanding and reasoning (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001, Cognitive Science, 25, 565–610) claims that people distinguish between causes and enabling conditions on the basis of sets of models that represent possible causal situations. In the tasks used to test this hypothesis, however, the proposed set of models was confounded with linguistic cues that frame which event to assume as given (the enabling condition) and which to consider as responsible for the effect under this assumption (the cause). By disentangling these two factors, we were able to show that when identifying causes and enabling conditions in these tasks, people rely strongly on the linguistic cues but not on the proposed set of models and that this set of models does not even reflect people's typical interpretation of the tasks. We propose an alternative explanation that integrates syntactic and causal considerations.     

Le rôle de la stigmatisation dans la symptomatologie dépressive de femmes françaises en surpoids ou en situation d’obésité

IntroductionDespite the high prevalence of depressive symptoms among women being overweight or having obesity, the role of stigma and causal attributions in the expression of these symptoms in French women has been largely under-explored to date.ObjectiveThe aim of this research is to study the role of internalized stigmatization, stigmatizing experiences and causal attribution in the intensity of depressive symptoms in overweight and obese French women.MethodThese four variables were measured in 160 French women being overweight or having obesity.ResultsOur analyses highlight positive correlations between stigmatizing experiences, internalized stigmatization and depressive symptomatology. It is important to note that stigmatizing experiences seem to play a more preponderant role than internalized stigmatization in the expression of depressive symptoms.ConclusionFor women with significant depressive symptoms, it appears essential to integrate interventions aimed at reducing their level of stigma. Moreover, from a preventive perspective, it also seems essential to promote campaigns in France aimed at reducing the stigmatization in this population.     

Using Marginal Structural Modeling for Grade Retention Effects

Vandecandelaere, Vansteelandt, De Fraine, and Van Damme (this issue) described marginal structural modeling (MSM) and used it to estimate the effects of a time-varying intervention, retention (holding back) in school grades, on students' math achievement. This commentary supplements Vandecandelaere et al. (this issue) and discusses several topics in retention studies and MSM. First, we discuss the importance of equating time-varying confounders in retention studies. Second, we discuss same-grade and same-age comparisons in retention studies. Third, we discuss one important section in the authors' overview of MSM: why standard methods (e.g., ANCOVA, propensity score analysis) cannot properly adjust for time-varying confounders. Finally, using the grade retention analyses in Vandecandelaere et al. (this issue) as an example, we provide our insights on four aspects of MSM: (a) covariate selection, (b) estimation of weights, (c) evaluation of balance properties, and (d) missing data handling.     

Which one made it go? The emergence of diagnostic reasoning in preschoolers

We evaluate the hypothesis that children's diagnostic causal reasoning becomes more sophisticated as their understanding of uncertainty advances. When the causal status of candidate causes was known, 3- and 4-year-olds were capable of diagnostic inference (Experiment 1) and could revise their beliefs when told their initial diagnosis was incorrect (Experiment 2). In Experiments 3 and 4, only 4-year-olds made successful inferences when the causal status of candidate causes was uncertain. The results suggest that by age 3, children appreciate that an effect can have multiple candidate causes, but it is not until age 4 that they begin to reason correctly when the causal status of candidate causes is unknown.