Individual differences in strategies for syllogistic reasoning

Current theories of reasoning such as mental models or mental logic assume a universal cognitive mechanism that underlies human reasoning performance. However, there is evidence that this is not the case, for example, the work of Ford (1995), who found that some people adopted predominantly spatial and some verbal strategies in a syllogistic reasoning task. Using written and think-aloud protocols, the present study confirmed the existence of these individual differences. However, in sharp contrast to Ford, the present study found few differences in reasoning performance between the two groups, in terms of accuracy or type of conclusion generated. Hence, reasoners present an outward appearance of ubiquity, despite underlying differences in reasoning processes. These findings have implications for theoretical accounts of reasoning, and for attempts to model reasoning data. Any comprehensive account needs to account for strategic differences and how these may develop in logically untrained individuals.     

Book review

Long-standing beliefs about one's self-efficacy and learning ability accumulate over the school years. Attributions, or causal perceptions and interpretations, of behavioural outcomes are also based on a person's learning history. And, it is evident from research on attributional bias and self-esteem that the perceived causes of success and failure have consequences for academic success. An important perspective on attributions, frequently neglected in educational research, pertains to content-specific beliefs about one's competence. We set up a field study in which students from the first form of secondary education were asked to report their causal attributions of regular school examinations in three school subjects: history, native language, and mathematics. The results suggest that students generate different causal attributions for successful or unsuccessful examinations, belonging to different school-subjects. Perception of specific examination conditions may or may not urge students to generate specific attributions. There is evidence for both school-subject specificity and examination-specificity in the observed causal attributions. But, the effect of school-subject seems to be more pronounced than the effect of examination. Information at the momentary level (examination conditions) interacts with information at the middle level (school-subject). Closer analyses of the observed causal attributions vis-à-vis perceived success and failure in the three school-subjects displayed marked differences, especially in relation to the effort attributions.     

Teacher–child relationships and academic achievement: A multilevel propensity score model approach

A robust body of research finds positive cross-sectional and longitudinal associations between teacher–child relationships and children's academic achievement in elementary school. Estimating the causal effect of teacher–child relationships on children's academic achievement, however, is challenged by selection bias at the individual and school level. To address these issues, we used two multilevel propensity score matching approaches to estimate the effect of high-quality teacher–child relationships in kindergarten on math and reading achievement during children's transition to first grade. Multi-informant data were collected on 324 low-income, Black and Hispanic students, and 112 kindergarten and first-grade teachers. Results revealed significant effects of high-quality teacher–child relationships in kindergarten on math achievement in first grade. No significant effects of teacher–child relationships were detected for reading achievement. Implications for intervention development and public policy are discussed.     

Dual frames for causal induction: the normative and the heuristic

Causal induction in the real world often has to be quick and efficient as well as accurate. We propose that people use two different frames to achieve these goals. The A-frame consists of heuristic processes that presuppose rarity and can detect causally relevant factors quickly. The B-frame consists of analytic processes that can be highly accurate in detecting actual causes. Our dual frame theory implies that several factors affect whether people use the A-frame or the B-frame in causal induction: among these are symmetrical negation, intervention and commitment. This theory is tested and sustained in two experiments. The results also provide broad support for dual process accounts of human thinking in general.     

组织成员地位的形成及影响机制

组织成员地位通常是指组织内个体受组织其他成员尊重和钦佩的程度,是近些年备受关注的一个心理学构念。虽然组织成员地位与权力、阶层、面子、基于组织的自尊等概念具有一定的关联性,但它们之间存在着明显的界限。组织成员地位主要受到外在显性因素(形体特征、人口统计特征)、内在心理因素(人格、认知、情绪、行为)以及神经生理因素(睾酮激素、皮质醇激素)的影响,并能够对组织成员的认知、情绪、行为和绩效产生显著的影响。未来研究应当进一步区分组织成员地位的维度,探索组织成员地位的生物学基础和文化差异,关注组织成员地位的动态演化及其后果,并检验团队和组织层面地位分布的作用机制。     

Unresolved questions in nudging research: Putting the psychology back in nudging

Nudging interventions are broadly defined as a rearrangement of a choice context that gently suggests a specific choice. Their increasing popularity has attracted attention and discussion from researchers, policy makers, and practitioners alike. After some applications to domains such as health, environmental issues, and retirement savings, the next step in nudging is to understand the psychological boundary conditions when applied to varied domains of daily life. It is yet unclear for example to what extent nudging interventions can be transparent without losing effectiveness, or how permanent the effects are. These unresolved questions may have contributed to heated political and scientific discussions, on for example the ethics of using nudges in the public health domain, due to the missing scientific evidence. Indeed, this popularity may have led to forget how nudging harnesses insights from decades of research in psychology to change people's behavior. The aim of this paper is to shift the focus back to the psychological premises nudges were built upon. It summarizes several outstanding questions that future research in the psychology of nudging should address. Advancing research in nudging will help to improve our understanding of applied nudging interventions and provide clarity to debates such as ethical appropriateness, effectiveness, and public approval.     

Are People Successful at Learning Sequences of Actions on a Perceptual Matching Task?

We report the results of an experiment in which human subjects were trained to perform a perceptual matching task. Subjects were asked to manipulate comparison objects until they matched target objects using the fewest manipulations possible. An unusual feature of the experimental task is that efficient performance requires an understanding of the hidden or latent causal structure governing the relationships between actions and perceptual outcomes. We use two benchmarks to evaluate the quality of subjects' learning. One benchmark is based on optimal performance as calculated by a dynamic programming procedure. The other is based on an adaptive computational agent that uses a reinforcement-learning method known as Q-learning to learn to perform the task. Our analyses suggest that subjects were successful learners. In particular, they learned to perform the perceptual matching task in a near-optimal manner (i.e., using a small number of manipulations) at the end of training. Subjects were able to achieve near-optimal performance because they learned, at least partially, the causal structure underlying the task. In addition, subjects' performances were broadly consistent with those of model-based reinforcement-learning agents that built and used internal models of how their actions influenced the external environment. We hypothesize that people will achieve near-optimal performances on tasks requiring sequences of action-especially sensorimotor tasks with underlying latent causal structures-when they can detect the effects of their actions on the environment, and when they can represent and reason about these effects using an internal mental model.     

Infants’ reasoning about ambiguous motion events: The role of spatiotemporal and dispositional status information

Two experiments investigate whether 7-month-olds reason about the origin of motion events by considering two sources of causally relevant information: spatiotemporal cues and dispositional status information derived from the identification of an object as either animate (with the enduring causal property of self-initiated motion) or inanimate (requiring an external cause of motion). Infants were shown a ball, a human hand, and an animal engaged in a motion event. While dispositional status information remained constant, spatiotemporal relations varied across conditions. Based on looking time data, we conclude that infants attend flexibly to both types of information. Without spatiotemporal cues, infants rely on dispositional status information. When two objects provide dispositional cues to motion origin, but only one also provides corresponding spatiotemporal information, infants attribute the motion to the object providing both types of information. Given an ambiguous motion event with two dispositional motion originators but no additional spatiotemporal cues, infants may prefer either of the two.     

Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation,Free Will,and Moral Responsibility

If someone brings about an outcome without intending to, is she causally and morally responsible for it? What if she acts intentionally, but as the result of manipulation by another agent? Previous research has shown that an agent's mental states can affect attributions of causal and moral responsibility to that agent , but little is known about what effect one agent's mental states can have on attributions to another agent. In Experiment 1, we replicate findings that manipulation lowers attributions of responsibility to manipulated agents. Experiments 2–7 isolate which features of manipulation drive this effect, a crucial issue for both philosophical debates about free will and attributions of responsibility in situations involving social influence more generally. Our results suggest that “bypassing” a manipulated agent's mental states generates the greatest reduction in responsibility, and we explain our results in terms of the effects that one agent's mental states can have on the counterfactual relations between another agent and an outcome.